THE DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

WORDS ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS

IN THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE,

POINTED OUT,

AND THE PROPER CHOICE OF THEM

DETERMINED.

Uſeful to all who would either write or ſpeak with Propriety and Elegance.

By the Rev. Dr. JOHN TRUSLER.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

THE THIRD EDITION,

WITH ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

THE PREFACE.

THE deſign of theſe volumes is to point out the delicate difference between words reputed ſynonymous; that is to ſay, the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics of ſuch words, as reſembling each other in their general idea, may nevertheleſs be diſtinguiſhable one from another by ſome additional one, peculiar to each of them.

In order to uſe words with propriety and elegance, there is a choice to be attended to. We muſt be a little nice upon words, not imagining that ſuch as are called ſynonymous, are really ſo, that is, exactly uniform in their ſenſe, and reſemble each other as perfectly as two drops of water from the ſame ſpring: for, on a cloſer examination we ſhall ſee that this reſemblance does not take in the whole extent and force of ſignification, but conſiſts only in one principal idea which they all expreſs; each word differing from the other by

ſome relative one, which conſtitutes its proper and particular character. That reſemblance which conveys one general idea makes then the words ſynonymous; and the difference that ariſes from the particular idea that accompanies the general, makes them far from being perfectly alike, diſtinguiſhing them as various ſhades of the ſame colour.

I will not abſolutely ſay that there are not occaſions on which ſo nice a choice may be diſpenſed with; but I maintain that there are ſtill more, where they ought not, or cannot paſs one for another, eſpecially in ſtudied and elaborate compoſitions. I will allow it to be a matter of indifference, in chooſing a yellow habit, whether we take the hue of the marigold or jonquil; but would we make an agreeable variety, it is neceſſary to conſult the different ſhades or tints: how ſeldom then does it happen that the mind does not find itſelf in ſimilar circumſtances? Very rare indeed! as in that conſiſts the whole art of writing.

Leſt any one, under a falſe notion that the richneſs of a language conſiſts in the plurality and abundance of words, ſhould explode this ſyſtem, relative to the diſtinction of thoſe reputed ſynonymous, I muſt ſay, that though language is enriched by an abundance of words, yet that abundance is not merely numeral, but ſuch as ſprings from d verſity, like that which is obſerved in the various productions of nature. It is the ſatisfaction of the mind, and not the tickling of the ear, which is the object of all converſation and writing; for which reaſon the quantity of words is not ſo much to be eſteemed as their quality. If they vary only from each other in their ſounds, and not in their

their greater or leſs degrees of energy, comprehenſion, preciſion, &c. they, in my opinion, ſerve more to burthen the memory, than to enrich or facilitate the art of ſpeech. To ſtand up for a number of words, without any regard to their ſenſe, is confounding abundance with ſuperfluity. Where is the great utility in having many terms to expreſs one ſingle idea? Is there not more advantage in having proper expreſſions for every idea we can form?

It will be in vain for Pleonaſm to alledge in its defence, that by this abundance we avoid the bad effects of repetition; for we are deceived with reſpect to the cauſe of that effect; it is not the repeating of the ſame ſound that offends ſo much, as the repetition of the ſame idea, as will be evident in the courſe of this work. If the ſame word diſpleaſes when uſed a ſecond time, it is not becauſe it hath already ſtruck the ear; but becauſe it hath before affected the mind, which grows weary, and is diſguſted without the graces of novelty. Hence came the eſtabliſhment of certain words we call Pronouns, the repetition of which cuſtom hath made familiar, having given them no other office than ſimply to recal the matter in queſtion, without any redundancy of words. For the ſame reaſon, what we call Articles and Prepoſitions are equally repeated without diſguſt, nothing being expected from them but a bare nomination or indication; for having nothing to determine of themſelves, they always appear new, when the ſubject they indicate is new. This is an undeniable proof that the beauty of words is more owing to their variety of meanings, than to their different articulations; and that 'tis a multiplicity

of

of ideas that produces in effect a multiplicity of terms. If any one yet doubts this, he has nothing to do but examine them a little closer, and be a little nicer in his choice; or, without giving himself the trouble of such examination, let him peruse only with attention the reflections here laid before him; for be the remarks either just or not, they will plainly shew that there are no words so perfectly synonymous as to signify exactly the same upon all occasions; consequently they admit of a particular nicety in choice. It is this choice the following sheets endeavour to determine, by definitions and examples which distinguish and disclose the proper character of these words, in which it is hoped they will in some measure succeed.

Had it been necessary, I could have supported the distinctions, here made, between words defined in this work, by going back not only to the etymology of them, but to an analyzation and decomposition of them, as I have done in the words *Purge* and *Purify*, at the end of the work, to which I refer my readers; but had I so done, it would have swelled the volumes without any real use. I trust the public will give me credit for what I have advanced: indeed the common good use of them speaks for itself.

Some part of this work is a translation from the French of the Abbé Gerard, and from that of the Abbe Roubard, at least so much as would agree with our mode of expression; the rest the reader will find to be new. Should any one imagine, because some words * which are here classed as

* See the distinction between *Fruitful* and *Fe[illegible]e*.

passing

paſſing for ſynonymous, do not immediately ſtrike the mind as ſuch; that labouring at a diſtinction was unneceſſary and uſeleſs; if he cannot recollect a paſſage where he has ſeen, or call to mind that he has at any time heard them indiſcriminately uſed, let him caſt his eye over the folio edition of Johnſon's dictionary, and he will inſtantly diſcover that theſe endeavours, though perhaps inadequate to the taſk, have not been wholly fruitleſs; and, ſhould the ſame error be remarked in the following pages which the tenor of the work condemns, it is hoped it will be attributed to the neceſſity of varying the expreſſions, in a treatiſe of this particular caſt, in order to make them agreeable to the mind. There are, it muſt be confeſſed, many more words that might have been taken under conſideration; but, on reflection that a thorough reform, even in theſe at preſent taken notice of, will go a conſiderable way towards the improvement of our tongue, the work cannot but be thought of ſervice; at leaſt it may be conſidered as the wanton ſallies of a mind greatly zealous for the beauty of its native language.

Note.—This edition is improved, by expunging ſuch diſtinctions between words, as on a more attentive examination appeared to the Author to be trifling, and by a great many reſpectable additions and amendments.

PREFACE

passing for synonymous, do not immediately strike the mind as such; that labouring at a distinction was unnecessary and useless; it has cannot recollect a passage where he has seen, or cast to mind that he has at any time heard them indiscriminately used, let him cast his eye over the collection of Johnson's dictionary, and he will instantly discover that these endeavours, though perhaps inadequate to the task, have not been wholly fruitless: and, should the same error be remarked in the following pages which the tenor of the work condemns, it is hoped it will be attributed to the necessity of varying the expressions, in a treatise of this particular cast, in order to make them agreeable to the mind. There are, it must be confessed, many more words that might have been taken under consideration; but, on reflection that a thorough reform, even in these at present taken notice of, will go a considerable way towards the improvement of our tongue, the work cannot but be thought of service: at least it may be considered as the wanton failure of a mind greatly zealous for the beauty of its native language.

Note.—This edition is improved, by expunging such distinctions between words, as on a more attentive examination appeared in the Author to be trifling, and by a great many respectable additions and amendments.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ESTEEMED SYNONIMOUS.

Sweat, Perſpiration.

BY *ſweat*, we mean ſenſible evaporation; by *perſpiration*, inſenſible.

Sweat is not only offenſive to the eye, but to the noſe; whereas, *perſpiration* is offenſive to neither.

It requires a certain degree of exerciſe, or warmth, to make us *ſweat*; whereas, we *perſpire* naturally, as in our ſleep. Indeed, *perſpiration*, though not to be ſeen in general, will, at times, become viſible; for the ſenſible vapour may be ſeen in condenſed air. A perſon, for example, going down into an ice-houſe, ſmokes.

To *Lie, Lay.*

Theſe words have certainly a very different meaning, and are ſeldom uſed one for another, but when connected with other words, ſo as to form phraſes. To ſhew the impropriety of an indiſcriminate uſe of them, it will be ſufficient to point out the diſtinction in a few inſtances.

To *lie* by, implies, to remain ſtill; to *lay* by, means, to reſerve for ſome future time.

To *lie* down, implies, to reſt or repoſe oneſelf; to *lay* down, means, to depoſit, or to advance as a propoſition.

To *lie* in, implies, to be in childbed; to *lay* in, means, to ſtore.

To *lie* with, implies, to ſleep with; to *lay* with, means, to bet with.

To *lie* under, implies, to be ſubject to; to *lay* under, means, to ſubject to.

Copper-plate, Cut, Print.

Each of theſe words denotes an impreſſion taken off from an engraving in ink, repreſenting a picture; but *copper-plate*, implies, an impreſſion from an engraving on copper; whereas, *cut*, implies, one from an engraving or cutting on wood.

Print is rather a general term, by which we underſtand an impreſſion from either wood, copper, pewter, or any other metal.

Cuts are always worked off with the letter-preſs; but *copper-plates* require to be worked alone, and that in a rolling-preſs.

Prints are now become ſo faſhionable in books, as to give great encouragement to many ingenious cutters in wood, ſo that, in a variety of figures, *cuts* are ſubſtituted in the room of *copper-plates*.

Picture, Painting.

A repreſentation, to the eye, of any thing in nature, by light and ſhade; whether it be done by the bruſh, the needle, or any other inſtrument, is what we underſtand by a *picture*; whereas, the word *painting*, implies, ſuch a repreſentation drawn in colours, by a bruſh.

Many

Many a pleaſing *picture* has been produced, where *painting* has been no where concerned. We have *pictures* in needle-work; *pictures* in marble; *pictures* in tapeſtry, &c. and performed in ſo maſterly a manner, as to reſemble, and be little inferior to the fineſt *paintings*.

Buſh, Tree.

There is certainly a manifeſt difference between the ſenſe of theſe words, as they ſtand alone, and imply each a genus; but, when compounded with other words, which expreſs a particular ſpecies, they are often uſed as ſynonimous.

Every one immediately ſees, and makes a diſtinction between a *buſh* and a *tree*; but, is the ſame diſtinction preſerved, between a gooſberry-*buſh* and a gooſeberry-*tree*; a currant-*buſh* and a currant-*tree*?

A gooſeberry-*buſh*, in my idea, implies, many ſtems from the ſame root; whereas, a gooſeberry-*tree* riſes from the ground in a ſingle ſtem, and continues thus, a foot or more in height, before it branches out.

Good-manners, Good-breeding.

Good-manners is the effect of civilization; *good-breeding*, of a polite education.

Good-breeding is of much larger extent than *good-manners*; it includes all the faſhionable accompliſhments; whereas, *good-manners* is confined to our conduct and addreſs.

Good-breeding cannot be attained by the beſt underſtandings, but by ſtudy and labour; whereas, a tolerable degree of reaſon will inſtruct us in every part of *good-manners*, without any other aſſiſtance.

Battle, Engagement.

In the uſe of theſe words, *battle* ſeems to me to be beſt applied to a fight between two armies; *engagement*, to one between two fleets.

More men fall generally in a *battle*, than in an *engagement*; becauſe a greater number are oppoſed to each other in the former, than in the latter, and the conflict uſually continues longer.

Bower, Arbour.

Theſe both imply ſhady places, under covert of trees, or branches interwoven; but a *bower* differs from an *arbour*, in that the latter is long and arched; whereas, a *bower* is either round or ſquare at the bottom, and made with a ſort of dome or cieling at the top.

Cathedral, Collegiate Church.

Both theſe terms imply, a place where choir-ſervice is performed; but, by the word, *cathedral*, is underſtood the principal church of the dioceſe; whereas, by *collegiate church*, is meant, no more than a church where there is collected a number of clerks or clergymen, &c. living together in a body, and performing their choir-ſervice.

All *cathedrals* have chapters belonging to them, and are found in moſt cities, and in all biſhopricks. *Collegiate churches* are inferior to *cathedrals*, and are eſtabliſhed elſewhere; as at Rippon, Yorkſhire; St. George's Chapel, at Windſor, &c. All *collegiate churches* have not chapters.

Every *cathedral* has a *collegiate* body; but every *collegiate church* is not a *cathedral*.

The *cathedral* is the pariſh church of the whole dioceſe, which a *collegiate church* is not.

To

To *Die, Expire.*

To *die*, implies a quitting of this world; whereas, to *expire*, implies the laſt action of life.

"She *died*," ſays Rowe, "every day ſhe lived."

The inſtant we *expire*, that very inſtant our doom is fixed; there is no repentance beyond the grave.

To *die* well, we ſhould be ſo prepared, as to be able to *expire* without a groan.

Difference, Diſtinction.

Difference reſpects the ſenſes; *diſtinction*, the underſtanding.

We ſee, we hear, we feel, we ſmell, we taſte, a *difference*; but we perceive a *diſtinction*.

We ſay, a *difference* in ſounds, in taſtes, &c. but a *diſtinction* in ideas.

Courage, Bravery, Intrepidity, Valour, Proweſs.

Each of theſe words implies, a readineſs to meet danger; but *courage* a natural one, *bravery* being rather an acquired *courage*. *Intrepidity* ſeems to riſe upon *bravery*, but carries with it an idea of raſhneſs; whereas, *valour* denotes a combination of *courage* and *bravery*, a fearleſſneſs, but with a degree of ſtudied coolneſs. *Proweſs* is beſt applied to military gallantry.

A man, though not naturally *courageous*, may, by a military education, and a nice ſenſe of honour, acquire ſuch a degree of *bravery*, as to perform feats of *valour*, which ſhall exceed all the *proweſs* of the moſt daring *intrepidity*.

Courage, as a natural quality, is frequently applied to animals. We ſay, a horſe of *courage*. *Bravery* may be the effect of example as well as education.

Many a timid man has made a *brave* ſoldier; he has advanced mechanically, glowing with the martial ſpirit of his comrades, and has ſhewn a *proweſs* equal to men of conſummate *valour*.

We ſay, a *valiant* warrior, but an *intrepid* hero.

Courage leads us cheerfully on, and is impatient to attack. *Bravery* either baniſhes fear, or ſurmounts it. *Intrepidity* encounters the greateſt perils, and dares even preſent death. True *valour* never deſpiſes the enemy, but executes its deſigns with coolneſs and deliberation. *Proweſs* glories rather more in the atchievements of its own arm, than in the combination of the force of numbers.

Cuſtom, Habit.

Cuſtom is a frequent repetition of the ſame act; *Habit*, the effect of ſuch repetition.

It is a good *cuſtom* to riſe at an early hour, being conducive to health, and, as in a little time, it will produce a *habit* of ſo doing; for if a man has been accuſtomed to wake at ſix, he will always wake at that hour, whether he has ſlept long or not.

Cuſtom, ſuppoſes an act of the will; *habit*, implies an involuntary act.

A good *cuſtom* ought never to be laid aſide; but as *habit* is a kind of ſecond nature, brought on by *cuſtom*, no bad *cuſtom* ſhould be indulged.

Cuſtom is more applicable to many; *habit*, to an individual.

So prone are men to imitation, that they will frequently follow *cuſtom*, even in ridiculous things; faſhions are a proof of this.

If the mind pays particular attention to any impreſſion, its force and diſtinctneſs is increaſed. Hence ariſes the improvement of the ear, touch, &c. This from *habit*. A blind man, for example, will hear and feel better than another.

Entertaining,

Entertaining, Diverting.

A thing may be *entertaining*, and yet not *diverting*. That which *entertains* will amuſe; but that which *diverts*, will make us laugh.

Entertaining is moſt applicable to ſilent amuſement; *diverting*, to the reverſe.

An *entertaining* man is an exceeding good companion; but we ſhould take care not to be *diverting*, at the expence of our character or good ſenſe.

Sin, Crime.

Sin may be in the thought or ſecret purpoſe of a man, of which neither a judge nor a witneſs can take notice; but a *crime* is ſuch a *ſin*, as conſiſts in action againſt a law; of which action he can be tried by a judge, and convicted or cleared by witneſſes.

Sins may be *crimes*, but all *crimes* are not *ſins*.

Giving alms to a ſtrong ſturdy beggar may be no *ſin*, becauſe, given with a principle of charity; but it may be a *crime*, if contrary to a ſtatute law. Thus men may commit *crimes* through ignorance or error, and yet not *ſin*.

Taken in the ſenſe of Divine cognizance, every *ſin* is a *crime* before God.

All *ſins* are threatened with eternal puniſhment, not ſo all *crimes*; clipping the coin of the realm, is a *crime* againſt the ſtate, and is puniſhed with death, but is not ſuch a *ſin* as endangers our future happineſs.

Wit, Humour.

Wit relates to the matter; *humour*, to the manner. Our old comedies abound with *wit*, and the players of thoſe times added conſiderably to the repre-

ſentation, by the great fund of *humour* they threw into the parts.

Humour, always excites laughter, *wit*, does not.

A fellow of *humour*, will ſet a whole company in a roar. There is ſuch a certain ſmartneſs in *wit*, that it cuts while it pleaſes.

Wit, always implies ſenſe and abilities; *humour*, does not.

Humour is chiefly reliſhed by the vulgar, whilſt intellectual excellence is requiſite to comprehend *wit*.

Occaſion, Neceſſity.

Occaſion, rather requires ſeaſonableneſs, or ſomething proper; whereas, by *neceſſity*, is underſtood indiſpenſableneſs, or ſomething obligatory.

There may be an *occaſion* for certain things, when there is no *neceſſity*.

Occaſion requires that we ſhould put on mourning at the death of a father, though there is no *neceſſity* for our ſo doing.

Thus the word, *neceſſity*, infolds in its idea that of *occaſion*; though the word, *occaſion*, does not that of *neceſſity*.

Extravagance, Profuſeneſs.

Both theſe words imply waſte, but *profuſeneſs*, a greater degree of it than *extravagance*.

Accuſtomed *extravagance* will, at laſt, lead a man on to *profuſeneſs*.

Accent, Emphaſis.

Accent is diſtinguiſhed from *emphaſis*, as the former regards the tone of the voice; the latter the ſtrength of it.

There

There are three grammatical *accents* in common uſe, the acute, the grave, and the circumflex, on which the whole ſyſtem of pronunciation turns; but as minutely as the *accents* of words have been ſtudied, the *accents* of ſentences ſeem to have been utterly overlooked.

The neceſſity of preſerving propriety of *emphaſis*, is ſo great, that the true meaning of words cannot be conveyed without it.

Maid, Virgin, Damſel.

The word, *virgin*, ſeems to riſe upon that of *maid*; *maid* implying pure in deed; *virgin*, pure in thought, word, and deed.

The purity of the Holy *Virgin*, is an example worthy of being imitated by every *maid*.

Many a *virgin*, through an unhappineſs of temper, and deformity of perſon, has died a *maid*.

Virgin, as an adjective, is uſed frequently in an allegorical ſenſe, and implies, that which is in its firſt ſtate, and perfectly unſullied; whereas, *maiden* is not. Thus we ſay, *virgin* thoughts, *virgin* ſnow, *virgin* honey.

Damſel means a young gentlewoman, and is applied to all *maids* of a ſuperior claſs of people, it not being applicable to the loweſt.

Reſidence, Dwelling.

Reſidence implies more the ſituation; *dwelling*, the habitation.

We ſay, a pretty place of *reſidence*; but a homely *dwelling*.

Preſumptuous, Preſumptive.

Theſe words have been uſed as ſynonimous; but with great inelegancy.

The *preſumptuous* nun, would claim heavenly merit.

Preſumptuous, implies an arrogant confidence; *preſumptive*, means taken by previous ſuppoſition.

I would recommend, however, the word *preſumptive*, to be uſed only in the ſenſe ſuppoſed; as, the *preſumptive* heir, in oppoſition to the heir apparent. See *Heir apparent*.

Memory, Remembrance, Recollection.

The ſoul is affected with ſenſations and ideas, the retention of which is *memory*.

We can frequently experience the ſame ſenſations and ideas which we have experienced before; the re-production of theſe ſenſations and ideas, with a ſenſe of their identity, is *remembrance*.

We can aſſemble, at will, a ſeries of paſt ideas, and of paſt ſenſations; this faculty is termed, *recollection*.

Memory is a faculty purely paſſive, as ſenſibility; but the *remembrance* of particular ſenſations, or particular ideas, is not ſimply the perceiving our ſenſations preſent and paſt, but the knowing, that the ſenſation or idea which we actually experience, to be the ſame we had experienced before.

The *memory* has the faculty of retaining things which we have been once affected with; ſenſibility, thoſe that do affect us: one is the index of things paſt, the other of things preſent: but it is the underſtanding only that has the power to perceive them, in thoſe indexes of things paſt and preſent; and to conſider, compare, and acknowledge them, if ſimply re-produced, or really new; in a word, it

is the underſtanding only which has the ſenſe of their identity.——Hence, we perceive, that *remembrance* is not a ſimple faculty, but the compound of *memory*, ſenſibility and underſtanding.

In *recollection*, likewiſe, it is not the *memory* that traces paſt ſenſations, and paſt ideas in our minds: from the little we can attend to what is paſſing within us, during the ſucceſſion of our thoughts, we may be convinced, that the underſtanding only (inceſſantly actuated with ſome ſenſation, with ſome idea,) paſſes from thoſe with which it is actually affected, to the analogous ſenſations and ideas which have already affected it, and *recollects* in the mind, things paſt by analogy. Thus, when we chuſe to *recollect* any ſenſations or ideas, we perceive them about to offer, when the mind runs over the neareſt analogies.

Though this power, to render preſent in the mind the ſenſations and ideas treaſured up in the *memory*, acts, ſometimes, without an interpoſition; it is ſometimes ſubject to the will. *Recollection* is not, therefore, a ſimple faculty, but the aggregrate of many united. In *remembrance*, *memory* is combined with the underſtanding and the will, but without theſe ſenſations. It is thus that theſe different faculties produce *remembrance* and *recollection*.

Enthuſiaſm, Superſtition.

Enthuſiaſm is a kind of exceſs in devotion; *superſtition* is the exceſs, not only of devotion, but of religion in general.

An *enthuſiaſt* in religion, is like an obſtinate clown; a *ſuperſtitious* man, like an inſipid courtier. *Enthuſiaſm* has ſomething in it of madneſs; *superſtition*, of folly.

Moſt of the ſects that fall ſhort of the Church of England, have in them ſtrong tinctures of *enthu-*

ſiaſm; as the Roman Catholic religion is one huge overgrown body of childiſh and idle *ſuperſtition*.

Nothing is ſo glorious in the eyes of mankind, and ornamental to human nature, ſetting aſide the infinite advantages which ariſe from it, as a ſtrong, ſteady, maſculine piety; but *enthuſiaſm* and *ſuperſtition* are the weakneſſes of human reaſon, that expoſe us to the ſcorn and deriſion of infidels, and ſink us even below the beaſts that periſh.

To *Improve, Amend.*

To *improve*, ſuppoſes, or not denies, that the thing is well already; but to *amend*, implies ſomething wrong.

We *improve* our virtues, but *amend* our faults.

Æra, Epoch.

In ſtrictneſs of ſpeech, *epoch* is that fixed point, where an *æra*, made uſe of, commences.

Thus, the 26th of February, 747, (abating 57 days) before the chriſtian *æra*, may be ſaid to be the *epoch* of the *æra* of Nabonaſſar. Within this *æra*, other *epochs* may be noted; as that of the death of Auguſtus; that of the death of Alexander, &c. but theſe cannot properly be called *epochs* of the *æra* of Nabonaſſar.

An *epoch*, is alſo a point fixed by chronologers; whereas, an *æra*, is a like point fixed by the popular uſage of a country or nation. We ſay, the firſt *epoch* began with the creation; the ſecond, with the deluge; &c. but we ſay, the Philippic *æra*; the *æra* of Martyrs or Diocleſian; the Perſian *æra*, &c.

Fear,

Fear, Terror, Conſternation.

Theſe words ſeem to riſe upon each other. *Fear*, acts upon the mind; *terror*, upon the ſenſes; *conſternation* upon the heart.

We *fear* things in imagination. Dreadful ſights create *terror*. A combination of horrid circumſtances will throw us often into the greateſt *conſternation*.

Fear, alarms; *terror*, ſhakes; *conſternation*, confounds.

Timid minds are often alarmed where no *fear* is. *Terror* will ſhake the very frame, and *conſternation* ſo diſorders the ſenſes, as to unman us.

Landſcape, Proſpect.

The former is expreſſive of home-ſcenes; the latter of more diſtant ones.

We ſay, a pretty *landſcape*, but an extenſive *proſpect*.

A *landſcape* ſhould contain variety enough to form a picture upon canvas.

Proſpects ſhould take in the blue diſtant hills, but never thoſe ſo remote as not to be diſtinguiſhed from clouds, at a view. See *View*, *Proſpect*.

Affection, Love.

Affection, is that attachment ariſing from natural ties, or from a continued courſe of friendſhip. *Love* is that attachment between the ſexes, implanted in us by our Creator, for mutual happineſs in a connubial ſtate.

It is *affection* that unites a man to his child or his friend; but *love* that ties him to his wife.

Love attaches us ſolely to one perſon; but we may have an *affection* for many.

It is rare to find a firſt *love* followed by a ſecond, and, I doubt, whether ever it can be ſaid, by a third; but *affection* is as frequent as attractions occur.

Diſcredit, Diſgrace.

Diſgrace riſes upon diſcredit.

Diſcredit leſſens a man in the opinion of the world; *diſgrace* ruins him.

That which turns out a *diſcredit* to a man, if continued in, will in the end *diſgrace* him.

Eſſay, Diſſertation, Treatiſe.

Theſe words, like many others, ſeem to riſe upon each other; an *eſſay*, being an attempt to amuſe or inſtruct; *diſſertation*, a more full and regular diſcourſe on any ſubject; whereas, *treatiſe* implies both method, order, and ſyſtem.

An imperfect indigeſted *eſſay*, is often better received than a prolix *diſſertation*, and leaves a greater impreſſion on the mind, than a philoſophical or ſyſtematical *treatiſe*.

Haſte, Hurry.

Both theſe denote ſpeed; *haſte*, however, carries with it an idea of care and method, whereas, *hurry* implies the reverſe.

A man of ſenſe may be in *haſte*, but he is never in a *hurry*; convinced that *hurry* is the ſureſt way to make him do what he undertakes, ill.

To be in a *hurry*, is a proof that the buſineſs we embark in confuſes us, and is too great for us; whereas, to be in *haſte*, on particular occaſions, bears no ſuch implication; but is a mark of diligence.

School,

School, Academy.

School, implies a place of diſcipline and inſtruction; *academy*, a place not intended to teach or profeſs any art or ſcience, but to improve it; it is not for novices to be inſtructed in, but for thoſe that are more knowing; for perſons of diſtinguiſhed abilities to confer in, and to communicate their lights and diſcoveries to each other, for their mutual benefit and improvement; as the royal *academy* in England, and thoſe of many other nations.

Schools begin the education, *academies* finiſh it.

Boys, who learn to read with a tone, at *ſchool*, ſeldom get the better of it, even when they are grown up. *Academies* are the nurſeries of learned men.

Tempeſt, Storm, Hurricane.

By *tempeſt*, is underſtood a very violent wind; by *ſtorm*, a commotion of the elements. *Hurricane* implies the utmoſt violence of the wind, is a *tempeſt* of but ſhort continuance, and is rather partial, running through a diſtrict in certain directions.

Tempeſts are more dreadful at ſea than *ſtorms*. *Hurricanes* are generally more deſtructive than either *ſtorms* or *tempeſts*.

We uſe the word *ſtorm*, to denote any violence of weather; but then, in order to determine what weather we mean, we are under a neceſſity of adding ſuch other words to it, as ſhall expreſs the idea we want to convey. Thus, we ſay, a *ſtorm* of wind; a *ſtorm* of hail, &c. but the word *tempeſt*, is underſtood to be neither more nor leſs than, as was ſaid before, a very violent wind: ſhould this exceſs of wind be attended with rain, thunder, and lightning, it then becomes a *ſtorm*. A *hurricane*, while it laſts, tears every thing before it.

The

The word, *tempeſt*, is uſed with moſt elegance, when we are talking of the ſea; *ſtorm*, and *hurricane*, when we are ſpeaking of the land.

Words cannot deſcribe the diſtreſſes of ſeamen, when out in *tempeſtuous* weather. *Stormy* weather, is generally ſucceeded by ſerene; but *hurricanes* are of ſuch a nature, as to ſweep every thing from the face of the earth, in their way.

Mirth, Cheerfulneſs.

Mirth I conſider as an act of the mind, *cheerfulneſs*, as a habit.

Mirth is ſhort and tranſient; *cheerfulneſs*, fixed and permanent.

Thoſe are often raiſed into the greateſt tranſports of *mirth*, who are ſubject to the greateſt depreſſions of melancholy; whereas, *cheerfulneſs*, though it does not give the mind ſuch an exquiſite gladneſs, prevents us from falling into any depths of ſorrow.

Mirth is like a flaſh of lightning that breaks through a gloom of clouds, and glitters for a moment; *cheerfulneſs*, keeps up a kind of day-light in the mind, and fills it with a ſteady and perpetual ſerenity.

Aſſurance, Impudence.

Aſſurance is the faculty of poſſeſſing a man's ſelf, or of ſaying and doing indifferent things, without any uneaſineſs or emotion of mind; whereas, *impudence* is ſhameleſſneſs or want of modeſty.

Aſſurance will make a man reſpectful; *impudence* makes him inſolent.

It is a moderate knowledge of the world, and a mind determined to do nothing againſt the rules of honour and decency, that gives *aſſurance*; but an

impudent

impudent fellow is not only ignorant of life, but loſt to all ſenſe of honour and virtue.

What we endeavour to expreſs, when we ſay a modeſt *aſſurance*, is the juſt mean between baſhfulneſs and *impudence*.

Foreſt, Chace, Park,

Are all habitations for animals of venary; but none are accounted *parks*, but ſuch as are from royal grant.

Foreſts and *chaces* lay open, *parks* are encloſed.

The *foreſt* is the moſt noble of all, being a franchiſe, and is the property of the king; if he tranſfers one to a ſubject, it becomes a free-*chace*.

If any offend in a *park* or *chace*, which are private property, he is puniſhable by the common law; but a *foreſt* hath laws of its own, and certain officers belonging to it, as foreſters, verderers, regarders, agiſters, &c. whereas, a *chace* or *park* hath only keepers and woodwards.

They differ ſomething alſo in the ſpecies of beaſts that inhabit them. The hart, the hind, the boar, the wolf, are *foreſt* beaſts; whereas, the buck, the doe, the fox, and the hare, are animals belonging to a *chace* or *park*.

One of our kings thought proper to deſtroy a number of pariſhes, in Hampſhire, in order to make a *foreſt*.

Tax, Rate, Aſſeſſment.

Taxes are government impoſts, as, the land-*tax*, window-*tax*, wheel-*tax*, &c. *Rates*, are pariſh charges, as, the church-*rate*, poor's-*rate*, &c. *Aſſeſſments*, imply chiefly, the ſums appointed by aſſeſſors to be paid, whether they be *rates* or *taxes*.

Aſſeſſments may be conſidered as the genus; *rates* and

and *taxes* as certain ſpecies of that genus: thus, every *rate* and every *tax* is an *aſſeſſment*; but *aſſeſſment* may partake of both, or either.

Aſſeſſors, in making out their *aſſeſſments*, ſhould be juſt and equitable, and not bear harder upon one inhabitant than another.

The *aſſeſſors* of the land-*tax*, are generally men of property in the county: thoſe of the church and poor-*rates*, are the churchwardens and overſeers of pariſhes.

Underſtanding, Intelligence, Knowledge.

Theſe three words ſeem to point out the extent of intellectual abilities, *underſtanding*, implies the loweſt degree, *intelligence*, a degree above, and *knowledge*, the ſuperlative.

Every man is endowed with *underſtanding*, but it requires reading and an acquaintance with the world, to become a man of *intelligence*.

Knowledge is not to be acquired but with the ſtudy of years.

We ſay, a man of tolerable *underſtanding*; of great *intelligence*; of extenſive and conſummate *knowledge*.

In a higher ſenſe, *underſtanding* may be applied to man, *intelligence* to angels, but *knowledge* is the attribute of God.

The Creator, in his univerſal *knowledge*, made the world, and filled it with various orders of beings; he formed a number of *intelligent* ſpirits that ſurround his throne and inhabit the vaſt expanſe; but man he ſeated on this penſile globe, with a variety of animals deſtined for his uſe, and gave him an *underſtanding* capable of enjoying them.

Teſtament, Will.

Both of theſe words relate to the diſpoſal of a man's property at his death; but *teſtament* is limited

to

to goods and chattels, requiring executors; whereas, *will* is confined to land, and requires no executor.

Every *teſtament*, indeed, is a *will*; but every *will* is not a *teſtament*.

An infant, at the age of fourteen, may make a *teſtament* of perſonal property, but cannot make a *will* of real property. See To *Deviſe*, &c. below.

To *Deviſe*, *Bequeath*.

Theſe verbs equally denote giving at the end of life; but *deviſe* ſeems properly applicable to land; *bequeath*, to goods.

Indeed, whether a man diſpoſe of his property after his death, by the words *deviſe* or *bequeath*, is of little conſequence, ſo long as the teſtator's intention evidently appears; but he that would uſe them with propriety, while living, will make the above diſtinction.

Where a man has nothing but perſonal property to *bequeath*, his *teſtament* requires to be ſigned only by two witneſſes; but if he *deviſes* an eſtate, it is neceſſary that his *will* ſhould be ſigned by three.

Men *bequeath* legacies as tokens of friendſhip, but they ſeldom *deviſe* property but to relations.

Biſhoprick, *Dioceſe*.

The ſenſe in which I would conſider theſe words, is that extent of country over which a biſhop hath epiſcopal juriſdiction; but *biſhoprick*, implies greater extent than that of *dioceſe*; for *biſhoprick* may extend into the *dioceſe* of another biſhop, on account of a peculiar juriſdiction which the biſhop of one *dioceſe* may have in that of another.

The archbiſhop of Canterbury hath more than one hundred peculiars or churches in the ſeveral *dioceſes* of

of London, Wincheſter, Rocheſter, Norwich, Lincoln, Oxford, and Chicheſter, where he exerciſes epiſcopal juriſdiction; of courſe, his *biſhoprick* extends into thoſe *dioceſes*.

To *Depoſe*, *Deprive*.

Depoſition, takes away an office from a man; *deprivation*, only takes from him the exerciſe of that office.

As in the caſe of a biſhop. To *depoſe* him, would be to degrade him from his order; but to *deprive* him, is merely to take from him the exerciſe of that order in ſuch a particular dioceſe, leaving him ſtill a biſhop as he was before: in ſhort, it only vacates his promotion.

The conſecration of a biſhop gives ſo indelible a character, that ſhould it ſo happen, that for ſome juſt cauſe he ſhould be *deprived* from his ſee, or ſuſpended both from the execution of his ſpiritual juriſdiction, and the profits of his biſhoprick, yet he would ſtill retain the title of a biſhop, as he cannot be *depoſed*, that is, the order cannot be abſolutely taken from him.

So, with reſpect to a crowned head. To *depoſe* a monarch, is to un-king him; but to *deprive* him of his crown, is merely to vacate the throne, and take from him the exerciſe of his regal authority.

During the commonwealth, king Charles was *deprived* of his crown, though he was not *depoſed*, he being virtually king of England, from the inſtant of his father's death. James II. alſo, was not *depoſed*, but *deprived*; and under this idea, kept his title, and was acknowledged by foreign powers as king of England whilſt he lived.

Appropriation,

Appropriation, Impropriation.

Theſe words equally denote a diviſion of the great tithes of a pariſh from the ſmall, in favour of ſome other perſon or perſons, diſtinct from him who performs the clerical duty of the church; but it is properly called an *appropriation*, when ſuch tithes are in the hands of a biſhop, a college, or religious houſe; *impropriation*, when (as Blackſtone ſays) they are improperly in the hands of a layman.

The art of *appropriation* was certainly invented by monaſtic men, as a curb and weight upon the ſecular clergy, and took place before the conqueſt; but the preciſe time when it began, is uncertain. It is, however, well known, that *impropriation* originated on the ſuppreſſion of the monaſteries, when Henry VIII. diſpoſed of the great tithes among his favourites. Hence they came into lay hands.

Animal, Brute, Beaſt.

Animal, implies every living creature, and is the genus; *brute* and *beaſt*, are ſpecies of that genus.

Brutes and *beaſts* are *animals* diſtinguiſhed from birds, inſects, fiſhes, and man; but *brutes*, imply rather domeſtic *animals*; *beaſts*, ſuch as are wild.

We ſay, the *brutes* of the field, the *beaſts* of the foreſt.

Man is an *animal* endowed with reaſon, given him for the purpoſes of ſociety; if he uſes it not, he puts himſelf on a level with *brutes*, and may in time become as ſavage as a *beaſt* of prey.

Exiſtence, Duration.

Exiſtence, implies being; *duration*, the continuance of that being, or, in other words, *exiſtence* is the time or term of production; *duration*, the time of preſervation

preſervation. Whatever gives birth, gives *exiſtence*; whatever preſerves that *exiſtence* gives it *duration*: thus, *duration* follows the *exiſtence* of a thing, as neceſſarily as *exiſtence* follows eſſence.

A ſtudious man will give *exiſtence* to a variety of ideas, which ſhall have little or no *duration*, but ſhall be dropped almoſt as ſoon as taken up.

We owe our *exiſtence* to God, and our *duration* on earth to his favour only.

If theſe words are ever uſed to expreſs the ſame ſenſe, it will be the beſt to apply the word *exiſtence* to animate beings, *duration* to inanimate.

It requires care to preſerve our *exiſtence*; without it, we ſhould expire almoſt as ſoon as we begin to breathe.—Stone buildings are of longer *duration* than ſuch as are built of brick.

Clearly, Diſtinctly.

It is with reſpect to viſion that I would make my obſervations on theſe words, which are very generally confounded by writers on optics.

We ſee an object *clearly*, whenever it is ſufficiently illuminated to enable us to form a general idea of its figure; but we ſee it not *diſtinctly*, till it be ſo near that we can recognize all its parts. When we view a diſtant tower, we ſee it *clearly*, as ſoon as we perceive it to be a tower; but we ſee it not *diſtinctly*, 'till we approach it ſo near as to be able to determine, not only on its general dimenſions, but to diſtinguiſh the parts of which it is compoſed, as the order of architecture, the materials, the windows, &c. we may, therefore, ſee an object *clearly*, without ſeeing it *diſtinctly*; and we may ſee it *diſtinctly*, without ſeeing it *clearly*; becauſe, a *diſtinct* viſion implies a ſucceſſive diſcrimination of the different parts of objects.

Old

Old men ſee *clearly*, but not *diſtinctly*; they perceive large or luminous objects at a diſtance, but they are unable to diſtinguiſh ſmall objects, as the characters of a book, without their being magnified by convex glaſſes. Short-ſighted perſons, on the contrary, ſee ſmall objects *diſtinctly*; but they have no *clear* viſion of large objects, unleſs they are diminiſhed by concave glaſſes.

A great quantity of light is neceſſary for *clear* viſion, and a ſmall quantity for *diſtinct* viſion. Hence, ſhort-ſighted people ſee better in the night than other men.

To *Abandon*, *Forſake*, *Leave*, *Relinquiſh*, *Deſert*, *Quit*.

The words *abandon* and *leave*, imply involuntary acts; the words *forſake*, *relinquiſh*, and *deſert*, thoſe that are voluntary.

To *abandon*, is more applicable to things; *leave*, to perſons. He was under a neceſſity of *abandoning* his poſſeſſions, and compelled to leave his friends.

To *forſake*, implies leaving in reſentment or diſlike; to *relinquiſh*, quitting any claim to; to *deſert*, leaving meanly or treacherouſly.

Being treated with diſreſpect, we are apt to *forſake* even the perſon whoſe cauſe we were ſtudious to eſpouſe. Every honeſt man, finding his plea not backed by juſtice, would readily *relinquiſh* his claim, and even make his competitor a recompence, adequate to the expence and trouble he had put him to. It is an act of the greateſt baſeneſs, to *deſert* one's friend in time of diſtreſs.

To *quit*, implies the breaking off from; and may be either voluntary or involuntary.

When he had acquired, by trade, ſufficient to ſupport himſelf for the remainder of his life, he prudently

prudently *quitted* his buſineſs. Being overpowered by ſuperior ſtrength, he was obliged to *quit* his hold.

We ſhould by no means *abandon*, while we can keep poſſeſſion; nor *leave*, while we are able to ſtay; we ſhould not *forſake*, without ſufficient reaſon; nor are we bound to *relinquiſh*, but when our title is bad; no colour of excuſe can be alledged for *deſertion*; nor ſhould we ever *quit*, with a view of laying hold again.

To *Abdicate, Renounce, Reſign.*

To *abdicate*, is an involuntary act; *renounce* and *resign*, are voluntary.

Abdicate, more particularly relates to a throne; *renounce*, to matters of religion; *resign*, to employments.

King James the ſecond *abdicated* the throne of England, when he could keep poſſeſſion of it no longer. Many perſons, through conviction of mind, have formerly *renounced* the errors of the church of Rome. We frequently *resign* our employments, through a deſire of retirement.

To *abdicate* a crown, is ever looked upon as diſgraceful; to *renounce* a religion, as honourable, when done through the prevalence of truth; and to *resign* an office, as noble, when generouſly given up in favour of another, and with the approbation of the perſon we ſerve.

To *Abate, Diminiſh, Decreaſe, Leſſen.*

Theſe words are nearly ſynonomous, when they are verbs neuter; they then mean to grow leſs: as verbs active, they are very different. Even as neuters, they will carry ſome difference in their meaning.

To

To *abate*, implies a decreaſe in action; *diminiſh*, a waſte in ſubſtance; *decreaſe*, a decay in moral virtue; *leſſen*, a contraction of parts.

Want of ſpirits, when a man is running, will *abate* his ardour, and conſequently his pace. Febrifuges, if properly applied, will *abate* a fever. Put ſugar into water, and it will *diminiſh* viſibly. An object, ſeemingly *diminiſhes* in proportion to the diſtance from which we view it.

Through a contempt of religion, men daily *decreaſe* in virtue. A *decreaſe* in piety, is uſually accompanied with falſe notions of God. Draw the air from a blown-up bladder, and it *leſſens* proportionably.

As verbs active; to *abate*, more particularly implies to lower in the price of; *diminiſh*, to make leſs by abſciſion or deſtruction, either with reſpect to bulk, value, quality or quantity; *leſſen*, to a voluntary act of degradation.

Shop-keepers generally aſk their cuſtomers an advanced price for goods, that they may be enabled to *abate*, if deſired.

By dividing of ſubſtance, we *diminiſh* its bulk; by breaking a diamond, we *diminiſh* its value; by mixing water with ſpirits, we *diminiſh* the quality; and by taking one yard from ten, we *diminiſh* the quantity.

A mean action always *leſſens* us in the ſight of good men; and whatever falſe notions vanity may inculcate, we ever ſeem *leſs*, when we ſtrive to appear greater.

To *Abhor*, *Hate*, *Loath*, *Deteſt*.

All theſe words imply averſion, but require to be differently uſed upon different occaſions.

To *abhor*, implies an averſion to that to which we have a natural antipathy; *hate*, an averſion, ac-

tuated by revenge; *loath*, is more applicable to food; *deteſt*, implies averſion, actuated by diſapprobation.

We *abhor* what we cannot endure. We are apt to *hate* the perſon who injures us. We *loath* the food by which we have been ſurfeited. We *deteſt* the man who is guilty of a mean action.

The ſpendthrift naturally *abhors* niggardlineſs, and the niggard, profligacy. The *hatred* of the revengeful man is rouſed, whenever the object of his revenge approaches. The ſtomach *loaths* the very ſight of that meat by which we have been ſatiated. Every thinking man *deteſts* the leaſt degree of meanneſs, more particularly that which is ſordid or baſe.

Abject, Low, Mean, Beggarly.

As the words *abject* and *low* are indiſcriminately uſed, when meant to ſignify a perſon's ſtate or condition, ſo are the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when we would expreſs the diſpoſition; but the impropriety of ſo doing is very evident.

By *abject*, is underſtood that forlorn ſituation in life, that a man brings himſelf into by ill conduct; by *low*, that in which Providence has placed him: the firſt is voluntary, the latter involuntary.

Divine Wiſdom hath thought proper, for many reaſons, to make diſtinctions between men, placing ſome in a higher ſphere, others in a *lower*,; but never was he the cauſe of any one's *abjectneſs*. Want of merit or fortune, often renders a man *low*, but it muſt be a villainous character to make him *abject*.

With reſpect to the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when meant to expreſs the diſpoſition, the abſurdity of uſing them, one for the other, is equally viſible.

Mean, ſignifies a man's readineſs to perform a dirty or illicit action; whereas *beggarly*, is more particularly expreſſive of a narrow groveling ſpirit.

He

He who can ſtoop to be guilty of a *meanneſs*, merits the contempt of all who know him. It has ever been accounted *beggarly*, to live below the rank of life we are in.

When a man is brought into a ſtate of penury and contempt, by a long courſe of infamy, we juſtly call him *abject*; if his narrow circumſtances are only owing to the poverty of his parents, we then repute him *low*; when guilty of any thing beneath the character of an honeſt man, or a gentleman, we account him *mean*; and, when the treaſures of the rich are ſullied by the narrow notions of the poor, we call it *beggarly*.

To *Aboliſh*, *Abrogate*, *Diſannul*, *Repeal*, *Revoke*.

Aboliſh, is a term rather to be uſed with reſpect to cuſtoms; *abrogate* and *repeal*, with regard to laws; *diſannul* and *revoke*, to private contracts.

When old cuſtoms have been, by long experience, found to be detrimental, they have very prudently been *aboliſhed*. New faſhions *aboliſh* old ones.

The word, *abrogate*, is generally uſed with reſpect to ancient laws; *repeal*, to modern: that is, when we talk of rendering old laws null, we call it *abrogating*; when thoſe lately made, *repealing*.

Deſpotic power has frequently *abrogated* what was inſtituted in equity. Upon the enaction of a new law, many inconveniences have ſometimes appeared, before unthought of; this has occaſioned a *repeal*.

The *abrogation* of a fundamental law, frequently cauſes the ruin of the ſovereign, or of the people; and ſometimes of both. The legiſlative power has often found itſelf obliged to *repeal* an act of parliament, one ſeſſions, which paſſed the laſt; merely to appeaſe the clamours of the people.

The difference in meaning, between the words, *diſannul* and *revoke*, is not very great; yet ſuch as to admit of a diſtinction.

Diſannul is applied to a written contract; *revoke*, to a verbal.

He who gives a conditional bond to another, has a right to *diſannul* it, if the ſpecified conditions are not punctually obſerved. To *revoke* a promiſe, now a-days, is no other than faſhionable; whereas formerly, it was conſidered as a breach of friendſhip.

On, Upon.

Theſe two words are indiſcriminately uſed one for another on all occaſions, but with great impropriety.

On, rather ſignifies by; as, *on* my word; *on* my honour, &c. whereas, *upon* means up, on the top of, and is applied to matter; as, *upon* the table; *upon* the chair; *upon* the houſe, &c.

The abſurdity of a contrary diction is evident, from the following change of words: it was his honour *upon* which he ſwore.

Indeed, the word, *upon*, is uſed with elegance, even detached from ſubſtance, when the ſenſe is figurative; as for inſtance, he relied *upon* the promiſe of his friend; intimating, that ſuch promiſe was the ſtaff *upon* which he leaned: but on other occaſions the impropriety is groſs.

To *Finiſh, Complete, End, Conclude.*

With reſpect to the firſt three words, the proper ideas of *finiſhing* is the bringing a thing to its laſt period: the *completion* of any thing, is the actual arrival of that laſt period; and the characteriſtic of *ending*, is ceſſation, or diſcontinuation.

Lazy

Lazy people begin many things without *finiſhing* any. We ever feel a ſecret ſatisfaction in the *completion* of a work we have been long about. May we not queſtion the wiſdom of thoſe laws, which, inſtead of *ending* ſuits, do but ſerve to prolong them?

By the word *conclude* we underſtand, performing the laſt act of ratiocination; widely differing from *complete*. We *complete* a piece of mechaniſm, but *conclude* an oration.

A piece of clock-work is of little value till *completed*. It is allowed by all rhetoricians, that the greateſt ornament of an harangue, is a well finiſhed *conclusion*.

We *finiſh* what we have begun, by continuing to work at it. We *complete* a work, by putting the laſt hand to it. We *end* it, by diſcontinuation. Thus we may *finiſh* without *ending*, and *end* without *completing*.

Act, Action, Deed.

Cuſtom having applied the word, *deed*, chiefly to ſignify the written evidence of any legal act, it will be neceſſary only to ſhew the difference between the words *action* and *act*.

The word *action* then, is applicable indifferently to every thing we do, whether common or extraordinary; but the word, *act*, ſhould ſignify ſomething done, which is remarkable.

An elegant ſpeaker will not ſay, a *virtuous act*, a *good or a vicious act*; but an *act of virtue*; or *of goodneſs*, or *of iniquity*: whereas, to ſay, a *virtuous action*, or *a good* or *vicious action*, is proper and elegant.

'Tis, generally ſpeaking, a good *action* to conceal the faults of our neighbours; and it is the rareſt *act* of charity among mankind.

The ſentiments of the heart are not ſo much to be judged of from words as from *actions*. It is an *act* of great heroiſm to pardon our enemies, when we have power to be revenged on them.

Theſe two words are further diſtinguiſhable by our conſidering them ſomewhat phyſically. The word *action*, in this light, relates more to the power that acts; and the word *act* is more applicable to the effect itſelf, produced by that power; this makes the one, probably, the attribute of the other; ſo that it may be juſtly ſaid, we ſhould always have a preſence of mind attendant upon our *actions*, to render all of them either *acts* of bounty, or *acts* of juſtice.

To *Enlarge*, *Increaſe*.

The word *enlarge* is properly uſed to ſignify an addition of extent. *Increaſe* is critically applicable only to number, height and quantity.

We *enlarge* a town, a field, a garden. We *increaſe* the inhabitants of a town, our expences, our revenues.

The former word is more ſuitable to one entire and vaſt quantity of ſpace; the latter, to any groſs and multiplied quantity in general. Thus it is commonly ſaid, that we have *enlarged* our houſe, when we have made made it more extenſive, by adding buildings to the ſides of it: but we uſually ſay, a houſe is *increaſed* with an additional ſtory, or with ſeveral new rooms.

By *enlarging* our territory, we generally *increaſe* our riches. Princes certainly *enlarge* their renown, by widening the bounds of their dominions; and they are apt to think, they at the ſame time *increaſe* their power: but in this they are ſometimes miſtaken; for ſuch an *enlargement* may chance to produce only an *increaſe* of cares and troubles, which may end in their utter ruin.

A king

A king who labours more after acquiring new ſubjects than in governing thoſe he already has, may *enlarge* his fame; but will never *increaſe* his happineſs.

Addreſs, Air, Mien, Behaviour, Manners, Deportment, Carriage.

What is called our *air*, *mien* and *carriage* ſeem to be born with us, and ſtrike at firſt ſight: our *addreſs*, *manners*, *behaviour* and *deportment* are owing to education; and gradually diſcloſe themſelves in our intercourſe with the world.

Mien rather relates to our look; *carriage* to our frame; but the word *air*, to both. We uſually judge of the *mien*, by the face; the *carriage* by the perſon; and the *air*, by both.

How ſweet is the *mien* that has good humour in the countenance! A gentleman, though in rags, is eaſily diſcovered by his graceful *carriage*. An open countenance and majeſty of perſon, gives a man the moſt engaging *air* imaginable.

Addreſs is confined to our words; *deportment*, to our actions; *behaviour* ariſes from both; and the fruit of *behaviour* is *manners*.

Our *addreſs* ſhall often pleaſe, when our *deportment* ſhall diſguſt, and VICE VERSA.

When our *addreſs* is engaging, and our *deportment* conformable, 'tis impoſſible our *behaviour* ſhould be otherwiſe.

In order to be well with the world, we ſhould ſuit our *behaviour* to our company; which, though in the eye of ſome perſons, has been conſidered as deceitful, muſt in the end be looked upon as the height of good *manners*.

An engaging *air*, which is the union of a charming *mien* and graceful *carriage*, is neceſſary to make any thing pleaſe; but unleſs accompanied with good *manners*, ariſing from a genteel *addreſs* and *deportment*, it becomes perfectly diſguſtful.

To *Accoſt*, *Approach*.

We *accoſt* thoſe with whom we would ſpeak; but often *approach*, without any intention to *addreſs*.

The bold can *accoſt*, without the leaſt heſitation. We cannot *approach* the great, without ſome kind of ceremony.

When we have any thing to ſay to a perſon, we naturally *accoſt* him; when we would inſinuate ourſelves into his good graces, we endeavour to *approach* him.

Education teaches us to *accoſt* the ladies with civility; but to *approach* them, requires ſome kind of aſſurance, ſeaſoned with reſpect.

To *Add*, *Augment*.

By *adding* one thing to another, we *augment* the ſame. By the word *adding*, we underſtand the joining of different things together; or, if they are things of the ſame kind, joining them in ſuch a manner as not to confound them, but that after ſuch junction, each may be diſtinguiſhed from the other: whereas the word *augment*, indicates our making a thing larger, or more abundant, by ſuch an addition as ſhall cauſe it afterwards to appear one and the ſame thing; or at leaſt, that when the addition is made, the whole together ſhall be conceived under one idea; thus, for example, we *add* one baſket of rubbiſh to another; one room to another; but we *augment* the heap, and the houſe.

There are many who would not ſcruple to *augment* their own ſtock, by fraudulently *adding* to it that of another.

To *add* is a verb active only; *augment*, both active and neuter.

Our ambition *augments* with our fortune; and we are no ſooner in poſſeſſion of one hundred pounds, than we are eager to *add* to it another.

Ingenuity,

Ingenuity, Cleverneſs, Abilities, Parts.

Ingenuity relates more to the invention of things; *cleverneſs*, to the manner of executing them; *ability*, to the actual execution of them; and *parts*, to the diſcernment. The third, then, puts in uſe what the ſecond dictates, purſuant to the digeſted plan of the fourth, invented by the firſt.

A man may be *ingenious* and not *clever*; he may be *clever*, without *abilities* to execute; and he may have great *abilities*, and yet not be a man of *parts*.

Admitting we are not very *ingenious*, ſtill, if we are accuſtomed to the management of things, we may be *clever*; but it requires *abilities* to do with them as we would; and *parts*, to conduct them.

He who diſcovered the powers of refraction and reflection, had he known nothing more, would have been *ingenious*: he who conſtructed the teleſcope, was *clever*; the finiſher was a man of *abilities*; and without doubt, the philoſopher, he who applies the inſtrument to the various purpoſes of aſtronomy, muſt be a man of *parts*.

To *Study, Learn.*

To *ſtudy*, implies a uniform application, in ſearch of knowledge; to *learn*, implies that application with ſucceſs.

We *ſtudy* to *learn*: and *learn* by dint of *ſtudy*.

People of vivacity *learn* eaſily; but are heavy at *ſtudy*.

We can *ſtudy* but one thing at a time, but we may *learn* many.

The more we *learn* the more we know; but oftentimes, the more we *ſtudy*, the leſs we know.

We have *ſtudied* well, when we have *learned* to doubt.

There are many things we *learn* without *ſtudy*: and other things we *ſtudy* without *learning*.

Thoſe are not the wiſeſt who have *ſtudied* moſt; but thoſe who have *learnt* moſt.

We ſee ſome perſons *ſtudying* continually, without *learning* any thing; and others, *learning* almoſt every thing, without the leaſt *ſtudy*.

The time of our youth is the time of *ſtudy*; but it is in a more advanced age, when we truly can be ſaid to *learn*; it is then only, we have capacity to digeſt, what we have before laid up in the memory.

Buttreſs, Support, Prop.

The *Buttreſs* fortifies; it is fixed cloſe to reſiſt the impulſion of other bodies: the *ſupport* bears, by being placed beneath a thing to prevent its falling under a weight: the *prop* aſſiſts, and its general uſe is to ſtrengthen.

A wall is frequently made ſtronger by *buttreſſes*: an arch is *ſupported* by columns: a houſe, when in danger of falling, is kept up by *props*.

That which has received a violent thruſt, or is much bulged, ſtands in need of a *buttreſs*; that which is too heavy to carry itſelf, is in want of *ſupporters*; and that which ought to ſtand upright, and cannot be made to do ſo of itſelf, muſt be *propped*.

In a figurative ſenſe, *buttreſs* relates more to defence; *ſupport*, to credit; and *prop*, to friendſhip.

The true Chriſtian ſeeks no *buttreſs* againſt the malignity of men, but that of innocence and integrity; he makes work the moſt ſolid *ſupport* of his life; and looks upon implicit obedience to the decree of Heaven, as the moſt ſteady *prop* of his felicity.

Enough, Sufficient.

The object of both theſe words is quantity; but with this difference, that *enough* relates more to the quantity one deſires to have, and *ſufficient* to that quantity one really wants to employ.

Thus

Thus, the avaricious man never has *enough*; let him accumulate ever ſo much, he ſtill deſires more; and the prodigal never *ſufficient*, he ſtill wanting to expend more than he has.

We ſay we have *enough*, when we wiſh not for more; and we ſay we have *ſufficient*, when we have juſt what is neceſſary.

When applied to ſuch things as are conſumable, the word *enough*, ſeems to denote a much greater quantity than the word *ſufficient*; for, in relation to ſuch things, when we ſay we have *enough*, it ſeems, as though we ſhould have too much, had we more: but what we call *ſufficient*, may be added to, without coming near, that extreme: for we may ſay of a very ſmall income or revenue, that it is *ſufficient*; though at the ſame time we can hardly think it *enough*.

The word *enough*, has a more general and comprehenſive meaning; the word *ſufficient*, a more limited and particular one.

An hour at table is certainly *ſufficient* for our nouriſhment; but not *enough* for ſome perſons' pleaſure or ſatisfaction.

An œconomiſt can find *enough*, where there is very little; but the prodigal never has *ſufficient*, let him have ever ſo much.

To *Declare*, *Affirm*, *Proteſt*, *Aver*, *Aſſert*, *Maintain*, *Swear*, *Avouch*, *Atteſt*.

In the firſt ſeven words, we find different degrees of declaration. To *declare*, ſignifies to tell any thing ſimply, but ſeriouſly; to *affirm*, means to ſay confidently; to *proteſt*, implies a ſolemn affirmation; to *aver*, ſignifies a poſitive declaration; to *aſſert*, that declaration defended; to *maintain*, implies a ſupport of ſuch aſſertion; to *ſwear*, is to ratify it by an oath.

When we give our opinion, on being ſeriouſly aſked, we are ſaid to *declare* it: when we would give that declaration more force, we *affirm* it; and to ſtrengthen that affirmation, we *proteſt* it ſolemnly; that is, we *affirm* it by invoking the Deity.

Note. The other words are ſufficiently explained above.

If ever we wiſh to gain credit in the world, whatever we *declare* ſhould be backed by truth. True politeneſs forbids our *affirming* any thing, unleſs required by the obligations of juſtice. To make frequent uſe of *proteſtations*, betrays a ſuſpicion, that our bare word is not to be believed. Always to *aver*, hath an appearance of dogmatiſing, and ſhews us ignorant of that proper degree of diffidence, which ever accompanies wiſdom. Some perſons are ſo ready to *aſſert*, that let the matter be right or wrong, 'tis equally the ſame. When our opinions are juſt and well-grounded, we have an undoubted right to *maintain* them. *Swearing*, was firſt inſtituted in courts of judicature, as a conſcientious teſtimony of truth.

The words, *avouch* and *atteſt*, though often uſed as ſynonimous with the foregoing, have a very different ſignification. The word *avouch*, implies an aſſertion in defence of another; *atteſt*, a bearing witneſs to what another has juſt before ſaid.

When the reputation of an honeſt man has been undeſervedly hurt, 'tis the part of a friend to *avouch* his good character.

Too much care to *atteſt* all that is advanced, renders our converſation tireſome.

There is another verb, *warrant*, which has ſome affinity to the word *maintain*; but as cuſtom has made the uſe of it vulgar, it is unneceſſary to take any further notice of it.

Arms, Weapons.

By *arms*, we underſtand thoſe inſtruments of offence generally made uſe of in war; ſuch as fire-arms, ſwords, &c. By *weapons*, we more particularly mean inſtruments of other kinds (excluſive of fire-arms), made uſe of as offenſive, on ſpecial occaſions.

In the ſtate of Switzerland, all men are obliged to learn the uſe of *arms* in their youth, that, in caſes of extremity, they may be capable of defending themſelves againſt the attacks of their enemies.

In times of inſurrection, people make uſe of ſuch *weapons* as they can get.

Attractions, Allurements, Charms.

Beſides the general idea which makes theſe three words appear ſynonimous, it is likewiſe their common fate, ſcarce ever to be uſed in the ſingular number; at leaſt in thoſe ſenſes in which they are here conſidered; that is, whenever they are uſed to ſignify the power of beauty, of agreeableneſs, or of any thing which pleaſes.

With reſpect to their different meaning, it appears to me, that *attractions* mean ſomething natural; *allurements*, ſomewhat rather artificial; and *charms*, ſomewhat ſtronger and more uncommon than either.

Attractions may be ſaid to engage us; *allurements*, to entice us; *charms*, to ſeduce us.

The heart of man can ſcarce ſtand againſt the *attractions* of a pretty woman: It is with difficulty he can defend himſelf againſt the *allurements* of a coquette; but to reſiſt the *charms* of a ſweet-tempered beauty is impoſſible.

Ladies always owe their *attractions* and their *charms*, to the happy formation of their features and perſons;

perſons; but they ſometimes procure their *allurements* at their toilettes.

I know not whether I may fall in with the taſte of mankind; but, in my opinion, *attractions* riſe from thoſe ordinary graces which nature has beſtowed upon the women, with more or leſs liberality, and which are the common appendages of the ſex; *allurements*, from thoſe cultivated graces which form a faithful mirrour of the natural, and are ſtudied merely with a deſire to pleaſe; *charms*, from thoſe ſingular graces which nature ſometimes beſtows as a moſt valuable gift, and which are moſt particular and perſonal.

Defects not ſeen at firſt, but afterwards obſerved, leſſen *attractions* greatly. *Allurements* vaniſh as ſoon as the artifice appears. *Charms* loſe their force, when time and cuſtom hath rendered them familiar.

Theſe words are not in uſe only with regard to beauty and the graces of the ſex, but with reſpect to every thing that pleaſes. In this caſe, *attractions* and *charms* are applied only to ſuch things as are amiable in themſelves; whereas the word, *allurements*, is ſometimes applied to ſuch things as are even in themſelves odious; but which we love nevertheleſs.

Virtue has *attractions* which the moſt vicious of men cannot avoid being ſenſible of. The riches of the world are *allurements*, which never fail to captivate, in ſpite of their ill tendency. Pleaſure has ſuch *charms*, that it is hunted after by every one, as well by the philoſopher as the libertine.

We ſay, great *attractions*; powerful *allurements*; and invincible *charms*.

Honour *attracts*; fortune *allures*; but the *charms* of glory are invincible.

Miſerly,

Miſerly, Niggardly, Covetous, Avaricious.

The word, *miſerly*, ſignifies, rather a parſimonious diſpoſition, or a depriving ourſelves of the neceſſaries of life, merely to hoard the riches we poſſeſs. By *niggardly*, we underſtand, that ſordid temper that does things by halves. *Covetous*, implies an eager craving for the poſſeſſions of another. By *avaricious*, we mean that inordinate thirſt of gain, that makes a man graſp at every thing he ſees. Taking the words in theſe ſenſes, which are undoubtedly the proper ones, we may be *covetous*, and not *avaricious*; *niggardly*, and not *miſerly*.

He who never gives any thing away, is juſtly called *miſerly*; he who fails to beſtow when neceſſary, or when he beſtows gives too little, draws on himſelf the epithet of *niggardly*; he who longs for the goods of another, is *covetous*; and he who graſps at wealth by all means whatever, is *avaricious*.

Of all extraordinary beings, there is no greater one than the *miſer* who puniſhes himſelf, and ſtarves in the midſt of plenty.

The *miſer* is laughed at, but the *niggard* is deſpiſed.

The contented man is at quiet within himſelf; but the *covetous* is ever on the rack: he eagerly wiſhes for what another poſſeſſes, and his inability of obtaining it, is his continual torment.

It is neceſſary to be ever watchful of an *avaricious* man, for his diſpoſition leads him to take every opportunity of defrauding you.

Acknowledgment, Confeſſion.

Acknowledgment ſuppoſes a queſtion aſked; whereas, *confeſſion* ſavours a little of ſelf-accuſation.

We *acknowledge* what we had an inclination to conceal:

conceal: We *confeſs* that which we were blameable in doing.

It is interrogation which cauſes *acknowledgment*; repentance, *confeſſion*.

It is better to make a ſincere *acknowledgment*, than a bad excuſe.

We ſhould not *confeſs* to all ſorts of people.

An *acknowledgment* unaſked, is either noble or fooliſh, according to the circumſtances and effect it produces.

Confeſſion, unaccompanied with repentance, is an inſult to the Deity.

It would be want of ſpirit to *acknowledge* a fault, without a certainty that ſuch *acknowledgment* would be ſatisfactory; and it would be fooliſh to make *confeſſion*, without hopes of pardon; for why ſhould we declare ourſelves culpable to thoſe who breathe nothing but vengeance?

Admonition, Advice, Counſel.

The end of *admonition* is gentle reproof. *Advice* and *counſel*, are to convey inſtructions; but with this difference, that *advice* implies no ſuperiority with reſpect either to rank or parts in the perſon who gives it; whereas, *counſel* generally carries with it one, if not both.

Admonition in a maſter, frequently has a greater effect than correction.

People are readier to give *advice* than to take it.

Parents ſhould take care to *counſel* their children, before they turn them out into the world.

Admonition ſhould be given with temper; *advice*, with ſincerity; and *counſel*, with art and modeſty.

Admoniſh a friend in private, but reward him openly.

Nothing is more ſalutary than good *advice*, and yet nothing is more nauſeous to take.

When

When *counſel* is given with an air of impertinence, it is ſure to make the *counſel* deſpiſed, and the counſellor odious.

To *Have*, *Poſſeſs*.

In order to *have* a thing, it is not neceſſary to have the power of diſpoſal of it, or to have it actually in our hands; it is ſufficient that it belongs to us: but to *poſſeſs* it, it muſt be in our hands, and we have the liberty of diſpoſing of it whenever we think proper.

Thus we *have* an eſtate, notwithſtanding it is mortgaged for the benefit of our creditors; but, as to riches, we *poſſeſs* them.

We are not always maſters of what we *have*; we are, of what we *poſſeſs*.

A married man *has* continual torment, when the Demon of Jealouſy *poſſeſſes* him.

We *have* often but the half of things, partaking them with others; we *poſſeſs* them when they are entirely our own.

Thoſe who *have* only the knowledge of arts, follow their rules; but thoſe who *poſſeſs* them, lay down their rules to follow.

Battle, *Combat*, *Fight*.

Battle is an action more general, and commonly preceded by ſome preparation. *Combat* ſeems to be an action more particular, and often unexpected. *Fight* may be either one or the other, and is ſeldom uſed in the plural.

Thus, the *fight* between the Carthaginians and the Romans; and that at Pharſalia, between Cæſar and Pompey, were *battles*: but thoſe in which the Horatii and the Curatii decided the fate of Rome, were *combats*.

Handſome,

Handſome, Pretty, Beautiful.

It is the fate of theſe words, when applied to the female ſex, to be uſed indiſcriminately one for the other; and yet at the ſame time, no three words can be more different.

By a *handſome* woman, we underſtand one that is tall, graceful, and well-ſhaped, with a regular diſpoſition of features; by a *pretty*, we mean one that is delicately made, and whoſe features are ſo formed as to pleaſe: by a *beautiful*, a union of both.

A lady may be *handſome* and not *pretty*; *pretty* and not *handſome*: but to be *beautiful*, ſhe muſt be both *pretty* and *handſome*.

Many a *handſome* woman has a forbidding countenance.

It has been the misfortune of many a *pretty* woman to be crooked.

A *beautiful* woman is now-a-days very rare to be met with.

Prettineſs carries an idea of ſimplicity; *handſomeneſs*, of nobility; *beauty*, of majeſty.

The ladies in romances, are deſcribed, as either *beautiful* or *handſome*; the ſhepherdeſſes, by the poets, are repreſented as *pretty*; ſo in other things, we ſay, a *beautiful* palace; a *handſome* houſe; a *pretty* cottage.

A *beautiful* woman is an object of curioſity; a *handſome* woman, of admiration; and a *pretty* one, of love.

When applied to other things, *beautiful* relates to ſomething more ſerious and engaging; *pretty*, to ſomewhat more gay and diverting: this is the reaſon why we ſay, a *beautiful* tragedy; but a *pretty* comedy.

Benignity, Benevolence, Kindneſs, Tenderneſs, Humanity.

Benignity, is a ſort of kind condeſcenſion, and an attribute of princes only. *Benevolence*, a wiſhing well to mankind, and ſeems relative to thoſe who have more particularly the power of doing good. *Kindneſs* is the ſame diſpoſition among equals. *Tenderneſs* is a ſuſceptibility of impreſſion, and more applicable to perſons nearly connected. *Humanity*, denotes a fellow-feeling for the diſtreſſes, even of a ſtranger.

Benignity, *benevolence*, and *kindneſs*, ſpring from the will; *tenderneſs*, and *humanity*, from the heart.

The *benignity* of a prince, makes him univerſally beloved by his ſubjects.

Benevolence is a ſhining character, and is more conſpicuous for the charitable actions it produces.

Kindneſs is what one man naturally expects from another, and what we are reciprocally bound to impart.

The *tenderneſs* of a parent, has often been the ruin of a child.

The diſtreſſes of individuals will often draw tears from a perſon truly *humane*.

From the very inſtant of our birth, we experience the *benignity* of Heaven, and malignity of corrupt nature.

The realized *benevolence* of ſome good men, have almoſt made them worſhipped by their fellow-creatures.

Kindneſſes are in the power of every one to ſhew; therefore, he that withholds them, ſavours more of the brute than of the man.

The great *tenderneſs* of animals to their young, is a ſtanding reproof to the many unfeeling mothers.

True *humanity* conſiſts, in not treating with rigour, but excuſing the weakneſſes, ſupplying the defects,

defects, aſſuaging the pains, and comforting the afflictions of our neighbour.

Poverty, Indigence, Want, Need, Neceſſity.

Poverty is that ſituation of fortune, oppoſed to riches, in which we are deprived of the conveniences of life.

Indigence is a degree lower; we there want the neceſſaries; and is oppoſed to ſuperfluity.

Want ſeems rather to arrive by accident, implies a ſcarcity of proviſions, rather than a lack of money, and is oppoſed to abundance.

Need and *neceſſity* relate leſs to the ſituation of life than the other three words, but more to the relief we expect, or the remedy we ſeek; with this difference between the two, that *need* ſeems leſs preſſing than *neceſſity*.

Merit, or a fortunate circumſtance in life, frequently extricates us from a ſtate of *poverty* in which we were born; and in which prodigality often plunges the rich.

Diligence is the beſt remedy againſt *indigence*, which is generally the juſt puniſhment of idleneſs.

Wiſe precautions prevent *want*, which is often brought on by extravagance.

When we are in *need*, we ſhould ſeek aſſiſtance from our friends, but be careful not to importune too much.

The means of obtaining relief in extreme *neceſſity*, is to implore the ſuccour of the truly charitable.

A ſtate of *poverty* is moſt conducive to the health of the ſoul; we being then out of the way of temptations.

The man who opens his hand to the cravings of the *indigent*, feels within his breaſt a ſecret ſatisfaction, which the uncharitable man is an entire ſtranger to.

He

He that will waſte, will *want*.
A friend in *need*, is a friend indeed.
Neceſſity is the mother of invention.

Good-fortune, Proſperity.

What we call *good-fortune*, is the effect of chance; it comes unexpected. *Proſperity* is the ſucceſs of conduct, and comes by degrees.

Fools have ſometimes *good-fortune*: wiſe men do not always *proſper*.

The capitol that was ſaved by the cackling of geeſe, and not by the vigilance of the centinels, is a piece of hiſtory more proper to ſhew the *good-fortune* of the Romans, than their military government on that occaſion; though on all others, their wiſe conduct has contributed as much to their *proſperity* as the valour of their ſoldiers.

Good-nature, Good-humour.

Theſe terms, though very expreſſive of their reſpective meanings, are too often, for want of proper diſcernment, confounded.

We may be *good-humoured*, and not *good-natured*; *good-natured*, and yet not always *good-humoured*.

To make this properly appear, it is neceſſary to give a full definition of each.

By *good-nature*, is meant that diſpoſition which partakes the felicity of all mankind; that promotes the ſatisfaction of every individual, within the reach of its ability; that relieves the diſtreſſed, comforts the afflicted, diffuſes bleſſings, and communicates happineſs, as far as its ſphere of action can extend; whereas, *good-humour* is nothing more than a cheerful, pleaſing deportment, ariſing either from a natural gaiety of mind, or an affectation of popularity, joined to an affability of behaviour, which is the reſult

ſult of good-breeding, and a compliance with the taſte of every company.—This kind of *good-humour* is by far the moſt ſtriking quality; 'tis frequently miſtaken for, and complimented with, the ſuperior name of real *good-nature*. A man, by this ſpecious appearance, has often acquired that appellation, who, in all the actions of his private life, has been a moroſe, cruel, revengeful, ſullen, haughty tyrant. On the contrary, a man of a true benevolent diſpoſition, and formed to promote the happineſs of all around him, may ſometimes, perhaps, from an ill habit of body, an accidental vexation, or a commendable openneſs of heart, above the meanneſs of diſguiſe, be guilty of little ſallies of peeviſhneſs or *ill-humour*, that may carry the appearance of, and be unjuſtly thought to proceed from *ill-nature*, by perſons who are not acquainted with his true character; and who take them for ſynonymous terms, though, in reality, they have not the leaſt analogy to each other.

Happineſs, Felicity, Bliſs.

Theſe three words denote equally an advantageous ſtate and agreeable ſituation; but that of *happineſs* marks properly the ſtate of fortune, capable of diſpenſing pleaſures, and placing them within our reach; that of *felicity*, expreſſes particularly the ſtate of the heart diſpoſed to taſte pleaſure, which it finds in whatſoever it poſſeſſes; that of *bliſs*, which conveys a myſtic idea, paints a ſtate of imagination, which we anticipate, as it were, from a thorough conviction that we ſhall inherit it hereafter.

Our *happineſs* glares in the eyes of the world, and expoſes us often to envy. Our *felicity* is known only to ourſelves, and gives us continual ſatisfaction. The idea of *bliſs* extends itſelf beyond a life temporal.

We are ſometimes in a ſtate of *happineſs*, without being in a ſtate of *felicity*. *Happineſs* conſiſts in the poſſeſſion

poſſeſſion of wealth, honours, friends and health; but 'tis the ſatisfaction of the mind, and the enjoyment of thoſe things, that conſtitutes *felicity*. As to *bliſs*, it is the portion of the godly, and depends, in each religion, on the perſuaſion of the mind.

Satisfaction without, forms the *happineſs* of man; ſatisfaction within, his *felicity*: *bliſs* muſt be aſked of God. The firſt is within the reach of riches, the ſecond of wiſdom, but the third is reſerved for thoſe whom the ſcripture calls, the poor in ſpirit.

Confines, Limits, Bounds.

Confines are, where we are at liberty to go. *Limits* are, what we ought not to paſs. *Bounds* are, what we cannot paſs.

We approach or get farther from the *confines*; we contract or extend the *limits*; we advance or remove the *bounds*.

By *confines*, we rather underſtand, the edge or border: the *confines* of a country not ſurrounded by the ſea, are generally diſtinguiſhed by rivers or hills.

He who continually exceeds the *limits* which temperance hath ſet, will ſoon find himſelf on the *confines* of the grave.

They ſay, with more eloquence than truth, that the *limits* of the Roman empire, were thoſe of the world.

The Sea, the Alps, and the Pyrenean mountains, are the natural *bounds* of France.

Ambition knows no *bounds*; and we are never happy, but when the *bounds* of our fortune are thoſe of our deſire.

Extremity, End.

Each of theſe words ſignifies the laſt of thoſe parts which conſtitutes a thing, but with this difference

ference, that *extremity* ſuppoſes a ſituation and an arrangement, intimating the greateſt diſtance; whereas, *end* ſuppoſes a length only, and denotes that place where the length ceaſes.

Extremity anſwers to the centre; *end* to the beginning; thus we ſay, the *extremity* of a kingdom, the *end* of life.

Aim, View, Deſign.

The *aim* is more fixed, we take every method to purſue it; the *view*, more vague, we make uſe of means to accompliſh it; the *deſign* more cloſe, we leave nothing undone to complete it.

A good prince has no other *deſign* in his government, than to render his ſtate flouriſhing, becauſe he has the happineſs of his people in *view*, and true glory in his *aim*.

The true chriſtian has no other *aim* than heaven; no other *view*, than to pleaſe God; nor any other *deſign* to complete, than his own ſalvation.

We are ſaid to lay an *aim*; to have *views*; to form a *deſign*.

Reaſon forbids our laying any *aim* that is impoſſible to attain; to have any chimerical *views*, or to form any *deſign* we are unable to execute.

If my *views* are juſt, I have a *deſign* in my head, that will bring me to my *aim*.

Burden, Load.

By the word *burden* we underſtand, a weight poſſible to be borne; by *load*, a weight more than we are able to bear.

A light *burden* is no inelegant expreſſion; but a light *load*, certainly is.

In the heat of ſummer our very clothes are a *burden*.

Many

Many a poor animal is ſo inhumanly laden, as to ſink under the *load*.

Taken now in a figurative ſenſe, they are equally different.

How unhappy is the man who feels the *burden* of an evil conſcience!

We have ſometimes, through a bad habit of body, ſuch a *load* upon our ſpirits, as not to be able to ſupport ourſelves.

Charm, Enchantment, Spell.

The word, *charm*, carries an idea of force, which puts a ſtop to ordinary effects and natural cauſes. The word *enchantment* is uſed, properly, for that which regards the illuſion of the ſenſes. The word, *ſpell*, bears particularly an idea of ſomething which diſturbs the reaſon. All the three, in the literal ſenſe, mark the effect of a magical operation, condemned by religion, and laughed at by philoſophy.

Antiquated tales ſay, there is a *charm* to deſtroy the effect of arms, and make men invulnerable. We read in old romances, of the ſurpriſing power of *enchantments*, that have ſuddenly changed the manners, and reverſed the fortune. Weak people have thought, and do ſtill believe, that by means of a *ſpell*, the health has been deſtroyed, and the perſon, ſo bewitched, made raving mad; butperſons of good ſenſe, ſee no *charm* in the world but the caprice of paſſions, with reſpect to reaſon, which often ſuſpends reflection, and ſtops the effects which that would naturally and neceſſarily produce: they are acquainted with no other *enchantment*, than that ſeduction ariſing from a depraved taſte, and diſordered imagination: they know alſo, that which is fooliſhly attributed to the power of a *ſpell*, maliciouſly laid, is no other than the effect of a bad conſtitution, which is fre-

quently remedied by an application of proper medicines.

To *Chaſtiſe, Puniſh, Correct, Diſcipline.*

We *chaſtiſe* him who has committed a fault, to prevent his doing the ſame again: we *puniſh* the perſon guilty of a crime, by way of expiation, and as an example to others. To *correct*, ſignifies, to amend by means of *chaſtiſement*; to *diſcipline* means, to regulate and inſtruct.

We *chaſtiſe* a child, in order to *correct* his manners: officers are frequently obliged to *puniſh* a ſoldier with death, to keep up good *diſcipline* in the regiment.

It is neceſſary for good *correction*, that *chaſtiſement* be not the effect of anger: juſtice demands, that the *puniſhment* be rigorous, when the crime is enormous; otherwiſe, there can be no good *diſcipline* in the ſtate.

God, like a tender father, *chaſtiſes* us in this life, that we may not be *puniſhed* in the life to come.

As the words, *chaſtiſe* and *puniſh*, are thought to have the neareſt affinity to each other, it may not be unneceſſary to ſhew a yet further difference between them.

Chaſtiſe then carries always with it, an idea of ſubordination; denoting, an authority or ſuperiority in him, who *chaſtiſes* over the perſon *chaſtiſed*; but the word, *puniſhment*, carries no ſuch idea in its ſignification; for we are ſometimes *puniſhed* by our equals, by ourſelves, by our inferiors, by the mere event of things, or by the effects of the fault we have committed.

Parents who, through tenderneſs to their children, forbear to *chaſtiſe* them, are often *puniſhed* for their folly by their future ingratitude and ill conduct.

Prudence,

Prudence, Diſcretion, Care, Caution.

Prudence is here the mother virtue, and ſignifies, wiſdom applied to practice: *diſcretion* is the effect of prudence, and means, a knowledge to govern or direct one's ſelf. By *care*, we underſtand, heed, in order to preſervation. *Caution* implies a greater degree of warineſs.

A proper attention to *prudence* would make us ſo *diſcreet*, as to be *careful* in every thing we do, and cauſe us to act with the greateſt *caution*.

A haſty conduct can never be called *prudent*: want of attention in affairs of moment, is the greateſt height of *indiſcretion*; for without that neceſſary qualification, 'tis impoſſible any thing we do can be attended with ſucceſs: he who expects to do any thing well, muſt act with *care*, and he, who is deſirous of avoiding difficulties, with *caution*.

To weigh matters well, before we put them into execution, is a mark of *prudence*.

A *diſcreet* man, in the company of dangerous perſons, ſuch as would take advantage of his words, would be *careful* how he opened his mouth, and would utter nothing but with the greateſt *caution*.

Circumſpection, Conſideration, Regard.

A proper attention to the manner of acting and conducting ourſelves, in our commerce with the world, with reſpect to others; contributing rather to their ſatisfaction than our own, is the common and general idea, which theſe three words preſent at firſt ſight; notwithſtanding which, it appears to me, that their application ſhould be different.

Circumſpection, principally takes place in diſcourſe; it prevents our letting any thing eſcape us, that may do hurt or give offence; and is the effect of prudence which riſks nothing. *Conſideration* is more

perſonal, and relates particularly to our manner of treating other people, making a proper diſtinction, as different opportunities may offer; and is the conſequence of eſteem and duty. *Regard* relates more to the ſtate or ſituation of perſons; being particularly careful to omit nothing which good ſenſe and politeneſs require; and is the fruit of a good education.

To be well with the world, requires *circumſpection*, when we are ſpeaking before thoſe with whom we are not acquainted; *conſideration*, for people of rank and quality; and *regard*, towards thoſe with whom we are intereſted.

We ought to have a great deal of *circumſpection* in converſations of religion and government, becauſe they are public matters, and ſubjects on which particulars are not at liberty to ſay what they think; eſpecially, if their thoughts are in oppoſition to thoſe eſtabliſhed in the country where they are. It is not adviſeable, for our intereſts, to omit ſhewing marks of *conſideration* to ſuch perſons whoſe aſſiſtance we may ſtand in need of, and from whom we hope to receive any ſervice. We cannot have too great a *regard* for the ladies; it is what they expect, and are diſpleaſed, if we neglect.

Cunning, Fineſſe, Device, Artifice, Trick, Stratagem.

Cunning is the art of conducting deſigns in a manner proper to ſucceed. *Fineſſe* is a French word, lately adopted by the Engliſh, and means, an acting ſecretly and under cover. *Device*, is rather a pretty thought or contrivance. *Artifice* is unnatural, and a far-fetched mean of executing deſigns. *Trick*, which eludes the ſenſes, implies a juggle: and *ſtratagem* denotes a diſguiſed way of obtaining our ends.

The

The firſt three of theſe words, are oftener underſtood in a good ſenſe than the other.

Cunning, is employed in uſing means; *fineſſe* inſinuates inſenſibly, and muſt be accompanied by penetration; *device*, ſurpriſes and gives ſatisfaction; *artifice*, generally makes uſe of ſtudied diſſimulation; a *trick* is commonly looked on as a fraud, and a *ſtratagem* is oftener illicit than otherwiſe.

Without ſome degree of *cunning*, it will be impoſſible to deal with, or guard againſt the generality of mankind.

Fineſſe is ſo eſſential to the courtier, that without it, he is ſeen through preſently.

Pretty *devices* declare the authors of them perſons of ingenuity.

We ought particularly to guard againſt, a man who makes uſe of a great deal of *artifice*.

Jugglers perform *tricks* to divert, and conſequently if clever, deſerve applauſe; but he who *tricks* his neighbour, in order to ſave himſelf, is a rogue.

All *ſtratagems* in war are lawful; but in other caſes, they are ever conſidered as derogatory to the character of an honeſt man.

Moment, Inſtant.

A *moment* is not long; but an *inſtant* is ſtill ſhorter. The word *moment*, has a ſignification more extended; it is taken ſometimes for time in general; and is uſed in a figurative ſenſe: that of *inſtant* is more contracted; it marks the ſhorteſt duration of time, and is never uſed but in the literal ſenſe.

All depends upon knowing the favourable *moment*; ſometimes an *inſtant* too ſoon or too late, is all that makes the difference between ſucceſs and misfortune.

Let us baniſh thought as much as in our power, ſtill now and then a reflective *moment* will intrude,

The face of things, which we have thought eſtabliſhed, have been frequently changed in an *inſtant*.

Every *moment* is dear to one, who knows the value of time. Every *inſtant* of our life is a ſtep nearer to the grave.

Cuſtoms, Manners, Faſhions.

Cuſtoms relate to the general practice of the people; *manners*, to their way of life; and *faſhions*, to their dreſs.

There cannot be a more ridiculous *cuſtom*, than that of perſons complimenting each other in time of divine ſervice; it being ſuppoſed, they have, there, more material things to engroſs their attention.

An increaſe, or decreaſe of luxury, has been found to have more or leſs influence on the *manners* of the people.

It has been obſerved, that there is a continual round of *faſhions*; when the new are worn out, they have recourſe to the old, and thoſe old ones become new.

To *Be, Exiſt, Subſiſt.*

Be agrees with all ſorts of ſubjects, ſubſtances or modes; with all manner of beings, real or ideal: *Exiſt* is uſed only with reſpect to ſubſtances, and thoſe real: *Subſiſt* is applied equally to ſubſtances or modes, but with reference to the duration of their being, which is not expreſſed by the other two words.

We ſay of qualities, forms, actions, motions, and of all their different relations, that they *are:* that of *exiſt*, is in uſe only, to expreſs the end of ſimple exiſtence: and we employ *ſubſiſt*, to point out the duration of that exiſtence or modification. Thus we ſay, that man *is* inconſtant; that the phœnix *exiſts* not;

not; that all human eſtabliſhments *ſubſiſt* but for a time.

Famous, Illuſtrious, Celebrated, Renowned.

Each of theſe qualities diſtinguiſhes the reputation; but that which the word *famous* expreſſes, means no more than a ſimple diſtinction of one country or age above another, let that diſtinction be taken either in good part or bad. That which the word *illuſtrious* expreſſes, is founded upon a merit, ſupported by dignity and glory; which makes the object not only known but admired, and ranked among the great. That which we underſtand by the word *celebrated*, expreſſes a ſuperior degree of talents, with reſpect either to abilities or knowledge; though it raiſes not the object to an equal degree of grandeur, with the *illuſtrious*, it is nevertheleſs honourable. That which the word *renowned* denotes, is founded only upon faſhion or public taſte; which, without caſting much honour on the ſubject, draws it ſimply from oblivion, and makes its name known to the world.

The maid of Orleans, cried down by the Engliſh, but eſteemed by the French, was equally *famous* in both nations. Princes ſhine during their life, but they are only *illuſtrious* in future ages, by the monuments of grandeur, wiſdom, and greatneſs, which they leave behind them. There are *celebrated* authors, whoſe works we cannot find fault with; and thoſe which we cannot even commend, without riſking our own reputation. A man's fortune is half made, when he once becomes *renowned* in his profeſſion.

Famous, *celebrated*, and *renowned*, are equally applicable to perſons or things; but *illuſtrious* to perſons only; at leaſt when we would be nice in our choice of words.

Eroſtratus, among the Greeks, ſet fire to the temple of Diana, to make himſelf *famous*: he was rendered more ſo by an order of the ſtate, that his name ſhould never after be mentioned, on pain of puniſhment. The greateſt part of our libels are of the ſame kind; they raiſe a duſt, and become *famous* by being burnt by the hangman. The Duke of Marlborough became *illuſtrious* by the many victories he obtained; his glorious actions are *celebrated* in hiſtory. The Gobelins were ſo *renowned*, that their names live in the place where they worked, and in thoſe works in which others imitate them. It is a queſtion, whether the Phalernian wine was more *renowned* than thoſe are of Champaigne and Burgundy.

Excuſe, Pardon, Forgiveneſs.

We make *excuſe* for an apparent fault or ſlight offence: we aſk *pardon* for a real fault, or when the offence is greater. We implore *forgiveneſs* of our ſins. The firſt is an apology, in order to juſtify ourſelves, and is founded on politeneſs; the ſecond is a mark of a good diſpoſition, and is done in hopes of extenuation; the laſt, to avert the vengeance of God, and declares repentance.

The good mind *excuſes* eaſily. The good heart *pardons* readily. God delights more in *forgiveneſs* than in *revenge*.

Excuſe is more uſed, when we addreſs ourſelves to equals; *pardon* to ſuperiors; and *forgiveneſs* to Heaven.

Good manners demand an *excuſe* for that which turns out wrong, let the intention be never ſo good. It can never be a degradation to aſk pardon of that perſon whom we have offended; beſides, the ſuperior rank of ſome perſons makes it an abſolute duty in the offender. How great is the preſumption

tion of that wretch, who fancies himself not in need of the *forgiveneſs* of the Almighty!

Duty, Obligation.

Duty, means ſomething conſcientious, and ſprings from a law; *obligation* ſomething abſolute in practice, and ſprings from cuſtom.

We are ſaid to fail in our *duty*; and to diſpenſe with an *obligation*.

It is the *duty* of a clergyman, to carry himſelf modeſtly; and he is *obliged* to wear dark coloured cloaths.

Policy finds leſs diſadvantage in neglecting her *duty*, than in forgetting the leaſt of her *obligations*.

To *Live, Dwell.*

Theſe two words are eſteemed ſynonimous in that ſenſe, in which they ſignify reſidence; but *live*, relates to the particular place where we inhabit; *dwell* to the building in which we reſide.

We *live* in London; in Middleſex; in this country; we *dwell* in a large houſe; a cottage; or a furniſhed lodging.

When perſons of diſtinction *live* in London, they *dwell* in hovels, comparatively ſpeaking, with their houſes in the country.

We ſay, with great propriety, I *live*, all the ſummer, in the country, and have one of the prettieſt *dwellings* imaginable.

To *Stay, Remain.*

The common idea of theſe two words, is a ceſſation of progreſſion; and their difference conſiſts in

this; that to *ſtay*, ſeems to have leſs duration than to *remain*.

A good ſervant, when ſent on a meſſage, *ſtays* as ſhort a time as poſſible.

When we have given offence, we ſhould endeavour to make an atonement, that the offended party may not *remain* diſſatisfied.

The duration of time, expreſſed by the word *ſtay*, ſeems alſo leſs determinate than that by *remain*.

Thus we ſay, he *remained* at his country houſe a month; he *ſtayed* longer than we expected.

Event, Incident.

Event is a word moſt agreeable to ſtates and governments; *incident*, to caſualties in private life.

The revolutions of the ſtate, are *events* that determine the happineſs of the people.

Our life is full of *incidents*, which the eye of prudence cannot foreſee.

To *Awake, Awaken.*

The firſt of theſe words is more frequently uſed in a literal ſenſe; the laſt in a figurative.

The leaſt noiſe *awakes* thoſe who ſleep indifferently. It requires but little to *awaken* a paſſion which is not entirely rooted out from the heart.

Awake appears to me moſt applicable, when we diſturb a perſon from a light ſleep; *awaken*, when we rouſe him from a deep one; and by the ſame uſe of the word in a figurative ſenſe, we give an idea of the ſame exertion. When the body is ſufficiently refreſhed by ſleep, we naturally *awake*; when any violence diſturbs deep ſleep, it generally *awakens* us. We often *awake* late and are ſometimes *awakened* by ſurpriſe.

We eaſily *awake* the feelings of a tender-hearted man;

man; but it is a difficult thing to *awaken* remorſe in a hardened villain.

Tyrants, whom remorſe will not *awake*, may be *awakened* by terror.

Heavy, Weighty.

The word *heavy*, is more applicable to that which loads the body; *weighty*, to that which burdens the mind. It requires ſtrength to carry the one; parts to ſupport the other.

Feeble men find that *heavy*, which the ſtrong find light. The adminiſtration of ſtate affairs, is too *weighty* a concern for one perſon to undertake.

To *Conquer, Subdue, Overcome.*

Each of theſe words implies reſiſtance; but that of *conquer* refers to victory over enemies; and is generally uſed in the literal ſenſe: that of *ſubdue* is more applicable to our paſſions, being oftener uſed in a figurative, and means a bringing under ſubjection: that of *overcome* ſuppoſes efforts againſt any obſtacle that oppoſes; meaning rather to ſurmount.

We have *conquered* our enemies, when we have beaten them in ſuch a manner as to put it out of their power to do us any further hurt. We may be ſaid to have *ſubdued* our luſts, when we are able to withſtand every temptation. We *overcome* our adverſaries when we obtain our end, in ſpite of every oppoſition.

It requires courage and valour to *conquer*; endeavour and reſolution to *ſubdue*; patience and perſeverance to *overcome*.

Alexander gloried more in his *conqueſts* than in any other thing upon earth. Of all paſſions, avarice is the moſt difficult to *ſubdue*; as neither age or weak-

neſs of conſtitution is able to rebate its edge. We ſhould ſtrive to *overcome* evil with good.

Wave, Surge, Billow.

Waves are the natural effect of the fluidity of a running water; they are as applicable to rivers as the ſea, and leaves the idea of a calm. *Surges* are applied properly to the ſea only; imply ſwoln waves and mark a ſmall degree of agitation. *Billows* proceed from a more violent motion, conſequently denote a greater agitation; they break into white foam, and are attended with no little roar.

We cut through the *waves*; are lifted up by the *ſurges*; toſſed and daſhed by the *billows*.

The life of ſome men may be aptly compared to the ſharp-keeled veſſel cutting through the *waves*, leaving no noiſe or track behind it; while that of others may be repreſented, as toſſed up and down on the wind-ſwoln *ſurges* of a boiſterous fortune; or daſhed in pieces by the foaming *billows* of adverſity.

Uproar, Tumult, Riot.

Uproar, conveys an idea of ſome great noiſe; *tumult* and *riot* of ſome great diſorder.

The difference between the words *tumult* and *riot* is, that *tumult* implies the riſing of many people; *riot*, the diſturbance of a few; whereas, an *uproar* may be occaſioned by one ſingle perſon.

Tumults and *riots*, are always attended with ſuch *uproars*, as give umbrage to a peaceable neighbourhood.

Houſes of debauchery are ſubject to *riots*: a *tumult* often happens in ill-policed cities.

Inclination,

Inclination, Propenſity, Bias.

Theſe three words riſe gradually; *inclination* implying ſomething leſs ſtrong than *propenſity*; *propenſity* than *bias*: the firſt leads us to an object; the ſecond draws us; the third drags us.

Inclination is greatly owing to education; *propenſity* to cuſtom; *bias* to conſtitution.

Choice of company is eſſential to the education of youth, becauſe, at that age, they imbibe eaſily the *inclinations* of thoſe whoſe company they keep. It is a dangerous thing to give a looſe to any one vice, as frequent commiſſion is apt to create ſtrong *propenſities*. Perſons of warm conſtitutions have a natural *bias* to venery.

Inclination is generally applied to good objects; *propenſity* to bad. Thus we ſay, the charitable man is ever *inclined* to aſſiſt his neighbour. So depraved is human nature, that we have always a *propenſity* to vice.

Of two perſons to be ſerved, a foreigner and a countryman; we are generally *biaſſed* in favour of the laſt.

Should, Ought, Is neceſſary.

The firſt of theſe expreſſions, implies more preciſely, an obligation of complaiſance, cuſtom, or perſonal intereſt: thus we *ſhould* not offend the company we are in; we *ſhould* follow the faſhion; we *ſhould* know a man, before we truſt him. The ſecond denotes more particularly, an obligation of reaſon and good ſenſe; thus, we *ought* in every thing, to give up to thoſe who know better than ourſelves; we *ought* to ſerve them who have ſerved us. The third is more uſed to expreſs an eſſential and indiſpenſable obligation; thus, it is *neceſſary* to love God,

God, in order to be ſaved: It is *neceſſary* to be complaiſant, to pleaſe.

Furthermore, Moreover, Beſides.

Furthermore is properly uſed, when there is need only to add one more reaſon to thoſe before-mentioned; its intent is to multiply, and it has no relation but to number. *Moreover* is in its right place, when uſed, to add a reaſon of a different kind to thoſe that went before; its chief office is to add, with a particular reſpect to diverſity. *Beſides* is uſed with propriety, when we would ſtrengthen by a new reaſon the force of thoſe that were ſufficient of themſelves, its principal office is to enhance by abundance.

For a ſtate to ſupport itſelf, thoſe who govern ſhould be moderate; thoſe who ought to obey, governable; *furthermore*, the laws ſhould be judicious. There will always be war among men, becauſe they are naturally ambitious, and are governed by intereſt; *moreover*, zeal for religion makes them rigid. Holy Scripture teaches us the unity of the Godhead, and reaſon points it out to us; *beſides*, all nature makes us perceive it.

To *Manifeſt, Publiſh, Proclaim.*

Theſe three words imply open declaration; but that of *manifeſt* ſeems to convey a proof of what is made known; meaning, to ſhew inconteſtably: *publiſh* denotes only a ſimple declaration but general: to *proclaim* is to make known by a formal and legal publication.

When once a man has loſt his name, let him *manifeſt* his good character as much as poſſible, he will find it difficult to recover the good opinion of mankind, for prejudice is blind even to the moſt viſible truths.

truths. He who *publiſhes* to the world the failings of another, betrays in himſelf a want of humanity, and is ſure to meet with the contempt of every thinking man. A famous Sultan of Egypt, left to poſterity, a moſt remarkable teſtimony of the vanity of earthly grandeur; for, on his death-bed, he commanded that his winding ſheet ſhould be carried at the end of a lance by a herald; who was to *proclaim*, here is all that this great prince will carry out of the world with him, of his wealth, dignity, and dominions, that he enjoyed upon earth.

Manifeſtos of a ſtate, are uſually *publiſhed* by formal *proclamation*.

To *Tell*, *Diſcloſe*, *Reveal*, *Divulge*, *Diſcover*.

To make known that which is unknown, is the common ſignification of theſe words: but to *tell*, is to declare things purpoſely, with a deſign to inform thoſe, we would not have remain ignorant. To *diſcloſe*, is to ſhew either by deſign or inadvertency, that which was before concealed. To *reveal*, is to lay open a ſecret: to *divulge*, is to do the ſame abroad. To *diſcover*, is the declaring a perſon to have done a thing, which he would not have been thought the author of.

So great an itch have ſome perſons for prattling, that they *tell* every individual thing they hear. Confidants too often *diſcloſe* the intrigues they are entruſted with. Confeſſors *reveal* ſometimes, by their imprudence, the confeſſion of penitents. The *divulging* of a ſecret, has often done more harm than any one thing whatever; as it is impoſſible to ſmother what once is blazed abroad. If we would not be *diſcovered*, we ſhould be careful to have no witneſs of our actions.

Equivocation,

Equivocation, Ambiguity, Double-entendre.

Equivocation has two ſenſes; the one natural, in which we would have what we ſay underſtood, and in which the hearer does abſolutely underſtand us; the other perverted, underſtood only by the perſon ſpeaking. *Ambiguity* has one general ſenſe, ſuſceptible of different interpretations; it always creates a difficulty in getting at the true ſenſe of the author, and ſometimes an impoſſibility. The *double-entendre*, a French word lately naturalized, has two natural and apt ſignifications, one of which preſents itſelf to the common underſtanding of all the world; and by the other is made a fine alluſion, underſtood but by certain perſons.

Theſe three ways of ſpeaking, are upon occaſion, ingenious methods of concealing one's true meaning: but we may make uſe of an *equivocation*, to deceive; of an *ambiguity*, to keep in the dark from all; and of a *double-entendre*, to conceal from ſome.

It is beneath the character of an honeſt man, to make frequent uſe of *equivocations*; he that does, being ſure to meet with the contempt of mankind. *Ambiguities*, are perhaps, oftener the effect of a confuſion of ideas, than a ſtudied deſign of keeping people in the dark: we ought never to uſe them but when an elucidation would be dangerous. Malice and politeneſs have introduced the *double-entendre*; but it ſhould never be uſed at the expence of our neighbours reputation.

Great, Big, Large.

The word *great* is a general term, ſignifying any thing conſiderable, either in bulk, extent, quality, number, &c. thus we ſay, a *great* houſe; a *great* road; a *great* weight; a *great* many; a *great* famine; a *great* happineſs. The words *big* and *large* are

are more circumſcribed; *big* implies greatneſs of bulk; *large*, greatneſs of extent. Thus we ſay, a *big* man; a *big* ſtone; but a *large* room; a *large* field.

A *large* man, is as great an impropriety as a *big* field; and we need only mention a *big* or *large* pleaſure to ſhew the abſurdity.

Staid, Grave, Serious.

We are *ſtaid*, through diſcretion and cuſtom; *grave*, through humour and conſtitution; *ſerious*, through taſte and affectation.

Levity is the reverſe of being *ſtaid*; vivacity, of *gravity*; wantonneſs, of *ſeriouſneſs*.

A conſtant round of buſineſs and continual tranſaction of affairs make us *ſtaid*; reflections on our latter end give *gravity*; the deſire of being thought *grave*, *ſeriouſneſs*.

Genius, Talent.

Theſe are both born with us, and are a happy diſpoſition of nature, by which we are qualified for ſome peculiar employment: but *genius* ſeems to be more internal, and poſſeſſed of the powers of invention; *talent*, more external, and capable of execution.

Thus we have a *genius* for poetry and painting; but a *talent* for ſpeaking and writing.

Such as have a *genius* for mechanics, may have no *talent* for watch-making.

People, Perſons.

The word *people*, is ſo very general, that it cannot be connected with a determinate number; as for inſtance,

inſtance, four, five, or ſix *people*; but that of *perſons* may.

To be pleaſant at table, none ſhould be admitted but *people* of good humour; neither ſhould there be more than ſeven or eight *perſons*.

In order to deſcribe a company, we ſhould know the quality of the *people*, and the number of *perſons* preſent.

In all governments, we find ill-affected *people*: and there are always, among a number, ſome diſcontented *perſons*.

To *Regard, Concern, Touch.*

We ſay very indifferently, without much choice, that a thing *regards* us, *concerns* us, or *touches* us, to mark the part we bear in it. There nevertheleſs appears to me, to be a delicate diſtinction between theſe three expreſſions, each riſing gradually above the other, according to the rank in which I have placed them. Though we have the leaſt part imaginable in a thing, it may be ſaid, to *regard* us; to *concern* us, we muſt have a greater; but when we are ſenſibly affected by it, it may be ſaid to *touch* us. It ſeems alſo, that the word *regard* is more applicable, when our intereſt is in queſtion; that of *concern*, when ſpeaking of things, committed to our care and conduct; that of *touch*, when it reſpects our honour and fortune.

The ill-behaviour of a ſervant to a cuſtomer, *regards* the maſter; as it affects his intereſt. The leaſt diſturbance in Europe, in ſome meaſure, *regards* every ſtate; it being difficult for any of them to keep a perfect neutrality for any length of time, while the others are at war. All the operations of government *concern* the firſt miniſter. It *concerns* a man to be punctual in the diſcharge of his duty: The conduct of a wife *touches* the huſband ſo cloſe, that he ought to have an eye over all ſhe does. The

behaviour

behaviour of an ambaſſor, *touches* always more or leſs the honour of the prince he repreſents.

Many people make themſelves uneaſy at that which does not in the leaſt *regard* them; meddle with what no way *concerns* them; and at the ſame time are indifferent to thoſe things which *touch* them nearly.

Tranquillity, Peace, Quiet.

Theſe words, let them be applied either to the ſoul, to a republic, or any particular ſociety; expreſs equally a ſituation exempt from trouble and moleſtation; but *tranquillity* relates to that within one's ſelf, and in the time preſent, independent of any other relation: *peace* to the ſituation, with regard to enemies in whoſe power it is to make an alteration: *quiet*, with reſpect to time paſt or future, as ſucceeding or preceding a ſituation troubled.

Uneaſy people have no *tranquillity* in their families. Litigious perſons are hardly ever at *peace* with their neighbours. After a troubleſome time, we enjoy a *quiet* ſtate with greater ſatisfaction.

What a ſtate of *tranquillity* does the religious man enjoy; no outward things have the power to ruffle or diſcompoſe him! To preſerve *peace*, we ſhould keep ourſelves always in a ſtate of defence. It is indulgence only that will eſtabliſh *quiet* in a mutinous people.

Huge, Vaſt, Enormous, Immenſe.

The common idea of theſe words, is ſomething greatly beyond the uſual meaſure; but thoſe of *huge* and *vaſt*, relate more to ſuch things as are material; thoſe of *enormous* and *immenſe*, to ſuch as are ideal; with this difference between them; that *huge* implies greatneſs in bulk; *vaſt*, greatneſs in extent;

enormous,

enormous, greatneſs in ſize, even to deformity and dreadfulneſs; *immenſe*, unlimited extent, even beyond expreſſion. Thus we ſay, a *huge* giant; a *vaſt* tract of land; an *enormous* crime; the *immenſe* expanſe.

There are ſome promontories ſo *huge*, as to ſhock the eye that views them. The deſarts of Arabia are ſo *vaſt*, that unleſs travellers carried their lodging and proviſion with them, they would periſh before they reached their journey's end. The ſins of the preſumptuous wretch are ſo *enormous*, that he can have little hopes of ſalvation, but in the infinite mercies of an all-gracious God. So great is the *immenſity* of the Godhead, as to exceed the utmoſt ſtretch of human thought.

Way, Road.

Way is much more extenſive and general than *road*; and implies the paſſage from place to place, whether through the high *road* or not: *road* is much more limited and particular, and means the beaten *way* of travellers, from one town or city to another. Which, ſays the traveller, is our beſt *way* to Hampton; the Hounſlow *road* or Kingſton? Either *road*, ſays his guide, is good; but when we come to Twittenham, the ſhorteſt *way* is acroſs the fields; though the pleaſanteſt *way* would be to go by water.

As the word *way* is often uſed to ſignify means; which, when conſidered as the intermediate ſtep to attainment, is not widely different from that of *road*; when we would adopt the figure of travelling, not to confuſe our ideas, we generally make uſe of the word *road*: thus, diligence with perſeverance, is the high *road* to preferment; yet, notwithſtanding, *way* is a much more elegant expreſſion: a ſtrict adherence to the principles of chriſtianity, is the direct *way* to Heaven.

Ways,

Ways, Means.

We go the *ways*; we uſe the *means*.

Ways are the methods we take, *means*, what we put in execution to ſucceed. The firſt words enfolds in its idea, honour and probity; the laſt pays little or no regard but to the end aimed at. Thus, good *ways* are thoſe which are juſt; good *means*, thoſe which are ſure.

Simoniacal practices are very bad *ways*; but very good *means* of obtaining benefices.

I cannot avoid here taking notice of the ingrammatical impropriety of annexing the ſingular number to the word *means*; the fault almoſt of every ſpeaker and writer; liberality, ſay they, is *a* ſure *means* of becoming popular: there *is* no better *means* of keeping in with the world, than that of paſſing by affronts with compoſure.—Glaring abſurdity! ſince the word *means* is evidently plural, and it would be much more elegant was the falſe concord avoided.

Often, Frequently.

One relates to the repetition of the ſame acts; the other, to a plurality of objects. We *often* diſguiſe our thoughts: by doing the ſame thing *often* it becomes habitual. We *frequently* meet with traitors: we *frequently* do thoſe things which we repent of afterwards.

There are two other words bearing an equal ſignification with *often*, viz. *oft* and *oftentimes*, but they being no more than the ſame word abbreviated and lengthened, it is is needleſs to take any further notice of them.

Cannot,

Cannot, Impoſſible.

One of theſe words, more properly relates to inability; the other to impoſſibility.

We *cannot* ſerve two maſters. It is *impoſſible* to execute two oppoſite orders at the ſame time.

We *cannot* love one, by whom we have been injured. It is *impoſſible* to love one, to whom we have a natural averſion.

Glory, Honour.

Glory, expreſſes ſomething more ſingular than *honour*. The one makes us undertake voluntarily, the moſt difficult things; the other leads us willingly to the execution of the moſt rigorous exactions.

Queſt of *glory*, ſometimes ſtimulates the ſoldier's courage, even to raſhneſs; and notions of *honour*, in ſpite of fear, keep him often to his duty.

An indifference to *glory* may paſs unnoticed; but not ſo, with reſpect to *honour*.

It is cuſtomary in converſation, to place intereſt in oppoſition to *glory*; and inclination to *honour*: thus we ſay, an author who labours after *glory*, takes more pains in the completion of his piece, than he who works merely for intereſt: and when an avaricious man lays out his money, it is more through *honour* than inclination.

World, Univerſe.

World conveys only an idea of one ſingle being, though general; that which exiſts: *Univerſe*, an idea of many beings, or rather that of all parts of the world; all that exiſts. The firſt of theſe words, is ſometimes uſed in the literal ſenſe, as when we ſay, the old and new *world*; and ſometimes in a figurative

rative, as when we ſay, in this *world* and in the other; the wicked *world*; the polite *world*: the ſecond is always uſed according to the letter; and in a ſenſe that excepts no one thing: it is for this reaſon, when we would expreſs the *univerſe*, by the term, *world*, that we are obliged to put the word *all* before it, which we have no occaſion to do by *univerſe*; for example, we ſhould ſay, the ſun warms *all* the *world*, and is the heat of the *univerſe*.

Anſwer, Reply.

The *anſwer* is made to a demand, or a queſtion aſked; the *reply*, to an anſwer or a remonſtrance.

Academies are taught firſt to ſtart difficulties, and then to *anſwer* them. It is nobler to hear a wiſe remonſtrance and profit by it, than make any *reply*.

The word *anſwer* is more extenſive in its ſignification than *reply*; we *anſwer* the queſtions of thoſe who aſk us; the demands of ſuch as expect our ſervices; the examination of counſel; the arguments of diſputants; the letters we receive; and for all our conduct. The word *reply* is far more limited; it ſuppoſes a diſpute, commenced from difference of ſentiment; we *reply* to the anſwer of an author whoſe works we have criticiſed; to the reprimands of thoſe whoſe correction we are unwilling to ſubmit to; to pleaders; to an anſwer in chancery.

An *anſwer* ſhould be clear, true, and dictated by reaſon and good ſenſe; a *reply* ſtrong and convincing, armed by truth, and ſtrengthened by experience.

We ſhould teach children as much as poſſible to give nice and judicious *anſwers*; and convince them, that there is more honour in liſtening, than in making *replies* to thoſe who have the goodneſs to inſtruct them.

Danger,

Danger, Hazard, Riſk, Venture.

All theſe words imply chance of harm; but that of *danger* relates to the evil that may happen; thoſe of *hazard, riſk,* and *venture,* to the good, we may loſe; with this difference, that *hazard* expreſſes ſomething near; *riſk,* ſomething at a diſtance; *venture,* ſomething farther off, relating only to the poſſibility of events. Hence thoſe expreſſions, in *danger* of death; in *hazard* of our life; by giving a looſe to debauchery, we *riſk* our health; nothing *venture,* nothing have.

Danger creates fear; *hazard,* alarm; *riſk,* caution; but we often *venture* with the greateſt ſatisfaction.

The avaricious man, ſpurred on by intereſt, fears no *danger*; *hazards* his health and happineſs; runs every *riſk* that attends his profeſſion; and gladly *ventures* his all, in ſearch of that, which if obtained, he would not have the ſpirit to enjoy.

To *Hazard, Riſk.*

Let us conſider the verbs in a different ſenſe. The firſt indicates only uncertainty of ſucceſs; the laſt threatens a bad iſſue. To *hazard,* is to expoſe or commit to fortune, to chance, and properly to play. To riſk, is to run the *hazard,* the danger, a fall, or a loſs, in a ſlippery career by a falſe ſtep.

With equal chance we *hazard*; with diſadvantage we *riſk.* If we *riſk* little to gain a great deal, we merely *hazard.* The lucky *hazard* freely. The bold *riſk.*

The gambler, who with a fortune of ten thouſand pounds, *hazards* five thouſand againſt five, little thinks he is playing two to one againſt himſelf; for he *riſks* the loſs of half his fortune, to gain only a third of what he has.

In

In the obſcurity of ſcience, we often *hazard* probable conjectures, but preſume not to *riſk* wild hypotheſis.

He who lightly *hazards* his fortune, does as do the Siameſe, ſtake their liberty at play, becauſe they value it not; but he who *riſks* it for the ſake of truth, or for a love of virtue, reſembles the Japaneſe, who bring on themſelves the dread of a capital puniſhment, to recover to life a father, or a mother.

Againſt, In ſpite of.

Both theſe denote oppoſition; but the expreſſion, *in ſpite of*, implies more reſolution and greater force than the word *againſt*; *againſt*, ſuppoſing little or no reſiſtance in the object propoſed; but, *in ſpite of*, a conſiderable ſtruggle.

We act *againſt* the will, or *againſt* rule, and *in ſpite of* oppoſitions.

The good man does nothing *againſt* the dictates of his conſcience. The wicked man commits ſin *in ſpite of* the puniſhment annexed to it.

Raſhneſs will attempt things, *againſt* all appearance of ſucceſs; and reſolution will purſue the attempt, *in ſpite of* all the obſtacles it meets with.

Boldneſs, Audacity, Impudence, Effrontery.

There is a commendable *boldneſs* that proceeds from a ſelf-conſciouſneſs of worth; but the *boldneſs*, which is here meant, ſprings from ignorance; is brazen and preſuming. *Audacty* is a greater degree of *boldneſs*, ſuch as is ſteeled again reproof; is rude and noiſy. *Impudence* conſiſts, in being an utter ſtranger to all kind of modeſty; is ſcurrilous and abuſive. *Effrontery*, proceeds from pride and ſelf-ſufficiency; is overbearing and inſolent.

The *bold* are unawed by diffidence; they ſpeak with great aſſurance; neither the quality or rank of thoſe they addreſs, being able to diſconcert them. The more you reprove the *audacious* man, the more it hardens him; he wilfully forgets the reſpect due to his ſuperiors, and idly imagines his boiſterous behaviour, a diſtinguiſhing mark of manhood. The weapons of the *impudent* are ſaucineſs and abuſe, which they take up at every turn; and, with which they lay about them in a moſt unmerciful manner. As great a cauſe of *effrontery* as any, is the want of education; he whom it poſſeſſes, is arrogant and inſolent; a ſtranger to good ſenſe, and unacquainted with the rules of good-breeding.

Profitable, Advantageous, Beneficial.

Profitable is more applicable to gain; *advantageous*, to honour, or any kind of convenience; *beneficial*, to health.

Some kinds of merchandiſe are far more *profitable* than others. A good name is very *advantageous*, as it ſerves to puſh us forward in the world. Loſs of blood, to a feveriſh perſon, is very *beneficial*.

Light *profits* make a heavy purſe. A ſeaſonable word, ſpoke in favour is frequently of more *advantage* than the greateſt ſervices. The greateſt *benefit* to the ſoul, is a ſincere repentance.

To *See, Look at, Behold, View.*

We *ſee* whatever ſtrikes the ſight: we *look at* an object, when we deſignedly caſt our eyes upon it: we *behold* it, when we look with attention: *view* it, when we ſurvey it.

We *ſee* all objects before our eyes: we *look at*, thoſe which excite our curioſity: we *behold*, ſuch as cauſe

cauſe our admiration; we *view* thoſe we are deſirous to examine.

We *ſee* diſtinctly or confuſedly. We *look at*, near, or at a diſtance. We *behold*, with wonder and attention. We *view*, with care and exactneſs.

The eyes open to *ſee*; turn to *look at*; fix themſelves to *behold*; and move all ways to *view*.

The connoiſſeur in painting, *looks at* the firſt picture he *ſees*; if it be the work of a celebrated artiſt, he *beholds* it with pleaſure, and *views* every part of it with the greateſt minuteneſs.

To *Stare, Gaze.*

Though the common meaning of theſe words is, to fix both the eyes upon an object, and look at it with wonder, intently and earneſtly; yet there is a great difference between them: *ſtaring*, implies looking with wonder and impudence; *gazing*, with wonder and reſpect.

The impudence of ſome fellows is ſo great, that they will *ſtare* a modeſt woman out of countenance.

A man in love, will ſometimes *gaze* upon the object of his affections, till he almoſt loſes his ſight.

When our Saviour firſt appeared to his diſciples, after his reſurrection, they *gazed* on him with aſtoniſhment and rapture.

To *ſtare* another in the face, has always been conſidered as a breach of good manners.

Uſeful, Serviceable.

As nearly ſynonimous as theſe words may appear to be, there is yet a manifeſt difference between them, but the diſtinction is ſo delicate, as to require ſome attention to diſcover it. *Uſeful*, in my opinion, is more applicable to to things in uſe; to thoſe

we have often recourſe to; and what cannot be well done without: *ſerviceable*, to things of ſervice, ſuch as we oftener do without than with: and ſuch as we cannot always obtain. Thus, furniture is *uſeful*; memorandum books, to perſons engaged in a multiplicity of buſineſs, are *uſeful*. Friends and good connections, are *ſerviceable*.

The plummet is ſo *uſeful* to the carpenter, that to fix a perpendicular without it, would give him a great deal of trouble. Of all animals, a horſe is the moſt *ſerviceable*.

The plummet is ſo *uſeful* to the carpenter, that to fix a perpendicnlar without it, would give him a great great deal of trouble. Of all animals, a horſe is the moſt *ſerviceable*.

Thoſe who take ſnuff, a box is extremely *uſeful*; but its contents, very far from *ſerviceable*.

Gulph, Abyſs.

What theſe words ſhould expreſs, is rather imaginary than real: they are generally uſed therefore in a figurative ſenſe: we are ſuppoſed to be ſwallowed up by a *gulph*; and loſt in an *abyſs*. The firſt carries with it, an idea of inſatiable voracity, which drags in and conſumes all that approaches; the ſecond, of an unmeaſurable depth, to whoſe bottom we can never get; and in which we loſe, at the ſame time the ſight of the place from whence we came, and of that where we are going.

A *gulph* is ſuppoſed to have many turns and windings; of which, if we have once ſet a ſtep in, we cannot poſſibly get out, but are carried on in ſpite of all our endeavours to the contrary. An *abyſs* is ſuppoſed to have many uncertain and obſcure roads, without end; in which, though we may ſometimes ſtoop, in hopes of finding a way out; yet being de-

ceived

ceived, we become diſheartened, bewildered with doubts, and overwhelmed with deſpair.

A looſe woman is a *gulph* of woe, all periſhes there; virtue, riches, and health. Philoſophy teaches us, that man is continually wandering in an *abyſs* of darkneſs.

Determination, Reſolution.

Determination is an act of judgment, and ſuppoſes examination; *reſolution*, an act of will, and ſuppoſes deliberation: the firſt ſhuts out ſuſpenſe; the laſt, wavering.

Our *determinations* ſhould be juſt, to avoid repentance; our *reſolutions* fixed, to exclude variation.

Nothing is more diſagreeable, both to ourſelves and others, than to be always *undetermined* in our affairs, and *irreſolute* in our proceedings.

It is more difficult to *determine* on points of precedence, than on ſolid and real intereſts. There are no weaker *reſolutions* than thoſe made at confeſſion, or on a ſick-bed; the firſt return of health carrying us again into the ſame courſe of life.

We may be *determined*, and yet not *reſolved*; that is, we may come to ſome deciſion, and ſtill not to be ſo far *reſolved*, as to put that deciſion into execution; fear, timidity, or ſome other motive may prevent us.

The *determinations* of women, are ſeldom better grounded than on whim or caprice. Men are ſo often led by taſte and cuſtom, that their *reſolutions* are generally vain.

In ſcience, we ſay, the *determination* of a point; the *reſolution* of a difficulty.

The more we *determine*, the leſs we prove. Though in the ſchools, we anſwer every difficulty, we *reſolve* but few.

Old, Ancient.

Theſe words expreſs different degrees of age; *ancient* riſing upon *old*.

A faſhion is *old*, when it ceaſes to be in uſe; *ancient*, when its uſe has been ſometime paſt.

That which is recent is not *old*; that which is modern is not *ancient*.

Oldneſs, agrees beſt with age; *ancientneſs*, with the origin of families.

As we grow *old*, we decreaſe in ſtrength; but gain more experience.

Ancientneſs, makes faſhions diſagreeable; but adds ſplendour to nobility.

General, Univerſal.

General, implies a great number of particulars; *univerſal*, every particular.

The government of princes has no object in view, but the *general* good. The providence of God is *univerſal*.

An orator ſpeaks in *general*, when he makes no particular application. Knowledge is *univerſal*, when it knows every thing.

Chriſtianity is *generally* known and believed; but not *univerſally*.

Word, Term, Expreſſion.

Nothing is more common than an indiſcriminate uſe of theſe words; and yet none differ more among themſelves. A *word*, is a ſingle part of ſpeech; is general, and determined by uſe: *term*, is a particular caſt of language; owes its formation to the ſubject, and its excellence to its ſuitableneſs. *Expreſſion*, is a certain mode of ſpeech; riſes from thought, and is more or leſs beautiful, according to its particular turn.

The purity of language depends upon its *words*; the preciſion, upon its *terms*; and brilliancy, upon its *expreſſions*.

Elaborate diſcourſes require the *words* to be truly Engliſh; the *terms* proper; and the *expreſſions* noble.

A *word*, which has eſcaped us undeſignedly, ſometimes has been attended with fatal conſequences. *Terms* of art are now pretty generally known; however, they appear with little grace, except in the mouths of the profeſſors of thoſe arts. Starched, or far-fetched *expreſſions*, carry with them an air of pedantry.

Pile, Heap.

Theſe words equally ſignify a quantity of things together, one upon another; with this difference, that *pile*, rather means things put up regularly; whereas, *heap*, implies no other order in the arrangement, than what riſes from chance. As, a *pile* of wood; a *heap* of rubbiſh.

We ſay, a *pile* of bricks; when they are the materials prepared for building; and a *heap* of bricks when they are the remains of a fallen edifice.

Departure, Death, Deceaſe.

Departure is a ſtile more refined, and carries with it an idea of the paſſage from one life to another; *death*, more common, and ſignifies, preciſely, extinction of life; *deceaſe*, more ſtudied, is a term ſomewhat bordering upon the law, and implies a cutting off from the number of men. The ſecond of theſe words, refers to all ſorts of animals; the other two to man only.

A glorious *departure* is preferable to a ſhameful life. *Death* is the common lot of all things living.

Succeſſion, does not take place, 'till the moment of *deceaſe*.

Departure preſents nothing horrid to the imagination, it indicates ſomething agreeable in eternity; but *death* preſents ſomething dreadful and affrighting. *Deceaſe*, preſents an idea only of leaving life to our ſurvivors.

A *departure* to immortality, at the point of *death*, was the rapturous object on which the ſaints of old, fixed their eyes, and which induced them to encounter all the difficulties and perils of life.

Property is continually occupied, from the *deceaſe* of one poſſeſſor, it paſſes to another.

Value, Worth.

Value riſes from the intrinſic goodneſs of things; *worth* from the eſtimation of them.

Of two things, the beſt is moſt *valuable*; and that *worth* moſt, that bears the greateſt price.

Valley, Bottom, Vale, Dale.

Of theſe four words, *valley* implies a narrow ſpace, ſituated between two hills; *bottom*, a like ſpace, but quaggy and diſagreeable. *Vale*, ſignifies a ſpace more extended: whereas, *dale*, means rather low lands.

The words, *dale* and *vale*, are oftener found in poetry;—*valley* and *bottom*, in proſe.

Valleys are, for the moſt part, winding, and as they receive water from the hills on each ſide, are generally converted into meads. He whoſe houſe ſtands in a *bottom*, cannot live on a more unhealthy ſpot. A fine *vale*, with beautiful encloſures, bounded by riſing woods, is a delightful proſpect. *Dales* are much eaſier to be ploughed than hilly lands.

Head,

Head, Chief.

The word, *head*, is reckoned ſynonimous only to *chief*, when uſed in a figurative ſenſe; but, even then, it requires a different application. *Head* agrees beſt with reſpect to arrangement: *chief*, with regard to ſubordination. Thus we ſay, the *head* of a battalion, or a ſhip; the *chief* of a party, or an undertaking.

A commander in *chief* is generally at the *head* of his troops.

Impediment, Obſtacle, Obſtruction.

There ſeems to be a gradation in theſe words. The *impediment* ſtays; the *obſtacle* reſiſts; the *obſtruction* puts an entire ſtop to.

We ſay, remove the *impediment*; ſurmount the *obſtacle*; take away or vanquiſh the *obſtruction*.

Even ſmall *impediments*, ſometimes, prove ſuch *obſtacles* as *obſtruct* our beſt endeavours.

The word, *impediment*, ſeems to expreſs ſomething, riſing from the nature and proper circumſtances of what we are about; that of *obſtacle*, ſomething, from a foreign cauſe; that of *obſtruction*, ſomething, proceeding from a ſuperior force.

Every temptation may be ſaid to *impede* our reſolutions to virtue. The eloquence of Demoſthenes, was the greateſt *obſtacle* that Philip of Macedon found in all his political undertakings; and which he could never ſurmount but by force of arms. Nearneſs of kin, is an *obſtruction* to marriage, which the laws have made, and which thoſe laws only can take away.

Learning, Literature, Erudition.

Of all order of words, there does not appear a more regular climax than in the above three; which

ſeems to be completed by the word KNOWLEDGE; but as that has never been accounted ſynonimous with theſe, I ſhall take no notice of it, here.

Learning, implies, ſimply, that knowledge which we acquire by our common ſtudy at ſchool. *Literature*, denotes polite learning, or an acquaintance with the Belles Lettres, and is rather practical: but *erudition*, ſignifies great depth of knowledge, with a particular relation to that which is ſpeculative.

Without ſome degree of *learning*, 'tis impoſſible to paſs well through the world. There was a time, when the nobility piqued themſelves on being men of *literature*. A taſte for *erudition*, will furniſh infinite amuſement for a tranquil and retired life.

To *Inquire*, *Interrogate*, *Aſk*.

We *inquire*, we *interrogate*, we *aſk*, in order to know; but the verb, *inquire*, implies curioſity; that of *interrogate*, authority; that of *aſk*, ſomething more civil and reſpectful.

The words, *inquire* and *interrogate*, make ſenſe by themſelves; but to uſe the word *aſk*, with propriety, we muſt add the matter to it; that is, to make the ſenſe perfect, we muſt mention the thing we *aſk*.

'Tis the buſineſs of a ſpy to *inquire*. Criminals are *interrogated* by the judge. The ſoldier *aſks* orders from the commanding officer.

To *Shun*, *Avoid*, *Fly*.

We *ſhun* thoſe perſons whom we would not ſee, or by whom we would not be ſeen. We *avoid* doing things that are diſagreeable to us. We *fly* both perſons and things, which we fear and dread.

In the words, *ſhun* and *avoid*, which ſeem to have the neareſt affinity to each other, there is this ſtanding

ing difference, that the word *ſhun* is generally applied to perſons; that of *avoid*, to things.

In order to *fly*, we turn to the oppoſite ſide, and get quick away to prevent being taken; in order to *ſhun*, we take another road, getting ſlily away to avoid being ſeen, or to eſcape a trap; in order to *avoid*, we uſe ſome extraordinary means.

We *ſhun* troubleſome company. We *avoid* running into exceſs. We *fly* thoſe who purſue us.

Knowledge of the world makes us *ſhun*. Prudence makes us *avoid*. Fear makes us *fly*.

The beſt remedy againſt the plague, is to *fly* far from the place where it is. The ſureſt method of preſerving our innocence, is to *ſhun* bad company. It is an act of the greateſt weakneſs, not to *avoid* doing things which are detrimental to our intereſt.

Severity, Rigour.

Severity, ſhews itſelf, chiefly, in the manner of thinking and judging; it condemns readily, and admits of no excuſe. *Rigour*, is ſeen, particularly, in the manner of puniſhing; it pardons nothing, nor lightens the ſtroke.

Falſe-devotees, are *ſevere* only to others, whom they are ever eager to condemn; and are always applauding their own actions. *Rigour* can never be juſtifiable, but at thoſe times when example is of the utmoſt conſequence; yet, even then, ſome ſort of allowance ſhould be made for human frailty.

To *Succour, Help, Aſſiſt, Relieve.*

We make uſe of the word, *ſuccour*, in danger; *help*, in labour; *aſſiſt*, in want; *relieve*, in diſtreſs. The firſt ſprings from a motive of generoſity; the ſecond, from good nature; the third, from humanity; the fourth, from compaſſion.

We give *ſuccour*, in battle; we *help*, when we carry part of another's burden; we *aſſiſt* the poor; and *relieve* the afflicted.

The policy of ſtates has found it neceſſary to *ſuccour* each other, when the power of any one of them is gaining too great a head. Very extraordinary things have been done by the joint help of numbers. Many a parent has beggar'd himſelf, in advancing the fortune of his child; 'tis, therefore, the indiſpenſable duty of that child to *aſſiſt* his father to the utmoſt of his power. The truly compaſſionate man, receives as much inward ſatisfaction in *relieving* the diſtreſſed, as he communicates.

Always, Continually, Perpetually.

That which we do *always*, we do at all times, and on all occaſions; that which is done *continually*, is done without interruption or intermiſſion, but for a time limited; whereas, what is done *perpetually*, is done without intermiſſion, and without any regard to time.

We ſhould *always* prefer our duty to our pleaſure. It is impoſſible to be *continually* at work. The heavenly bodies are *perpetually* in motion.

To pleaſe in company, we ſhould *always* talk well, but not *continually*. The longitude may be diſcovered by *perpetual* motion.

Diverſity, Variety.

Diverſity ſuppoſes a change, which taſte is always in ſearch of, in order to diſcover ſome novelty that may enliven and delight it: *variety* ſuppoſes a plurality of things, differing from each other in likeneſs, which cheers the imagination, apt to be cloyed with too great a uniformity.

Without

Without ſome *diverſity*, life would be altogether inſipid. Nature has thrown infinite *variety* among the ſmalleſt objects; which, if we cannot perceive, is owing to a defect of light.

An agreeable *diverſity* of colours, will give as much pleaſure to the eye, as harmonious ſounds to the ear. *Variety* of amuſements inſenſibly lead us into diſſipation.

Difference, Diſpute, Quarrel.

Oppoſition of intereſts, cauſes *differences*. Contrariety of opinions, produces *diſputes*. Harſhneſs of diſpoſitions, is the ſource of *quarrels*.

We make up the *difference*. We end the *diſpute*. We appeaſe the *quarrel*.

Envy and covetouſneſs make ſometimes great *differences* for trifles. Prejudice and want of attention to what is ſaid, commonly prolong *diſputes*. *Quarrels*, for the moſt part, proceed more from diſpoſition than animoſity.

Ill, Sick.

Theſe two words are conſidered only as ſynonymous, when they imply afflicted with diſeaſe; but as indiſcriminately as they may be uſed, even in that ſenſe, ſtill they convey different ideas, marking different degrees of illneſs. The word *ill*, in my opinion, is uſed with moſt propriety, when health is the leaſt impaired; that of *ſick*, when the body is greatly diſeaſed. Thus we ſay, when we find a heavineſs upon the ſpirits, or a want of appetite, that we are *ill*; but when the whole frame of any one is diſordered, we naturally ſay he is *ſick*.

When we apply either of theſe words to ourſelves, they carry very different meanings; thus, I am *ill*, is general, and implies diſordered in any part of the body;

body; whereas, I am *ſick*, is particular, and means diſordered in the ſtomach.

There is yet a further diſtinction between them; *Ill*, is moſt applicable, when in pain only; *ſick*, when diſeaſed; thus we ſay, he is *ill* of the gout; but *ſick* of a fever.

Diſeaſe, Diſtemper, Sickneſs.

Diſeaſe and *diſtemper*, imply particular diſorders; with this difference, that *diſeaſe* is more applicable to man; *diſtemper*, to brutes; whereas, *ſickneſs*, is more general, and may be applied to either.

Diſeaſes, ſuch as the plague, fevers, &c. are ſometimes ſo epidemical, as to lay waſte more than the ſword. *Diſtempers* among cattle, are generally infectious. Divine diſpleaſure, hath often ſhewn itſelf, by a general *ſickneſs* among men and beaſts.

Both *diſeaſes* and *diſtempers*, when become univerſal, are *ſickneſſes* ſo ſevere, as draw the joint prayers of a people, in hopes to avert them.

Weary, Tired, Fatigued.

It is the continuation of the ſame thing that either *wearies* or *tires*; with this difference, that *weary* implies a leſs degree; *tired* a greater; but it is labour that *fatigues*. We grow *weary*, or *tired* with ſtanding. We are *fatigued* with work.

When we are *weary* of a thing, to complete it, we lack ſpirits; when *tired*, we are totally unable; when *fatigued*, we want ſtrength to go through it as we would.

Wearineſs, proceeds ſometimes from an unwillingneſs in what we undertake; we are frequently *tired* through indiſpoſition of body, and ſlow circulation of blood; but *fatigue* is always the conſequence of much

much action; it ſuppoſes exceſs of work, with reſpect either to difficulty, or length of time.

In a figurative ſenſe, a petitioner grows *weary*, through his impatience; *tired*, through his perſeverance; and *fatigued*, through his importunities.

We are *weary* with waiting; *tired* with ill ſucceſs; and *fatigued* with purſuing.

Thus, we may be *weary*, and not *tired*; *tired*, yet not *fatigued*.

Light, Brightneſs, Splendor.

Light, is the origin or commencement of *brightneſs*; *ſplendor*, is *brightneſs* in perfection.

The intention of *light*, is only to make objects viſible; that of *brightneſs*, to make them clearly diſtinguiſhable and known: *ſplendor* ſhews them to the greateſt degree of perfection.

It is *light* at day-break; *bright* in the morning; *ſplendid* at noon.

We attribute *light* to the ſtars; *brightneſs* to the moon; and *ſplendor* to the ſun.

Luſtre, Brilliancy, Radiancy.

Theſe three words, as the laſt, riſe gradually one upon another, and mark the different degrees of the effect of light.

Luſtre, ſeems to be poſſeſſed of poliſh only; *brilliancy*, of light; but *radiancy*, of fire.

Luſtre ſhines only; *brilliancy* dazzles; but *radiancy* glares.

We ſeldom make uſe of the word *luſtre*, but in the literal ſenſe; whereas, we frequently uſe that of *radiancy*, and much more often that of *brilliancy*, in the figurative. Conſidered then in this ſenſe, it appears to me, that it is the force of truth, the energy of language, and the newneſs of the thoughts that

gives

gives *radiancy* to a diſcourſe; whereas, *brilliancy* riſes from the beautiful turns and lively touches of expreſſion: and that it is the choice of words, the agreement of terms, and the arrangement of phraſes, that gives *luſtre* to what is ſaid.

Wiſdom, Prudence.

Wiſdom, makes us act and ſpeak properly; *prudence*, prevents our ſpeaking, or acting, improperly. The firſt, in order to attain its ends, ſearches out the beſt paths to follow: the ſecond, that it may not miſs its aim, tries to diſcover the bad ways, in order to avoid them.

Wiſdom is more knowing; *prudence* more wary.

The *wiſe* man makes uſe of thoſe means that are moſt proper for his purpoſe; he conducts himſelf by the light of reaſon. The *prudent* man takes thoſe ways he thinks moſt ſure; he does not venture into places unknown.

An ancient writer has ſaid, that it is a mark of *wiſdom*, not to talk on any ſubject but what we are thorough maſters of, eſpecially if we would be eſteemed; we may add to this maxim, that it is a piece of *prudence*, not to bring a diſagreeable ſubject on the tapis; particularly if we are deſirous of being beloved.

To *Find, Meet.*

We *find* things unknown, or which we ſought after. We *meet* things that are in our way, or which preſent themſelves to us, unſought for.

We take a walk with the hopes of *meeting* our friend. We tell him who is ſearching for any one, the place where he is moſt likely to *find* him.

The unfortunate *find* always ſome reſource in their misfortunes. People who readily unite themſelves with

with all the world, are liable to *meet* bad company.

Union, Joining.

Union, relates particularly to two different things which agree together. *Joining*, reſpects, properly, two diſtant things, which draw near together one after the other.

The word *union*, carries with it an idea of agreement and fitneſs: that of *joining*, ſeems to ſuppoſe ſome kind of motion.

We ſay the *union* of colours; and the *joining* of armies: the *union* of two neighbours; and the *joining* of two rivers.

That which is not *united*, is divided: that which is not *joined*, is ſeparated.

We *unite*, in order to form a ſociety. We *join*, for the ſake of company.

Union, is often uſed in a figurative ſenſe; but *joining*, only in the literal.

Union, is the ſupport of families, and the power of ſtates. The *joining* of many ſtreams, forms great rivers.

Situation, Condition, State.

The words, *ſituation* and *condition*, imply ſomething accidental and tranſitory; with this difference, that *ſituation* reſpects outward circumſtances; *condition*, thoſe within the matter referred to; whereas, that of *ſtate*, implies ſomething more habitual and laſting.

We generally uſe the word *ſituation*, as relative to affairs, rank, or fortune; *condition*, with reſpect to the nature, quality, or property of a thing; and that of *ſtate*, applying it to health, or our well or ill-being.

We

We ſay our *ſituation* is bad, when we are ſurrounded with difficulties; that a building is in bad *condition*, when out of repair; and that ſome perſons enjoy but an indifferent *ſtate* of health.

An ill-*ſtate* of health, added to a bad *ſituation* of affairs, is a *condition* which every man muſt naturally dread the falling into.

Such is the *condition*, and viciſſitude of human life, that the moſt prudent men have often found themſelves in perplexing *ſituations*; and, from a *ſtate* of happineſs, have, as it were, through the perverſeneſs of fortune, fallen into one moſt wretched and deplorable.

Notes, Remarks, Obſervations.

Notes, imply a ſhortneſs and preciſion: *remarks*, a choice and diſtinction: *obſervations*, ſomething critical and far-fetched.

Notes are often neceſſary: *remarks* are ſometimes uſeful: *obſervations* ſhould be always learned.

Change of manners and cuſtoms, for the moſt part, renders authors in want of *notes*. There are as good *remarks*, perhaps, to be made upon the moderns, as upon the ancients. Hiſtorical *obſervations* make antiquity more known.

To *Take, Receive, Accept.*

We *take*, what is given us. We *receive*, what is ſent us. We *accept*, what is offered us.

We *take* money; we *receive* favours; we *accept* ſervices.

To *accept*, implies always conſent and approbation; to *receive*, does not; to *take*, excludes only refuſal.

No man ſhould ever *take* more than his due. We ſhould always acknowledge thoſe civilities we have *received*.

received. What we have once *accepted*, ſhould never afterwards be rejected.

Sentiment, Opinion, Thought.

Theſe words are all in uſe, when the bare expreſſion only of ideas is in queſtion. In this ſenſe, *ſentiment* is more certain; it is a belief raiſed by ſolid or apparent reaſons; *opinion*, is more doubtful; it is a judgment built on ſome foundation; *Thought* is ſtill certain, ſpringing only from conjecture.

The word *ſentiment*, is uſed with more propriety when the ſubject is on taſte. That Homer is an excellent poet, is the *ſentiment* of every man of learning. The word *opinion*, agrees beſt when talking of ſcience. It is the general *opinion*, that the ſun is the centre of the world. The word *thought*, is more particularly in uſe, when we are judging of the event of things, or the actions of men. Politicians have long *thought*, that the Moſcovians would find a greater advantage from Aſia, than from Europe.

Sentiments are, in in ſome meaſure, guided by the influence of the heart; we often find them in favour of thoſe perſons we love. *Opinions* are frequently owing to prejudice; it is common for ſcholars, to have good ones of their maſters. *Thoughts* riſe greatly from imagination; they are often chimerical.

Angry, in a Paſſion, Paſſionate.

An impatient agitation, or riſing of the blood, againſt any one who has offended us, is the common import of the firſt two of theſe terms: The word *angry*, implies a paſſion more internal and laſting; whereas, the expreſſion, *in a paſſion*, carries in its idea, a ſudden external guſt of anger; ſhort, but violent.

Anger,

Anger, has its riſe in ſenſibility, or irritability; ſhall ſometimes brood in the breaſt for years, till at laſt, it will diſſemble for a long while together; but often finds it extremely difficult to pardon: on the contrary, it is the general characteriſtic of thoſe who are *in a paſſion*, to forgive as ſoon as it ſubſides; which may, perhaps, be the next quarter of an hour; beſides, the man *in a paſſion* cannot diſſemble; his violence of *anger* muſt have vent; when that is obtained, he is cool as before; indeed his *paſſion*, which is choler, and riſes in the bile, and humours of the body, will now and then ſettle into confirmed *anger*; but, when that is the caſe, it is generally owing to repeated offences.

With reſpect to the word *paſſionate*, there is a wide difference between the man *in a paſſion*, and a *paſſionate* man; the one being extraordinary, the other ordinary, or conſtitutional.

Few men, for example, can avoid being *in a paſſion*, when they are greatly offended; but *paſſionate* people are heated on the moſt trifling occaſions.

Haſty, Paſſionate.

According to my conception, it appears, that *haſty* relates more to action or blows; and that *paſſionate* goes ſeldom farther than words.

A *haſty* man is apt to lift his hand; it is generally with him a word and a blow. A *paſſionate* man will vent his anger in words only.

We ſhould be upon our guard, when with *haſty* people; and have patience with the *paſſionate*.

Strong, Robuſt, Stout, Sturdy.

Strength, is chiefly owing to the conſtruction of the muſcles. A little man is often *ſtronger* than a greater. *Robuſtneſs* carries with it an idea of luſti-

neſs,

neſs, is leſs ſubject to infirmities, and much owing to conſtitution. A ſhort man may be *robuſt*. By *ſtout*, we underſtand tall and ſtrong-made. A little man, though never ſo *ſtrong*, cannot be called *ſtout*. By *ſturdy*, we mean *ſtout*, with a degree of hardineſs.

Strength gives a man an advantage over his enemies; *robuſtneſs* lends him an air of dignity and authority; *ſtoutneſs* makes him admired; *ſturdineſs* is accompanied with an air of meanneſs.

Complaiſant, Polite, Well-bred.

Complaiſance, riſes from the reſpect we ſhew thoſe whom we meet; is ſometimes ſincere, ſometimes not; *politeneſs*, from the flattering methods we make uſe of in our behaviour and converſation, and is generally inſincere; but to be *well-bred*, is to ſhew the ſame honours always with ſincerity.

Complaiſance, is the characteriſtic of the lover; *politeneſs* of the courtier; but to be *well-bred*, denotes the gentleman.

We ſhould be *complaiſant* without importunity; and *polite*, without inſipidity. The diſtinguiſhing mark of a well-bred man, is the conſtant care he takes never to diſguſt or offend.

Hump-backed, Crooked, Deformed.

The true meaning of the word *hump-backed*, is having a riſing upon the back, owing either to *crookedneſs*, or ſome other cauſe, and may be either natural or accidental: though the words *crooked* and *deformed*, convey other ideas, ſtill nothing is more common than to find them frequently in uſe to expreſs the ſame as *hump-backed*. By *crookedneſs*, is underſtood any deviation from natural ſtraitneſs. *Deformity* implies any part of the body being imperfect,

fect, or unnatural. Thus, a man is *crooked*, if any ways twiſted or bent from the natural ſhape; and *deformed*, if he has an eye, a finger, or a toe, too little, or too much. We may be *hump-backed*, or *crooked*, by a fall, or ſome other accident; but *deformed* we cannot be, otherwiſe than by a defect, or exuberance in nature.

A man may be *deformed*, and not *crooked*; *crooked*, yet not *hump-backed*.

Perfect, Finiſhed, Complete.

Perfection, regards, properly, the beauty which riſes from the deſign and conſtruction of the work; *finiſhing*, that which riſes from the workmanſhip and hand of the workman. *Completion*, depends upon the want of nothing; but on the work's having every thing it ſhould have. The firſt excludes all ſorts of defect. The ſecond ſhews a particular care and attention to the minuteſt article. The third reſpects more the totality of parts.

We may eaſily make a thing *complete*, and with much pains *finiſh* it; but, after all, it may not be *perfect*.

Misfortune, Diſaſter, Calamity.

Each of theſe words denotes a ſad event; but that of *misfortune*, is applied to caſualties and outward circumſtances; things detached from us. *Diſaſter*, reſpects, properly, perſonal accidents. *Calamity*, implies ſomething more general.

It is a *misfortune* to loſe our money, or our friend. It is a *diſaſter* to fall, or be wounded. It is a *calamity* to find ourſelves ſuddenly diſgraced and ruined in the world.

We

We ſay a great *misfortune*; a ſhocking *diſaſter*; and a dreadful *calamity*.

Misfortunes will happen to the beſt of men. We bring *diſaſters* frequently upon ourſelves through want of proper care. *Calamities* are often ſent by heaven upon the wicked, to rouſe them from their ſinful lethargy.

To *Conſent*, *Acquieſce*, *Agree*.

We *conſent*, to the will of others, by permitting. We *acquieſce*, in what is propoſed, by conforming. We *agree*, to what is ſaid, by approving.

We naturally oppoſe what we do not *conſent* to; diſcourage what we will not *acquieſce* in; and diſpute what we cannot *agree* to.

It appears to me, that the word *conſent* ſuppoſes ſome authority in the perſon *conſenting*; that of *acquieſce*, ſome ſubmiſſion in the perſon *acquieſcing*; and that the word *agree* denotes ſome averſion to diſpute.

Parents *conſent* to the marriage of their children. Parties *acquieſce* in the decree of a judge. Well-bred perſons *agree* almoſt to every thing.

Management, *Direction*, *Conduct*.

Management, reſpects only private things, truſted to the care of ſome one, to employ for the profit of another, and to whom he is to render an account; as that of a clerk to his maſter. *Direction*, relates to certain affairs, where there is either a diſtribution of money, office, or whatever elſe is committed to the care of another, to preſerve neceſſary order. *Conduct*, points out ſome knowledge and ability, with reſpect to things; and a ſubordination, with regard to perſons.

Whoſoever

Whoſoever has the *management* of any one's concerns in truſt, ſhould be as attentive and careful as if they were his own. He who undertakes the *direction* of public charities, ſhould diveſt himſelf of all prejudice and partiality. No one thing ſhould be committed to the *conduct* of another, unleſs we are well perſuaded he has abilities adequate to the taſk; and will act in conformity to the intentions of him whoſe buſineſs he undertakes.

Affront, Inſult, Abuſe.

Affront, is an arrow of reproach and contempt ſhot in public; it piques and mortifies thoſe who have any ſenſe of honour. *Inſult*, is an attack made with inſolence; it is uſually repelled with ſpirit. Both *affronts*, and *inſults*, may be given without words; but *abuſe*, reſults chiefly from ſcurrilous language.

Affronts are often given through the childiſh itch of revenge. *Inſults* are too frequently the offspring of pride. We ſeldom, if ever, hear *abuſe* in the mouth of a well-bred man.

Happy is that perſon that can put up *affronts*, with compoſure, bear *inſults* with calmneſs, and turn a deaf ear to *abuſe*.

To, in order to.

Theſe terms are ſynonimous in that ſenſe, where they ſignify doing one thing in view of another; but the word *to* denotes a nearer view; the expreſſion, *In order to*, one farther off.

We get introduced to a prince, *to* make our court: we make our court to him, *in order to* obtain his favours.

The word *to* ſeems to agree beſt, when what we do, in view of ſome other thing, is almoſt certain to take effect. The expreſſion, *in order to*, appears to

to be uſed with moſt propriety, when the thing we have in view may not be the immediate conſequence.

We fire cannon againſt a beſieged place *to* make a breach, and, *in order to* take it by aſſault, or oblige the enemy to ſurrender.

To, reſpects, more particularly, an effect which ought to be produced. *In order to*, regards properly an aim which we would obtain.

Young women, at a certain age, do all they can *to* pleaſe, *in order to* procure themſelves huſbands.

Outſide, Appearance.

In the literal ſenſe, it is the walls, the ditches, the courts, the gardens, the avenues, that form the *outſide* of a caſtle; but it is the figure, the grandeur, the ſituation, and the architecture that determine the *appearance:* the *outſide* being the external part of a thing; the *appearance*, the effect which a view of that thing produces, or the idea we form of it, by that view.

In the figurative ſenſe, *outſide* is oftener applied to our manners, and our way of living: *appearance* ſeems to be more in uſe, with reſpect to our actions and our conduct.

A brilliant *outſide* is no certain proof of a good fortune. Going frequently to church, is an *appearance* that can determine little with regard to virtue.

Viſion, Apparition.

A *viſion* paſſes inwardly in the mind, and is ſuppoſed to be only an action of the imagination. An *apparition* ſtrikes the ſenſes outwardly, and is ſuppoſed to be an object from without.

Joſeph was warned by a *viſion*, to fly into Egypt with his family. Mary Magdalen was informed of the reſurrection of our Saviour, by an *apparition*.

Feverish persons often think they see *visions*. Timid and credulous people, sometimes, take trees or posts for *apparitions*; and frequently objects of their own imagination.

To *See*, *Perceive*.

Objects that have some duration, or that shew themselves, are *seen*; those that pass by quickly, or are hid, in some measure from the eye, are only *perceived*.

We *see* the face, and by that *perceive* the disposition of the heart.

In a crowded court, those who stand forward are *seen* by the prince; while others, behind, are scarcely *perceived*.

In a further sense, *seeing* is the action of the eye; *perception*, the action of the mind.

We *see* the motions of an enemy; and *perceive* its designs.

To *Fear*, be *Apprehensive*, *Dread*, be *Afraid*.

We *fear* an ill; through a natural aversion to it, and from a sense that it may happen to us: we are *apprehensive* of losing a benefit, through an eager desire to obtain it, and from a conviction that we never may: we *dread* our adversary through sentiments of esteem, when we know him our superior: we are *afraid* of danger, through a timid disposition.

Want of courage makes us *fear*: Doubt of success makes us *apprehensive*. Distrust of strength makes us *dread*. Imagination itself will often make us *afraid*.

Common people *fear* death more than any thing: the Epicureans were much more in *fear* of pain; but gentlemen are of opinion they ought to *fear* nothing so much as infamy. The more ardently we wish for a thing,

a thing, the more we *apprehend* the loſing of it. Whatever merit an author may flatter himſelf that he has, he ſhould always *dread* the judgment of the public. Women, who are *afraid* of nothing but loſing their reputation, do honour to their ſex.

To *Teach, Learn, Inſtruct.*

To *teach*, is only to give leſſons; to *learn*, is to give leſſons with ſucceſs: both which words relate more to thoſe things that are proper to cultivate the mind, and form a good education; for which reaſon we uſe them with propriety when the arts and ſciences are in queſtion. To *inſtruct*, has a greater relation to that which is uſeful in the conduct of life, and ſucceſs of affairs; it is therefore in its proper place, when ſpeaking of any thing that concerns either our duty or our intereſt.

Profeſſors *teach* in public ſchools thoſe who come to hear them. The hiſtorian *learns* poſterity the events of his time. A father *inſtructs* his children how they ought to live in the world.

It requires great knowledge to *teach*; method and plainneſs to *learn* others; experience and abilities to *inſtruct*.

Many perſons attempt to *teach*, what they have occaſion to ſtudy themſelves. Some will undertake to *learn* others what they themſelves are almoſt ignorant of. Very few are capable of *inſtructing*.

The verb, to *learn*, however, is at beſt but inelegant, and is always uſed with more propriety when it ſignifies to gain knowledge, than to communicate it.

Gentle, Tame.

Gentle animals are naturally ſo; *tame* ones are ſo partly by the art and induſtry of man.

The dog, the ox, and the horſe, are *gentle* animals; the bear and the lion are ſometimes *tame*.

To *Bind*, *Tie*.

We *bind*, to prevent the limbs moving, or the parts of a thing ſeparating; we *tie*, to ſtop a thing, or prevent its going any farther.

We *bind* the feet and hands of a criminal; and we *tie* him to a ſtake.

In the figurative ſenſe, a man is *bound*, when he is not at liberty to act; and he is *tied*, when he cannot change his party, or quit it.

Authority and power *bind*: intereſt and love *tie*.

We do not think ourſelves *bound*, when we ſee not our bonds: and we do not imagine ourſelves *tied*, when we have no occaſion to uſe our liberty.

To *Hope*, *Expect*.

The firſt of theſe words has, for its object, ſucceſs in itſelf, and denotes a truſt borne up by ſome encouragement. The ſecond regards, particularly, the happy moment of event, and intimates a certainty of its arriving; we *hope* to obtain things; we *expect* their coming.

We ſhould always *hope* for the indulgence of Heaven; and *expect*, without murmuring, the hour of Providence.

What we *hope* for, ſeems to be more a favour or a kindneſs; what we *expect*, more a duty or obligation. Thus we *hope* for favourable anſwers to our demands; and we *expect* ſuch as are agreeable to our propoſitions.

I *hope* my work will meet with the taſte of the public; and I *expect* an equitable ſentence.

Weight, Influence, Sway.

Taking theſe words in the ſenſe of having power over the minds of others; *weight*, implies prevalence, though ſmall; *influence* ſeems to have more force; *ſway*, is more abſolute.

Superiority of rank and reaſon, gives *weight*; it is commonly by perſuaſion that it acts. Attachment to perſons, contributes much to the *influence* they have over us; it is by ſolicitation it prevails. The art of finding out, and taking advantage of the weakneſs of men, forms the *ſway* we bear over them; 'tis by watching their motions that we ſucceed.

The *weight* we have with others, proceeds always from ſome worth in ourſelves, either of mind, birth, or fortune. *Influence*, is owing to ſome tie, either of heart or intereſt. *Sway*, riſes from an aſcendency, arrogated by art, or ceded to us through weakneſs.

A perſon of *weight*, has ſucceeded ſometimes when arguments would have no force. *Influence*, on ſome occaſions, hath wrought almoſt miracles, effecting that which money could not bring to bear. *Sway*, is a wonderful operator on weak minds; procuring that, through art, which no other thing can poſſibly obtain.

What perverſeneſs then can poſſibly withſtand a man of ſome *weight*, in himſelf; whoſe *influence* is great, and who knows how to bear a proper *ſway*.

Authority, Power, Dominion.

We find, in the word *authority*, ſufficient energy to make us perceive a-right, either of civil or politc adminiſtration. There is, in the word *power*, a particular relation to the ſubordinate execution of ſupe-

rior orders. The word *dominion*, carries with it an idea of empire.

It is the law which gives *authority*; deriving all its might from thence. *Power*, is inveſted in delegates, thoſe to whom the execution of the laws is intruſted, and is conſequently in ſubordination to *authority*. *Dominion*, ſprings from the joint conſent of the people, or from the force of arms, and is either lawful or tyrannical.

We are happy in living under the *authority* of a Prince, who prides himſelf in juſtice; whoſe miniſter aſſumes no *power*, beyond what is legal; and who makes the welfare of his ſubjects, the baſis of his *dominion*.

Authority, if weak, is expoſed to contempt; it is equally as dangerous not to make uſe of it on proper occaſions, as even to abuſe it. A blind *power*, which acts in oppoſition to juſtice, becomes odious, and paves the way to its own ruin. A jealous *dominion*, that admits of no ſharer, makes itſelf formidable; awakens, on that account, the ardor of its enemies, and thus uſhers in its own fall.

There appears to me, particularly in the idea of *authority*, ſomething juſt and reſpectable; in the idea of *power*, ſomething ſtrong and active; and in the idea of *dominion*, ſomething great and elevated.

As there is none but God that has an unlimited *authority*; ſo there is none elſe who has infinite *power*; neither is there any abſolute, ſovereign, and independent *dominion* than his.

Nature has eſtabliſhed no *authority*, among men, but that of fathers over their children; all other proceeds from poſitive right. The *power* of the paſſions, is the true ſpring of action, and determines us with reſpect either to good or evil. It is not only by the diſpoſition of human laws, that marriage places the woman under the *dominion* of man; but it is alſo ſo ſettled by the divine.

Volume, Book.

A *volume*, may contain many *books*: A *book* may make many *volumes*. The binding, properly, diſtinguiſhes the *volumes*; and the diviſion of the work the *books*.

We muſt not always judge of the knowledge of an author, by the largeneſs of the *volume*. Works are ſometimes ſpread out into many *books*, which would be more valuable were they reduced to one.

To *have a Mind for*, *Long for*, *Wiſh for*, To *Hanker after*, *Luſt after*.

The laſt of theſe expreſſions, is more uſed in theology, and ſuppoſes, always, an illicit object, forbid by the laws of God; thus, we *luſt after*, a woman, or the goods of another. The others are all in common uſe, and expreſs our inclination to a thing, be it what it will; with the following difference between them: We *have a mind for*, or *long for*, a preſent object; but, *have a mind*, ſeems attended with more knowledge and reflection; *long for*, more opinion and more taſte: we *wiſh for* things farther diſtant; we *hanker after* things, that more affect us.

Princes, ſometimes, *have a mind*, to gratify their ambition, at the expence of their future welfare. Women with child, frequently *long for* moſt things they ſee. Lazy people often ſit down, and content themſelves with *wiſhing for* thoſe things they would preſently obtain, if diligent and aſſiduous. Some children will *hanker* a long time *after* their nurſes, and it is with the greateſt difficulty they can be brought to forget them.

Gain, Profit, Lucre, Emolument.

Gain, ſeems to ariſe from ſomething very caſual; and implies riſk and hazard; it is for this reaſon, the word is in great uſe among gameſters and tradeſmen. *Profit*, appears to be more ſure; proceeding either from lands or induſtry. Thus, we ſay, the *profits* of the earth; or the *profits* of our labour. The characteriſtic of *lucre*, conſiſts in a ſimple relation to the paſſion of intereſt; it is, on this account, we ſay, with the greateſt propriety, that man is fond of *lucre*. *Emolument*, relates to commiſſions and employments; intimating, not only the ſalaries, but all other perquiſites.

Some perſons are ſo particularly rigid, as to condemn all *gain* ariſing from play. Many will idly call that *profit*, which has accrued by illicit means. It is low and ſordid to be ever led by *lucre*. We do not always find the greateſt honour in offices, where there is the greateſt *emolument*.

Very, Extremely.

We are apt to uſe theſe words indifferently, one as well as the other, to expreſs a great degree of any thing. Thus, for example, we ſay, in the ſame ſenſe, *very* wiſe; *extremely* wiſe; notwithſtanding this, there appears to me ſome difference between them: The word *very*, marks an extraordinary degree; but *extremely*, a degree to admiration. Thus, we ſay, men are *very* wicked. Providence is *extremely* kind.

Beſides this diſtinction, there is one more delicate, which is, that *very*, does not ſuit well but in the literal and natural ſenſe; for when we ſay a man is *very* wiſe, we would be underſtood, as ſaying, truly wiſe; whereas, *extremely*, may be uſed with elegance in an ironical ſenſe. We ſay, then, in raillery, he is *extremely*

tremely wiſe, in ceaſing to purſue, that he knows not how to get at; and *extremely* patient, in taking a blow calmly, he has not the ſpirit to return.

Fantaſtical, Whimſical, Maggotty, Fanciful.

Of theſe words, that of *fantaſtical*, implies a rambling from true taſte, through exceſs of delicacy, or an unſeaſonable ſearch after ſomething better. That of *whimſical*, means an affectation of ſingularity. By *maggotty*, is underſtood a great inconſtancy, or ſudden change of taſte. *Fanciful*, implies a certain revolution of humour, or a particular way of thinking.

There cannot be a more deſpicable creature, than the *fantaſtical* fop; he tricks out his charming ſelf, in hopes of attracting the reſpect of mankind; but, on the contrary, meets only with ſcorn and contempt. The *whimſical* man, if his invention be fertile, is ſometimes an object of preſent admiration; but, on ſerious reflection, is too frequently the ſubject of ridicule. A *maggotty* perſon, is equally tireſome to himſelf, and to others; as what pleaſes him one minute, ſhall often diſpleaſe him the next. He who is *fanciful*, is far more troubleſome to himſelf than to others; for being led away by his wild imagination, he fondly believes many things to be real, which, in fact, are only ideal.

Capacity, Ability.

Capacity, has more relation to the knowledge of things: *ability*, to their application. The one is acquired by ſtudy; the other by practice.

He who has *capacity* for a thing, is proper to undertake; he, who has *ability*, to execute.

Little, Small.

The word *little*, ſometimes ſignifies only want of bigneſs; and, at other times, want of greatneſs, in every ſenſe; whereas, that of *ſmall*, is the oppoſite only to bigneſs, and ſuppoſes ſome kind of length. Thus, we ſay a *little* houſe; a *little* man; a *little* cup; a *little* globe: but, a *ſmall* thread; a *ſmall* line; a *ſmall* twig.

To *Remark, Obſerve.*

To *remark*, implies taking notice with attention, in order to remember: to *obſerve*, means rather to watch with examination, by way of paſſing our judgment.

The traveller *remarks* that which ſtrikes him moſt; the ſpy *obſerves* thoſe proceedings which he thinks of conſequence.

It is the part of a general, to *remark* thoſe of his men, who diſtinguiſh themſelves in battle; and *obſerve* the motions of the enemy.

We may *obſerve*, in order to *remark*: but cuſtom will not admit of an inverſion of the phraſe.

Thoſe who *obſerve* the conduct of others, in order to *remark* their faults; do it rather through a delight in cenſuring, than a deſire of correcting their errors.

To *Go back, Return.*

We *go back* from a place, where we have ſome conſiderable time been. We *return* to a place we had juſt before left. Thus, we ſay, he is *gone back* into his own country. He is *returned* home. We ſay, alſo, he is *gone back* from virtue; he has *returned* to his fault.

Idea, Thought, Imagination, Notion.

The *idea*, repreſents the object; *thought*, conſiders it; *imagination*, forms it; thus worked up, it becomes a *notion*. The firſt only points; the ſecond examines; the third ſeduces; but the laſt draws.

When in converſation, our *ideas*, are juſt; our *thoughts*, fine; and our *imaginations*, brilliant; we ſhall be ſure to pleaſe: and our *notions*, though ſingular, will always be reſpectable.

Buſineſs, Affairs.

Buſineſs, implies an object of induſtry; *affairs*, an object of concern. The firſt, employs the hands; the ſecond, the mind. The word *buſineſs*, by its having no plural number, intimates a particular employ; by the ſingular of *affairs*, being ſeldom in uſe, in the ſenſe before us, that word is underſtood to mean a variety of tranſactions.

The man of much *buſineſs*, ought to have a ſtrong conſtitution. He who has many *affairs* to ſettle, though he may have a clear head, will find it difficult to adjuſt them all to his ſatisfaction.

He who continually interferes with the *buſineſs* of others, neglecting his own *affairs*, makes himſelf an object of ridicule, and merits the contempt of mankind.

To *Take, Chooſe.*

When we would *take* a thing, we determine upon one, becauſe we cannot have all. We *chooſe*, by comparing things, becauſe we would have the beſt. The one, ſuppoſes a ſimple determination of the will; the other, a diſcernment of the mind.

Between two things, exactly alike, we may deter-

mine which to *take*, when, at the ſame time, there is no *choice*.

We are ſometimes conſtrained to *take* one thing out of many, when we are not obliged to *chooſe*.

We cannot uſe the word *take*, but with reſpect to ourſelves; but we *chooſe* ſometimes for others.

It is a point of good manners, when offered fruit, or any other thing, where there is *choice*, to *take* that which comes firſt to hand: but when we would preſent any thing of the like ſort to a ſtranger, it is a mark of politeneſs to *chooſe* for him the beſt.

When things are at our option, that is, when we may *take* which we pleaſe, we ſhould try to make a good *choice*.

Between a good courſe of life and a bad one, there is no medium; we muſt either *take* the one or the other. Nothing appears more difficult to me than the *choice* of a friend.

If in a journey, there were only two roads to *take*, the one ſhort, but bad; the other long, but good; I ſhould certainly *chooſe* the laſt.

To *Chooſe*, *Make choice of*.

The word *chooſe*, is moſt in its place, with reſpect to things we would make uſe of. The expreſſion, *make choice of*, is more proper, when it relates to perſons we would appoint to any dignity or employ.

George the third *choſe* the Queen's palace as his place of reſidence in town; and *made choice of* Cæſar Hawkins, to inoculate his children.

To *chooſe*, indicates, more particularly, a compariſon made between things, in order to know which is beſt to take; to *make choice of*, marks with greater preciſion, the ſimple determination of one perſon preferable to another.

Princes

Princes do not always *chooſe* their miniſters; neither do they always *make choice of* a Talbot for a chancellor, nor a Marlborough for a general.

To *Chooſe*, *Prefer*.

We do not always *chooſe* what we *prefer*: but we ever *prefer* that which we *chooſe*.

To *chooſe*, is to determine in favour of a thing, either on account of its merit or its value. To *prefer*, is to determine in its favour, by any motive whatſoever; whether it be merit, affection, good manners, policy, or what not.

'Tis the judgment that makes the *choice*; the heart that gives the *preference*. 'Tis for this reaſon that we commonly *chooſe*, what we are acquainted with, and *prefer* what we love.

Prudence, ſometimes, forbids our *chooſing*, that which ſtrikes the eye moſt. Juſtice will not often permit us to *prefer* our friends to other people.

In *chooſing* a ſtate of life, I think there can be no harm, in preferring that which is moſt agreeable to our inclinations, as in ſo doing, we ſhould naturally find more ſatisfaction in our duty.

Choice, is either good or bad, according to our taſte, or the knowledge we have in things. *Preference*, is either juſt or unjuſt, as reaſon dictates, or paſſion inſpires.

Partial *preference*, is ſometimes allowed to princes, in the diſtribution of their honours; but they ſhould always make *choice of* the ableſt men, in their appointments to public offices.

Meat, *Fleſh*.

By the word *meat*, is underſtood, any kind of food; but *fleſh*, ſignifies only the natural compoſition of an animal. Thus, we ſay, that fiſh and vegetables

vegetables are proper *meats* for Lent; and that the *fleſh* of a partridge, is very white and tender.

Grain is the *meat* of birds; *fleſh*, the food of beaſts.

Reformation, Reform.

Reformation, ſignifies, often the action of reforming; *reform*, ſeldom any other than the effect.

A general *reformation* of manners, among the people, will ever be found a very difficult and laborious taſk. When we have not been able to complete a thing to our ſatisfaction, by any ſort of amendment, we have often brought it to bear, by a thorough *reform*.

Smooth, Level.

That which is not rough is *ſmooth*. That which is free from either hollows or riſings, is *level*.

The *ſmootheſt* marble is the beſt. A country where there is neither hills nor valleys, is *level*.

Prerogative, Privilege.

Prerogative, relates to honour and perſonal preference; it riſes principally from ſubordination, or from the relation perſons bear among themſelves: whereas, *privilege* implies ſome advantage from intereſt or office, proceeding from the grant of a prince, or the laws of a ſociety.

Birth, gives *prerogatives*. Offices, give *privileges*.

Prerogative is ſeldom uſed now, but to imply the *privileges* of the Crown.

Knowing,

Knowing, Diſcerning.

The *knowing* man, acts ſurely, he ſeldom deceives himſelf; yet, knowledge of life only is his fort. The *diſcerning* man, is clear-ſighted and judicious, ſees through the artifices of mankind with half an eye, and will not ſuffer him to be deceived; his great abilities conſiſt in diſtinguiſhing.

The ſtudy of man, will make a perſon *knowing*: but it requires great experience, and a long attention both to men and books, to render him *diſcerning*.

An artful, ingenious rogue, will ſometimes take in the *knowing*, by a novel deceit; through the fallacy of which, the *diſcerning* man ſhall readily penetrate.

Order, Regularity.

Each of theſe words implies a prudent diſpoſition of things; but that of *order*, relates more to the effect which reſults from ſuch a diſpoſition; that of *regularity*, more to the power and to the model that conducts that diſpoſition.

We obſerve *order*, in conformance to *regularity*. The firſt is the effect of the ſecond.

Traffic, Trade, Commerce.

Traffic, relates more to the exchange of merchandiſe; *trade* and *commerce*, to that of buying and ſelling; with this difference, that *trade*, ſeems to imply the manufacturing and vending of merchandiſe within ourſelves; *commerce*, negociating with other countries.

We *traffic* with nations that have not the uſe of money, by bartering one kind of merchandiſe for another.

another. *Trade*, is looked upon by the wiſeſt of men, to be the ſupport of every ſtate; as the proſperity of a kingdom depends, in a great meaſure, upon its riches; and riches is the immediate effect of *trade*. The great and extenſive *commerce*, that England holds with other nations, makes us the glory and admiration of the world.

Traffic, is often uſed in an allegorical ſenſe, which the others are not; and then implies venality, or acting from intereſted motives, as in trade. Thus we, ſays Brieyere, *traffic*, with virtue and with love. All things are put up to ſale.

Exchange, Truck, Barter.

The word *exchange*, means ſimply, in a general ſenſe, the act of exchanging one thing for another, be it what it may: the other two are in uſe, to denominate the particular kinds, or methods of *exchange*; of which this is the difference, that the word *truck*, is uſed with moſt propriety, when ſpeaking of ſerviceable things, ſuch as are moveable; as the *trucking* of horſes, trinkets, utenſils, &c. Whereas, *barter* is a more mercantile expreſſion, and intimates the *exchange* of different commodities, by way of traffic. Thus, ſo little are the natives of Guinea acquainted with the value of gold, that they hold commerce with other nations, by *bartering* it away for glaſs, and other trifling ornaments.

Regard, Eſteem, Veneration, Reſpect.

When we entertain a good opinion of a man, we are ſaid to *regard* him; when that *regard* increaſes, we call it *eſteem*; we teſtify that *eſteem* by *veneration*; and prove it by ſubmiſſion, through *reſpect*.

We

We have a natural *regard* for a quiet neighbour; we *eſteem* him, if he ſtudies the good of the neighbourhood; if we perceive in him any eminent qualities, we hold him in *veneration*; and, in proportion to the rank he is above us, either by birth or fortune, we treat him with leſs or greater *reſpect*.

Being born in the ſame country, claims *regard*. Civility creates *eſteem*. Age and merit render *venerable*; rank and dignity, *reſpectable*.

Retinue, Train.

Retinue, implies a number of followers; *train*, the ſame with order. Thus, his coach was attended with ſo great a *retinue*, that there was no ſeeing the carriage for duſt. It was cuſtomary in a Roman triumph to have always a number of captive ſlaves in the *train*.

Occaſion, Occurrence, Conjuncture, Caſe, Circumſtance.

Occaſion, is uſed for the arrival of ſomething new, whether it be that which preſents itſelf, or what we ſeek; and in a ſenſe, as indeterminate with reſpect to time, as the object. *Occurrence*, is only in uſe, to expreſs that which happens unexpectedly, and with relation to the time preſent. We make uſe of the word *conjuncture*, to mark a ſituation proceeding from a concurrence of events, whether of buſineſs or intereſt. *Caſe*, is employed, to ſignify the main point, with a ſpecial reference to the ſort and ſingularity of the thing in queſtion. *Circumſtance*, carries with it, no other idea than that of ſomething additional, accompanying another, which is principal.

We know people on particular *occaſions*. We ſhould demean ourſelves, according to the *occurrence* of

of the times. It is commonly the *conjunctures* that determine us which ſide to take. It has been pretended, that there are *caſes*, in which reaſon would condemn even an attention to virtue. Diverſity of *circumſtances*, will make the ſame man think differently upon the ſame ſubject.

Uncertainty, Doubt, Suſpence.

In that ſenſe, in which theſe words are accounted ſynonymous, they all three imply indetermination: but, *uncertainty*, riſes when the event of things is unknown; *doubt*, when the mind knows not how to chooſe. By *ſuſpence*, is underſtood an indeterminate ſtate, when the mind is held in expectation.

We are in *uncertainty*, with reſpect to the ſucceſs of our proceedings; in *doubt*, what ſtep to take; in *ſuſpence*, when we are held from acting, by a delay of certainty.

Uncertainty, requires caution; *doubt*, conſideration; *ſuſpence*, patience.

A wiſe man is ſeldom *uncertain*, as to what ſhall happen; he foreſees future events, and prepares himſelf for them. When we are in *doubt*, and at a loſs to determine, we ſhould leave the matter to the deciſion of others. Of all ſtates of indetermination, that of *ſuſpence*, is the moſt vexatious, and the only remedy is a quiet reſignation.

Right, Juſtice.

Right, is the object of *juſtice*; and that which is due to every one. *Juſtice*, is the conformity of our actions with *right*; it is to render and ſecure to every one that which is his due. The firſt is dictated by nature, or eſtabliſhed by authority, either divine or human, and is, according to circumſtances, ſometimes

times liable to change. The ſecond, is the rule we ſhould always follow, and is ever invariable.

It is conſiſtent with the laws of *juſtice*, to uſe the ſame means in ſupport and defence of our *rights*, as are often employed to attack them.

Dejected, Melancholy, Low-ſpirited.

Dejection, is commonly cauſed by great affliction, and is too often a mark of deſpair. *Melancholy*, is generally the effect of conſtitution; its cloudy ideas overpower and baniſh all that are cheerful. *Low-ſpiritedneſs*, often proceeds from a weakneſs of nerves: exceſs of joy, fatigue, bad digeſtion will occaſion it.

The mind in *dejection*, is unhappy, not having ſufficient ſtrength and reaſon to get the better of it. *Melancholy*, will ſometimes wear away by frequent diverſion and diſſipation. A perſon, ſubject to *low-ſpirits*, ſhould purſue a regular courſe of life, and a uniform method of living.

The reverſe of *dejection*, is joy; the reverſe of *melancholy*, cheerfulneſs; and that of *low-ſpiritedneſs*, gaiety.

Piercing, Penetrating.

The word *piercing*, implies great ſtrength of ſight, and a ſtroke of the eye; that of *penetrating*, great force of attention and reflection.

A *piercing* mind, ſees things even through the veils that cover them; it is difficult to conceal truth from it; it will not ſuffer itſelf to be deceived. A mind that *penetrates*, reaches to the bottom of things, without ſtopping at the ſurface; it is not eaſy to deceive it, neither will it ſuffer itſelf to be amuſed.

Beſides the above diſtinction, *piercing*, ſeems to be executed by a ſudden glance; *penetrating*, by making way gradually.

To

To *Put, Place.*

Put, ſeems to have a general ſenſe; *place*, one more limited, meaning to *put* orderly, and in a proper place.

We *put* columns to ſupport an edifice: we *place* them with ſymmetry.

Diſcernment, Judgment.

Diſcernment, relates not only to a thing itſelf, but alſo to its appearances; and is a diſtinguiſhing knowledge, that prevents the confounding of one thing with another. *Judgment*, relates to a thing conſidered in itſelf, only in order to inveſtigate the truth, and is a knowledge that determines. The firſt is limited to things preſent; its office is to diſcern truth from falſhood, perfections from defects, motives from pretexts: the ſecond pries even into futurity; diſcovers the relation and conſequence of things, foreſeeing their effects. In ſhort, we may ſay of *diſcernment*, that it is knowing, that it renders our ideas juſt; and of *judgment*, that it is wiſe, that it makes our conduct diſcreet.

When choice or determination, with reſpect to the goodneſs or beauty of objects is in queſtion, we ſhould have recourſe to thoſe who have *diſcernment*. When we would take any ſtep of conſequence, we ſhould take the advice of ſuch perſons as have *judgment*.

Arts and ſciences require *diſcernment*; which is more or leſs nice, according to the delicacy of the underſtanding, or the extent of knowledge. Government, and the policy of ſtates, demand *judgment*; which is more or leſs ſure, according to the force of reaſon, and the length of experience.

Satisfied,

Satisfied, Contented.

We are *satisfied*, when we have obtained what we wished for: We are *contented*, when we wish not for any more.

It happens often, that when well *satisfied*, we are not the more *contented*.

Possession will always prove *satisfactory*; but it is the true enjoyment only of what we possess, that can make us *contented*.

Tale, Novel, Romance, Story.

Each of these words, implies a small history, or an entertaining relation of adventures: the first three are supposed to be fabulous, and made public; whereas, the last may be either true or feigned, and told either in print, or by word of mouth; but, as they carry ideas peculiar to themselves, it is my business to point them out. By the word *tale*, then, is meant a short, but dressed-up narrative of some single adventure; that of *novel*, signifies an amusing history, made up of many adventures, and carried on through one or more volumes. By *romance*, is understood a collection of wild adventures in love and war.

Tales, ought to be well related; *novels*, well invented; *romances*, well carried on; *stories*, well told.

Tales, if attended with good morals, are not only amusing, but instructive. *Novels*, are of no other use than to entertain; they waste the time without making the least improvement. *Romances*, spoil the taste of young people, who, by an attention to them, are apt to prefer the marvellous to the natural and simple truth. A droll *story*, told with humour, is a great enlivener of company.

Continuance,

Continuance, Continuation.

Continuance, relates to duration; *continuation*, to extent.

We ſhould ſtudy a conſcientious diſcharge of our duty, during our *continuance* in any office. The ſeveral books contained in the volume of Paradiſe Loſt, are *continuations* of the ſame ſubject.

Continual, Continued.

There may be an interruption in that which is *continual*; but that which is *continued*, will not admit of it. So that the firſt of theſe words, denotes properly the length of duration, although there may be intervals, and different renewals; and the ſecond, marks ſimply the unity of that duration, independent either of length, or ſhortneſs of the time; it is for this reaſon, we ſay, a *continual* noiſe; *continual* rains; but a *continued* ſtream; and, in muſic, a *continued* baſe.

Continual interruptions, will make us weary of the beſt undertakings. In countries, ſituated near the poles, there is, for the ſpace of five or ſix months together, one *continued* darkneſs, inſomuch that the inhabitants, during that time, are obliged to leave the place.

To *Bid, Order.*

The firſt of theſe is extremely general, the other more limited. To *bid*, intimates direction to perform, whether the perſon directing, has any authority for ſo doing or not. To *order*, implies the exerciſe of authority.

Some people are ſo very officious, that they are always ready to do what they are *bid*, whether the thing

thing be right or wrong, or the perſon *bidding*, be impowered to *order* them or not.

Yet, In the mean while, However, Nevertheleſs.

Yet, ſeems to have more force and energy; it aſſures with firmneſs, in ſpite of every oppoſition. *In the mean while*, is leſs abſolute, it affirms only againſt contrary appearances. *However*, diſtinguiſhes two things, which ſeem oppoſite; ſupporting one, without hurting the other. *Nevertheleſs*, affirms a thing by exception, giving us to underſtand, that it does not occur, but at the time we are ſpeaking.

Though the whole earth is in arms againſt truth, *yet*, it does not prevent its triumphing. Some parents are very ſtrict, with reſpect to the morals of their children; *in the mean while*, will indulge themſelves in every thing their own heart can wiſh. Addiſon was a wretched ſpeaker, *however*, he was an excellent author. Churchill, every one knows, was a bad liver; *nevertheleſs*, be was of ſome ſervice to his country, by ridiculing vice, and laſhing venality.

Excellency, Excellence.

Notwithſtanding theſe words are evidently the ſame, *excellence*, being no other than *excellency* contracted, or the redundant ſyllable, general in old writing taken away; yet cuſtom ſeems to have applied *excellency*, to expreſs the title of a governor, or that of an ambaſſador, from one prince to another; whereas, by *excellence*, is underſtood the ſtate of abounding in any good quality.

Pride, Arrogance, Vanity, Preſumption, Haughtineſs.

Pride, is unreaſonable or inordinate ſelf-eſteem. *Arrogance*, implies taking much upon ourſelves, and is *pride*, attended with inſolence and contempt. *Vanity*, is accompanied with affectation, and means *pride*, exerted on ſlight grounds. By *preſumption*, is underſtood a blind and adventurous confidence; with reſpect to *haughtineſs*, it is a mixture of ſoftneſs and inſolence, the immediate effect of *pride*.

The *haughtineſs* of the *proud* man, is inſufferable. *Pride*, makes us value ourſelves; *arrogance*, deſpiſe others. Through *vanity*, we covet the attention of our acquaintance. *Preſumption*, flatters us with having a vain power.

The *proud*, conſider themſelves in their own mind; full, and ſelf-ſwoln, they are taken up with their own perſon. The *arrogant*, claim to themſelves what they have not the leaſt pretenſions to; are ready to inſult thoſe who will not allow them what they claim, and look down on the reſt of the world with contempt. The *vain*, value themſelves upon the opinion of others; greedy of eſteem, they are eager to engroſs the attention of all mankind. The *preſumptuous*, carry their audacious hopes even to chimeras; bold to undertake, they fondly imagine they have power to do every thing.

The greateſt pain we can poſſibly give the *proud* man, is by laying his defects before his eyes. We cannot hurt the *arrogant* ſo much, as by ſilent contempt. We cannot mortify a *vain* man more, than by paying no attention to thoſe qualifications, or qualities, he prides himſelf in. In order to confound the *preſumptuous*, we need only deſire him to put his *vain* deſigns in execution.

Cure,

Cure, Remedy.

We perform a *cure*; we procure a *remedy*. The firſt relates more to the malady, and to the action of him who heals it; the ſecond, has more relation to health, and the ſtate of the malady we heal. We ſay of a *cure*, that it is fine, when its ſucceſs does honour to the perſon who performed it; and we ſay of a *remedy*, that it is certain or ſure, when its operations are efficacious; that is, when it produces thoſe conſequences we intended; and we ſay of both, that they are either eaſy or difficult.

Cure, ſeems to have no other object than ſtubborn diſorders, and thoſe which proceed from conſtitution; whereas, *remedy*, has a view to ſlight complaints, and ſuch as are of ſhort duration.

The more inveterate the diſorder, the more difficult the *cure*; in many caſes, regular living is the beſt *remedy*.

The word, *cure*, is often conſidered as the effect of *remedy*. Some *remedies* will complete a *cure*, much ſooner than others.

Incurable diſorders, are not only thoſe where the *cure* is abſolutely impoſſible; but ſuch as for which no *remedy* can be found.

Haughtineſs, Diſdain.

Both theſe words denote a diſpoſition that prevents affability, and keeps us at a diſtance from thoſe whom we think beneath us, either in birth, fortune, or abilities; with this difference, that *haughtineſs*, is founded upon the eſteem a man has for himſelf, and *diſdain*, upon the diſeſteem he has for others.

Haughtineſs, is ſeldom met with but in perſons of weak underſtanding, and thoſe who have had a bad

education. There are a ſort of vain people, who look upon *diſdain*, as a perſonal accompliſhment, and who uſe it on all occaſions, as a teſt of the merit they pretend to.

Sloth, Lazineſs, Sluggiſhneſs.

Sloth and *lazineſs*, are voluntary, with this difference, that *ſloth*, implies utter inactivity, an abſolute averſion to work; *lazineſs*, an inclination, but a fear of trouble and fatigue: whereas, *ſluggiſhneſs*, is often involuntary, proceeding ſometimes from conſtitution, and is diſcovered by its dull, heavy method of acting.

The *ſlothful* man, will not work at all. The *lazy* man, is drawn to it with difficulty. The *ſluggiſh* man, is ſlow through the whole operation.

Induſtry, is the reverſe of *ſloth*; activity, of *lazineſs*; expedition, of *ſluggiſhneſs*.

He who is *ſlothful*, is a murderer of time. *Lazineſs*, is its own puniſhment. A *ſluggiſh* perſon, is fit for no kind of employment, ſeldom doing any thing well he undertakes.

Harm, Hurt, Injury, Detriment, Miſchief.

Theſe words imply ſome kind of ill happening to a man's perſon, character, or property. Thoſe of *harm* and *hurt*, relate more to the perſon or character; with this difference, that *harm*, ſeems to denote a ſmall degree of *hurt*; *hurt*, a great degree of *harm*. *Miſchief*, implies ill to the perſon or property, and appears ever to be done with an evil intent. *Injury*, intimates a degree of *hurt*, without juſtice, and relates to the character or property. *Detriment*, carries an idea of loſs, and is ſeldom uſed but with regard to property.

By

By wounding a man, more or leſs, we *harm*, or *hurt* his perſon. By ſpeaking ill of him, deſervedly or not, we *harm*, or *hurt* his character: by breaking his head, or ſetting fire to his houſe, we are ſaid to do him a *miſchief*. By taking away his good name, we *injure* his character: by defrauding him of his goods, we *injure* him in his property. By breaking a hedge, or treading down of corn, we do a great deal of *detriment*.

Quickly, Soon, Speedily.

The word *quickly*, ſeems more proper to expreſs the motion with which we act; its reverſe is ſlowly. The word *ſoon*, reſpects the time when the action is performed; its reverſe is late. The word *ſpeedily*, has a greater relation to the time we employ about a thing; its reverſe is long time.

We advance the more by going *quick*; but we go ſurely by going ſlowly. Wickedneſs is always puniſhed either *ſooner*, or later. It is neceſſary to be a long time deliberating: but we ſhould execute *ſpeedily*.

He who begins *ſoon*, and works *quick*, will *ſpeedily* have done.

Aſſiduous, Expeditious, Quick.

When we are *aſſiduous*, at work, we loſe no time; when *expeditious*, we defer not, but finiſh immediately: when *quick*, we work with activity. Idleneſs, delay, and ſlowneſs, are the three defects oppoſite to theſe three good qualities.

An *aſſiduous* man thinks nothing of the trouble of what he takes in hand. An *expeditious* man will not quit his work. One that is *quick*, will preſently have done.

We ſhould be *aſſiduous*, in what we undertake; *expeditious*, in affairs that require to be ſoon ended; and *quick*, in the execution of orders.

Now, Inſtantly, Immediately, Preſently.

The doing a thing *now*, expreſſes the taking it in hand at that very inſtant; the other three words, as they are here placed, expreſs a time farther and farther off. *Inſtantly*, implies without any perceptible intervention of time. *Immediately*, means without delay. By *preſently*, is underſtood ſoon after.

Faſhion, Cuſtom.

Theſe two words, like many others I have taken notice of, though they may not ſtrike the reader at firſt ſight, as words reputed ſynonymous, have, nevertheleſs, been uſed as ſuch, by ſome of our beſt writers, and are at preſent: it is therefore neceſſary to point out the difference between them. *Faſhion*, then, ſeems more univerſal; *cuſtom*, more antient: that which the greater part of the people practiſe is a *faſhion*; that which has been practiſed a long time is a *cuſtom*.

Faſhion, introduces itſelf, and extends daily; *cuſtom*, eſtabliſhes itſelf, and gains authority; the firſt forms the mode; the ſecond, a uſage: each is a kind of law, independent on reaſon, with reſpect to that which relates to our outward actions.

There is ſometimes more policy in conforming to a bad *faſhion*, than being ſingular in ſome good things. Many perſons follow *cuſtom*, even in their way of thinking; imbibing the notions of their mothers and nurſes.

Variation,

Variation, Change.

Variation, conſiſts in being as much of one ſort as another: *Change*, conſiſts only in ceaſing to be the ſame.

We *vary* in our ſentiments, when we give them up, and embrace them again. We *change* our opinions, when we reject one, in order to embrace another.

He who has no certain principles, is liable to *vary*. He who is more attached to fortune than truth, will find no difficulty in *changing* his doctrine.

Variation, Variety.

Succeſſive changes in the ſame ſubject, make *variation*. A multitude of different objects forms *variety*. Thus, we ſay, the *variation* of time; *variety* of colours.

There is no government but is ſubject to *variation*. There is no ſpecies in nature, in which we may not obſerve great *variety*.

Track, Footſtep.

Track, is more general, meaning any mark left on the way of whatever paſſed. *Footſtep*, is more limited, implying the print of the feet. Thus, we ſay, the *track* of a horſe or a carriage; but the *footſteps* of a man.

Fickle, Inconſtant, Unſteady, Changeable.

The attachments of the *fickle* man are ſlight; thoſe of the *inconſtant*, of ſhort duration. As to the words *unſteady*, and *changeable*, they imply an averſion in

adhering to the ſame thing, with this difference, that the *unſteady* man is eager to enjoy many things; the *changeable* man, is in conſtant ſearch of different ones.

Men are commonly more *fickle* and *inconſtant* than women; but women more *unſteady* and *changeable* than men. The firſt err through indifference; the ſecond through a love of novelty. Conſequently. it is a merit in men to perſevere; and in women, to reſiſt.

Rogue, Sharper, Thief.

Theſe are all perſons who ſteal what does not belong to them; with this difference, that the *rogue* ſteals in ſecret; he pilfers. The *ſharper*, ſteals by fineſſe; he over-reaches. The *thief*, ſteals by all manner of means, robbing by force and violence.

The *rogue*, fears to be diſcovered; the *ſharper*, to be known again; and the *thief*, to be taken.

Intention, Deſign.

Intention, is a diſpoſition or inclination of the mind to ſomething at a diſtance; its characteriſtic is to aim. *Deſign*, ſeems to ſuppoſe ſomething ſtudied and methodical; it is employed in ſearching out the means of execution.

Intentions, are more ſecret and vague; *deſigns* more extenſive and more rational.

Intention, is the ſoul of action, and the ſpring of true worth. *Deſign*, is the effect of reflection.

As no one cares to be balked in his *intentions*, or croſſed in his *deſigns*, we ſhould have no other *intention* than to do our duty; nor any other *deſign*, than to conform to the will of Providence.

Nothing is leſs followed than the original *intention*,

tion, of charitable foundations. Nothing has been found more difficult to accompliſh, than the *deſign* of bringing about a thorough reformation of manners.

That man is truly great, who is right in his *intentions*, and reaſonable in his *deſigns*.

To *Tolerate*, *Suffer*, *Permit*.

We *tolerate* a thing when knowing it, and having ſufficient power, we do not hinder it. We *ſuffer* it, by making no oppoſition, but ſeeming either not to know it, or not to have the power of preventing it. We *permit* it, when we authoriſe it by formal conſent.

The words, *tolerate* and *ſuffer*, are never uſed but with reſpect to bad things, or ſuch as we believe ſo; whereas, the word *permit*, relates either to good or bad.

The legiſlative power, is ſometimes obliged to *tolerate* certain evils, in order to prevent worſe. It is ſometimes prudence to *ſuffer*, even abuſe, in the diſcipline of the church, rather than deſtroy its unity. Human laws never will *permit*, what the divine law forbids; but ſometimes forbids what the other will *permit*.

Gay, *Merry*.

We are *gay*, by diſpoſition; *merry*, through turn of mind. Sad and ſerious are exactly their oppoſites.

Our *gaiety*, turns almoſt entirely to our own advantage: but our *merriment*, at the ſame time that it is agreeable to others, is no leſs ſo to ourſelves.

We ſhould, if poſſible, ſuppreſs our *gaiety*, when in the houſe of affliction. We ſhould ceaſe to be *merry*, when others are ſerious.

Enmity, Rancour.

Enmity is more declared; it ſeems always open. *Rancour* is more concealed; it generally diſſembles.

Bad ſervices, and rude language, create *enmity*, which never ceaſes, till tired out with puniſhing, or a reconciliation is brought about by the interceſſion of friends. Remembrance of injuries, or affronts received, keeps *rancour* alive in the breaſt, which never ſubſides, while there is the leaſt thirſt of vengeance, or till we pardon ſincerely.

Enmity does not always deſtroy our eſteem for an enemy, nor prevent our doing him the juſtice he is entitled to; but it will not admit of our careſſing him, or doing him any good, otherwiſe than through a ſenſe of honour, or greatneſs of ſoul, to which we ſometimes ſacrifice our vengeance. *Rancour* makes us embrace with pleaſure, every opportunity of revenging ourſelves, but can hide itſelf with the cloak of friendſhip, till the very moment it begins to act.

Enmity is ſometimes noble, and it would be mean not to conceive it againſt certain perſons; but *rancour*, is always low.

A ſettled *enmity*, in families, ſometimes runs through many generations, and will not ceaſe till length of time ſhall obliterate it. Perfect reconciliations are very rare; there remaining often a great deal of *rancour* in the breaſts of thoſe who ſeem moſt ſincere.

A philoſopher, ſhould have no object of *enmity*, but the diſturbers of public tranquillity. If *rancour* can, in any caſe, be excuſable, it muſt be with reſpect to traitors; their crime being too black to be thought of without indignation.

To *Inſinuate, Suggeſt.*

We *inſinuate*, by cunning and addreſs; we *ſuggeſt*, by credit and artifice.

In

In order to *inſinuate*, we muſt conſult both time and opportunity; in order to *ſuggeſt*, it is neceſſary to have aſcendancy over the minds of perſons.

Inſinuate implies ſomething delicate: *ſuggeſt*, frequently ſomething fraudulent.

We cover artfully what we would *inſinuate*: and what we would *ſuggeſt*, we make of ſome conſequence.

We often imagine that what others *inſinuate*, was firſt thought of by ourſelves. He who *ſuggeſts* evil to another, is much more culpable than he who commits it.

Ordinary, Common.

Theſe words have been reputed ſynonymous in two ſenſes, as implying frequent uſe, and meaning of little or no value: but they are different in both. In the firſt ſenſe, the word *ordinary*, ſeems to me to be beſt applied, when the repetition of actions is in queſtion; *common*, when a multitude of objects. Thus, nothing is more *ordinary* at court than diſſimulation. Monſters are *common* in Africa.

In the ſecond, that which is *ordinary*, has nothing to diſtinguiſh it; that which is *common*, has nothing to make it ſought after.

To *Hear, Hearken.*

To *hear*, implies, having the ear ſtruck with any ſound. To *hearken*, means to lend an ear, in order to *hear*. Sometimes we *hear*, without *hearkening*; and we often *hearken* without *hearing*.

To *Underſtand, Comprehend, Conceive.*

To have juſt and proper ideas of every thing that occurs, is the common ſignification of theſe words:

but, to *underſtand*, implies a conformity of ideas, which has a peculiar relation to the value of the terms we uſe; to *comprehend*, denotes ſuch a conformity as anſwers directly to the nature of the things we explain; and that which is expreſſed by the word *conceive*, relates more eſpecially to the order and deſign of what we propoſe. The firſt is uſed with propriety, when applied to the particulars of what we ſay; the tone with which we ſpeak; the turn of our phraſes; and the delicacy of our expreſſions. The ſecond ſeems to agree beſt with a relation to principles, leſſons, precepts, and ſpeculative knowledge. The third appears with greater elegance, when it relates to forms, arrangement, projects, and plans; in ſhort, all that depends on the imagination.

We *underſtand* languages. We *comprehend* ſciences. We *conceive* whatever has relation to arts.

It is difficult to *underſtand*, that which is enigmatical; to *comprehend*, that which is abſtruſe; and to *conceive*, that which is confuſed.

Readineſs of *underſtanding*, is a mark of acuteneſs; that of *comprehenſion*, is a proof of penetration; that of *conception*, denotes a clear head.

A lover *underſtands* the language of the paſſions. A learned man *comprehends* the metaphyſical queſtions of the ſchools. An architect *conceives* the plan and œconomy of buildings.

Faſhion, Figure, Form.

Faſhion riſes from labour, and reſults from the workmanſhip; the workman enriching it more or leſs, according to his taſte. *Figure* ſprings from deſign, and reſults from the outlines of the thing; the author of the plan making it either more or leſs regular, according to his abilities. *Form* riſes from conſtruction, and reſults from the arrangement of parts;

parts; the conductor of the work making it more or leſs natural, as his imagination directs him.

The *faſhion* of a work, frequently exceeds in value the price of the materials. We ſeldom give in architecture, a round *figure* to any thing, except to ſingle pieces, and ſuch as ſtand by themſelves. Paganiſm pictures the Deity under all kinds of *forms*; whereas, Chriſtianity confines it to thoſe of a man, and of a dove.

We ſay of *faſhion*, that it is either pretty, or ugly; of *figure*, that it is either agreeable or diſagreeable; of *form*, that it is either common or uncommon.

Fault, Defect, Imperfection.

Fault includes in its idea, a relation to the maker; ſo that, while it implies ſome real want in the finiſhing of the work, it denotes alſo, that it was owing to the workman. *Defect* expreſſes ſomething *imperfect* in the thing, without any relation to the maker of it. *Imperfection* intimates ſomething of leſs conſequence than is underſtood by the preceding words, and is uſed with more propriety in morality, than either in phyſics or mechanics. However, if we do uſe it in either of the laſt two, it implies ſomething wanting to complete the work in hand. *Fault* leaves ſomething to reprehend and correct; *defect* leaves ſomething to reform and ſupply: *imperfection* leaves ſomething to deſire to add.

We find in the end, that to be beſt, which has feweſt *faults*. We probably ſhould not find any object without *defects*, if our eyes were clear enough to diſtinguiſh them. We may find *imperfections* in an author, without a *fault*.

The ſmoaking of chimneys is a great *fault* in houſes; as a little attention in the builder may eaſily prevent it. When the beauty of a building is ſpoil-

ed, for want of room, or proper materials, it is a *defect*, which the builder could not prevent. *Imperfections* are conſidered by the bigoted religioniſt, as real ſins; but reaſonable chriſtians look upon them only as the natural conſequents of frail humanity.

Fault, Crime.

Faults reſult from human weakneſs; being tranſgreſſions of the rules of duty. *Crimes* proceed from the wickedneſs of the heart, being actions againſt the rules of nature.

The effects of anger, and the intrigues of gallantry, are *faults*. Calumnies and aſſaſſinations are *crimes*.

It is our indiſpenſible duty to pardon *faults*, but puniſh *crimes*.

To *Oblige, Conſtrain, Compel, Force.*

The laſt of theſe words riſes upon the third, as the third does upon the ſecond, and the ſecond upon the firſt, each of them implying an oppoſition to liberty. The word *oblige* relates more to duty or neceſſity, intimating a power acting on us, in conformity to our inclinations: *conſtrain* refers to thoſe troubleſome oppoſitions, that make us determine againſt our inclinations; *compel* alludes to power and authority, which makes us act in expreſs contrariety to our will, which we lament the not being maſter of: the word *force* implies contrary efforts of a vigorous action, which we try to reſiſt, but in vain.

The duty of a child to its parents, *obliges* it to aſſiſt them in their old age. The weaker and ſofter ſex is that which can leaſt brook *conſtraint*. There are ſome occaſions on which we ſhould not be ſorry

to

to be *compelled*, even to that we are moſt unwilling to do. Ancient politeneſs of the table went ſo far as to *force* gueſts to eat and drink.

Heavineſs, Weight.

In the figurative ſenſe, the difference of theſe words is ſo extremely great, as need no pointing out; in the literal, indeed, they are often confounded; conſidered then, in this laſt ſenſe, *heavineſs* is that quality in a body which we feel, and diſtinguiſh by itſelf: *weight* is the meaſure and degree of that quality, which we cannot aſcertain but by compariſon.

We ſay abſolutely, and in an undetermined ſenſe, that a thing is *heavy*; but, relatively, and in a manner determined, that it is of ſuch a *weight*, for example, of two, three, or four pounds.

A thouſand circumſtances prove the *heavineſs* of the air; and the mercury determines its exact *weight*.

To *Return, Surrender, Reſtore.*

We are ſaid to *return* what has been lent or given us: to *ſurrender* what we have in pledge or charge: to *reſtore* what we have taken or ſtolen.

We ought to *return* punctually; to *ſurrender* faithfully; and to *reſtore* wholly.

We borrow with an intent to *return*; we take a thing in charge, with a view of *ſurrendering* it again; but we ſeldom take with a deſign to *reſtore*.

Cuſtom, makes uſe of theſe words on the following occaſions; the firſt, with reſpect to civility, favours, preſents, or teſtimonies of kindneſs: the ſecond, with reſpect to what we are entruſted with; honours, employs, or offices, with which we are inveſted: the third, with relation to things taken away that have been our due. Thus, we *return* money that has been lent us; preſents we have received;

ceived; and letters to a deſerted ſweetheart: we *ſurrender* a child to its parents; the ribbon of an order, the ſtaff of command, ſeals, and dignities, to a prince; we *reſtore* an accuſed perſon, when found innocent, to his eſtates and honours; and a minor, to the poſſeſſion of his effects which have been held from him.

Sincerity, Frankneſs, Plainneſs, Ingenuouſneſs.

Sincerity prevents our ſpeaking otherwiſe than we think, and is a virtue. *Frankneſs* makes us ſpeak as we think, and is a natural effect. *Plainneſs* is ſpeaking freely what we think; and ſprings, ſometimes, from want of reflection. *Ingenuouſneſs* makes us declare what we know, and is often a folly.

A *ſincere* man, will not deceive; a *frank* man, will not diſſemble; a *plain* man, is not apt to flatter; an *ingenuous* man, knows not how to conceal any thing.

Sincerity is of great value in the intercourſe of the heart. *Frankneſs* facilitates the commerce of the world. *Plainneſs* is often conſidered as a want of politeneſs. *Ingenuouſneſs* is frequently found to err againſt prudence.

The *ſincere* are always eſteemed. The *frank* pleaſe all the world. The *plain* ſometimes offend. The *ingenuous* often betray themſelves.

Experiment, Trial, Proof.

Experiment relates properly, to the truth of things; it determines whether a thing is or is not; clearing up of doubt, and diſſipating ignorance. *Trial* concerns particularly, the uſe of things; judging whether they are proper or not; it ſettles the matter, and determines the will. *Proof* has a great

great relation to the quality of things, teaching us whether they are good or bad, diſtinguiſhing the beſt, and taking away any fear of being deceived.

We make *experiments*, in order to know; *trials*, to chooſe; and *proofs*, to be thoroughly acquainted with.

Experiments confirm our opinions, being the root of knowledge. *Trial* conducts our taſte, being the road to ſatisfaction. *Proof* removes our fears, and is a remedy againſt error and impoſture.

Effigy, Image, Statue.

Corporeal repreſentation is the common idea of theſe three words; but an *effigy*, is to ſupply the place of the real thing; an *image*, is to ſhew the attitude and deſign, but in miniature; a *ſtatue*, the ſame; but as large as life.

Perſons who draw on themſelves the popular odium, are ſometimes hung in *effigy*. *Images*, are made of china, ſilver, &c. and ſet up in houſes by way of ornament. We erect *ſtatues* of our kings, in grateful remembrance of them.

To *Give, Preſent, Offer.*

Of theſe three words, that of *give*, is generally uſed in a familiar ſenſe; that of *preſent*, in a reſpectful one; that of *offer*, in a religious one. We *give*, to our ſervants. We *preſent*, to princes. We *offer*, to God.

We *give*, what we would have received. We *preſent*, what we think will be agreeable. We *offer*, what we imagine will be acceptable.

We cannot *give*, what does not belong to us, nor *offer*, what is not in our power; but we ſometimes *preſent*, what is neither ours, nor in our power to *give*.

Frugality,

Frugality, Oeconomy.

Frugality implies only diſcretion of expence; *oeconomy* includes in its idea ſome kind of management, in order to eke matters out.

Frugality is generally the province of the huſband; whoſe buſineſs is to take care his expences do not exceed his income: *oeconomy* is principally the care of the wife, whoſe ſtudy is, by a prudent management, if poſſible, to make up every deficiency.

Clothes, Dreſs.

Clothes expreſs ſimply, that which covers the body, and include all, for that purpoſe, from head to foot, and nothing more; it is for this reaſon we ſay, with propriety, the neceſſaries of life conſiſt in meat, drink, lodging, and *clothes*. *Dreſs* has a more confined meaning; beſides, that of a bare covering, it includes in its idea, a relation to form and faſhion, as well to the ornaments as the neceſſaries; thus, we ſay, a Spaniſh *dreſs*; a Hungarian *dreſs*; a rich *dreſs*, &c.

Though the ſword and cockade cannot be called *clothes*, they are, nevertheleſs, part of the *dreſs* of an officer.

Wonder, Aſtoniſhment, Amazement, Surprize.

Of theſe words, that of *wonder*, implies admiration, at ſomething extraordinary; *aſtoniſhment* is a ſudden confuſion of mind, ariſing from either fear or *wonder*; *amazement* implies a greater degree of *aſtoniſhment*; as to *ſurprize*, it means only being taken unawares.

Of all theſe words, *wonder* and *ſurprize* are ſuppoſed to be neareſt each other in ſignification; but

even

even between theſe may be obſerved a difference; the firſt, being generally conſidered as relative to things good in themſelves; the latter, with reſpect to either good or bad. We are apt to *wonder*, when a bad man does good; and be *ſurpriſed*, when a good man does ill.

Beſides, *wonder* includes in its idea ſome ſmall degree of conſideration, *ſurprize* does not.

If a mean-ſpirited perſon, whom I have inſulted, ſhould come to me, in order to ſolicit a reconciliation, I ſhould naturally ſay, I am *ſurprized* at his coming; but, when I reflect on the meanneſs of his ſpirit, I do not much *wonder*.

Wonder and *ſurprize* act upon the mind; *aſtoniſhment* and *amazement*, upon the ſenſes.

We *wonder*, and are *ſurprized*, at the miraculous events of Providence. We are *aſtoniſhed*, and *amazed*, at the extraordinary qualities of the magnet.

Liberality, Generoſity, Bounty.

A ready and willing diſtribution, according to our abilities, is the general idea of theſe three words; but they have each a particular one, as follows: *liberality* implies acts of mere giving or ſpending: *generoſity*, acts of greatneſs: *bounty*, acts of kindneſs.

A *liberal* man, gives freely; a *generous* man, nobly; and a *bountiful* man, charitably.

Liberality is a natural diſpoſition; *generoſity* proceeds from elevation of ſentiment; *bounty*, from religious motives.

Liberality, denotes freedom of ſpirit; *generoſity*, greatneſs of ſoul; *bounty*, openneſs of heart.

Too great *liberality* borders upon profuſeneſs; it then becomes a fault. *Generoſity* is a princely quality, and if it does not exceed the bounds of our abilities,

lities, is always commendable. *Bounty* is an amiable virtue, and never goes unrewarded.

Prepoſſeſſed, Opiniative.

Theſe epithets denote a folly which conſiſts in being too much wedded to our own opinion; but that which is particularized by the word *prepoſſeſſed*, ſeems to ariſe from exceſs of prejudice; which ſeduces and cauſes us to think what we have pre-conceived the beſt, paying little or no regard to the opinions of others. In one *opiniative*, this folly ſeems to be the effect of an over-fondneſs for his own notions, and a contempt for thoſe of others.

A perſon *prepoſſeſſed*, follows his own opinions, after examining, in ſome ſort, thoſe of others. One who is *opiniative*, follows his own notions implicitly, without ever liſtening to thoſe of others.

See *Infatuated, Prejudiced.*

To *Lift, Raiſe.*

We *lift*, in taking any thing up; we *raiſe*, in ſetting it upright, or placing according to ſome order. Thus, we *lift* a weight, &c. we *raiſe* the head; we *raiſe* a ladder; we *raiſe* a maſt.

To *Inſtitute, Found, Eſtabliſh, Endow.*

To *inſtitute*, is to create and form things, having ſome relation to the author, or him who firſt contrived or laid down the plan. To *eſtabliſh*, is to fix that plan upon a laſting baſis. To *endow*, is to provide the neceſſaries for its ſubſiſtence.

After univerſities were once *inſtituted*, colleges were *founded*, though not at firſt *endowed*; ſince which, thoſe noble *inſtitutions*, have been well *eſtabliſhed*,

bliſhed, by ſuch *endowments*, as do honour to our country.

Chance, Fortune.

Chance forms neither order or deſign; we neither attribute to it knowledge, or will, and its events are always very uncertain. *Fortune* lays plans and deſigns, but without choice; we attribute to it a will without diſcernment, and ſay that it acts blindly.

The chief of our ſucceſſes, are more owing to *chance*, than ſkill: it is ſometimes a long while before *fortune* will look upon us with a favourable eye.

Lot, Deſtiny.

Lot ſuppoſes diſtinctions, and a method of deciſion; we attribute to it a hidden determination, which keeps us in doubt till the inſtant it ſhews itſelf. *Deſtiny* forms deſigns, diſpoſitions, and connections; we attribute to it knowledge, will, and power; its views are determined and unalterable.

Lot, decides; *deſtiny*, ordains.

We obſerve many ſo extremely raſh, as to leave their lives to the *lot* of a die. Whatever *deſtiny* decrees, is inevitable, becauſe we can neither force its diſpoſition, nor ſee beyond the reach of its light.

See *Deſtiny*, *Deſtination*.

Religion, Piety, Devotion.

The word *religion* is not conſidered here as ſignifying the worſhip we owe to the Deity, and the tribute of our dependance upon him; but, as denoting a quality of the ſoul, and a diſpoſition of the heart towards God: it is in this ſenſe only, that it is reputed as ſynonymous with the other two. This

diſpoſition,

diſpoſition, then, prevents our failing in any part of our duty to the Supreme Being. *Piety* makes us acquit ourſelves with greater reſpect and zeal. *Devotion* adds to this, outwardly, a ſerious compoſed behaviour.

It is ſufficient for a worldly perſon to be *religious*; *piety* agrees beſt with perſons who pride themſelves in virtue; and, as to *devotion*, it is the employ of people perfectly recluſe.

Religion, is more internal; *piety*, is both internal and external; *devotion*, is ſometimes more external.

Where there is no integrity, there is no *religion*. He who fails in his reſpect for religious worſhip, fails in *piety*. *Devotion*, unleſs ſincere, is mocking the Moſt High.

Empire, Kingdom.

Theſe are names given to different dominions whence princes take the title of emperor or king; 'tis not, however, in this alone, that their difference conſiſts.

It appears to me, that the word *empire*, conveys an idea of a vaſt territory, compoſed of various people: whereas, that of *kingdom*, implies one more bounded, and intimates the unity of that nation of which it is formed. It is, perhaps, from this difference of idea, that the different denomination of ſtates, and the titles their princes enjoy, take their riſe; if it is not the only reaſon, it is at leaſt the common one, as we may remark, in the *empire* of Germany, the *empire* of Ruſſia, and in the Ottoman *empire*, of whoſe diverſity of people and nations, the world is well acquainted: on the other hand, we ſee, in thoſe ſtates, which bear the name of *kingdom*, ſuch as France, Spain, Poland, &c. that the diviſion of provinces does not deſtroy the unity of the people.

There

There is in *kingdoms*, a uniformity of fundamental laws; the difference of particular laws ariſing from different cuſtoms, in no reſpect hurt the unity of political adminiſtration. It is from this uniformity, or ſingle government, that the words *king* and *kingdom*, take their riſe; for this reaſon alſo, though there may be many perſons in the adminiſtration, there is, nevertheleſs, but one prince or ſovereign miniſter: but it is not the ſame in *empires*, one part of which is ſometimes governed by fundamental laws, very different from thoſe by which another part of the ſame *empire* is governed: this diverſity deſtroys the unity of government; and 'tis the ſubmiſſion of certain chiefs to the command of a general ſuperiour, that preſerves the union of the ſtate: it is alſo from this right of governing, that the words *emperor* and *empire*, are derived. Hence it is, that there are many ſovereigns and *kingdoms* in the ſame *empire*.

The Roman dominion, was originally a *kingdom*, being formed of one ſingle people; the name *empire*, was not given it, till ſuch time it brought under its ſubjection other foreign ones, who became, though in themſelves diſtinct nations, members of that ſtate, and over whom the Romans eſtabliſhed one government, though they had ſeparate adminiſtrations.

The advantages we find in the ſociety of a body politic, contribute as much on the part of ſubjects to form *kingdoms*, as the deſire of governing on the part of princes. It was ambition alone, that formed the plan of *empires*, which were eſtabliſhed, and are ſupported chiefly by the force of arms.

Power, Ability, Faculty.

Theſe words are explained, and taken here in a moral and literal ſenſe; they all ſignify a diſpoſition in

in the ſubject, by means of which it is capable of acting or producing an effect; but that of *power*, reſults from ſupply or liberty of acting; *ability*, riſes from ſtrength; *faculty*, from natural properties.

A man, without the aids of grace, has not even the *power* of doing good. Youth, is in want of wiſdom to deliberate; old age, of *ability*, to execute. The human mind, has the *faculty* of reaſoning.

Our *power* frequently diminiſhes, by long uſe. Age deſtroys our *ability*, to ſatisfy the paſſions, though it does not our deſires. The mind will often loſe its *faculties*, by accidents happening to the organs of the body.

Pleaſure, Delight.

The idea of *pleaſure*, is of a good much more extenſive than that of *delight*; becauſe, this word relates to a greater number of objects than the other; whatever agreeably affects the mind, the heart, the ſenſes, the fortune, &c. produces *pleaſure*. The idea of *delight*, riſes upon that of *pleaſure*, by force of opinion; but is, nevertheleſs, a good of much leſs extent, with reſpect to objects; it is limited, properly, to ſenſation, and has a particular relation to good entertainment.

True philoſophy finds *pleaſure* in every occupation. There cannot be a greater *delight*, than in the true reliſh of innocent mirth.

There is ſtill another ſenſe, in which theſe words are uſed, that in which we ſay of a perſon, that he gives himſelf up entirely to *pleaſures*; that he enjoys the *delights* of the country. Taken in this laſt ſenſe, they have equally, as in the other, their differences, and particular niceties. Thus, *pleaſures*, relate more to perſonal practice, ſuch as cuſtoms, paſtimes, and recreations; *delights*, more to the charms

charms which are furniſhed by nature, art, and opulence; ſuch as ſweet habitations, ſtudied conveniences, and choice company.

Content, Satisfaction.

Content alludes properly to that inward ſerenity of heart, which renders the ſoul ſedate and compoſed. *Satisfaction* relates more to the paſſions, being a change, owing to ſome ſucceſs, in which we hug ourſelves.

No reſtleſs or turbulent man can every enjoy true *content*. *Satisfaction* hardly ever accompanies immoderate ambition.

Excurſion, Ramble, Jaunt.

Excurſion ſuppoſes a pleaſurable expedition to ſome diſtant place, determined on ſome time before. *Ramble* implies an irregular roving in places unthought of, till the time we arrive there. By *jaunt*, is underſtood a walk or journey, agreeable to the perſon who takes it, but held in contempt by others, or conſidered as an act of levity.

We ſay innocent *excurſions*; wild *rambles*; and imprudent *jaunts*.

Excurſions are neceſſary to perſons in a ſedentary way of life, in order to unbend the mind and exerciſe the body. *Rambling* is an evident ſign of an unſteady diſpoſition. *Jaunts*, in parties of pleaſure, have been often attended with calamitous conſequences.

Ale-houſe, Public-houſe.

Nothing is more common than the general uſe of theſe terms, to expreſs one and the ſame thing, but with

with great impropriety: though every *ale-houſe* is undoubtedly a *public-houſe*; it does not follow, that every *public-houſe*, is an *ale-houſe*. *Public-houſe*, is a more extenſive expreſſion, implying a houſe open for the entertainment of the public: whereas, *ale-houſe*, is more limited, denoting a particular ſpecies of *public-houſes*, that which is appropriated to the ſale of beer. Thus, taverns, coffee-houſes, &c. are *public-houſes*; but not *ale-houſes*.

Gentlemen frequent many *public-houſes*, without any ſort of diſgrace; but it always leſſens their characters to be ſeen in an *alehouſe*.

Lie, Falſehood.

Contrariety to truth, is the general idea of theſe two words; but that of *lie*, ſuppoſes always ſomething criminal; whereas, that of *falſehood* does not.

If queſtioned in a cauſe, wherein bound to tell the truth, we do not, we are guilty of a *lie*; if we deviate from truth, where there is no ſuch obligation, it is merely a *falſehood*.

Lies, are always ſinful; *falſehoods*, many times juſtifiable. A *lie*, is an offence to God, and a diſgrace to man. A beneficial *falſehood*, is preferable to a deſtructive truth.

Sea, Ocean.

By *ſea*, is underſtood a large body of water oppoſed to land, confined within certain bounds; by *ocean*, a much larger body, whoſe utmoſt verge is not particularly known. Thus, we ſay, the Baltic *ſea*; the Mediterranean *ſea*; the Adriatic *ſea*; but the Weſtern *ocean*; the Atlantic *ocean*; the Pacific *ocean*: So, again, the wide *ſea*; but the vaſt *ocean*.

Social,

Social, Sociable.

Of theſe two words, that of *ſocial*, relates more to a chriſtian-like diſpoſition; that of *ſociable*, more to a familiar one.

'Tis goodneſs of heart that makes a man *ſocial*; ſweetneſs of temper, that makes him *ſociable*.

Humanity, benevolence, beneficence, friendſhip, &c. are the *ſocial* virtues; good-nature, good-humour, condeſcenſion, &c. are the qualities that render *ſociable*.

Luxury, Voluptuouſneſs.

In the general ſenſe of theſe words, *luxury* implies a giving one's ſelf up to pleaſure; *voluptuouſneſs*, indulgence in the ſame to exceſs.

The *luxury* of a people is the forerunner of their ruin. The *voluptuous* man wallows in ſenſuality, and is void of the feelings of humanity.

Beſides this diſtinction, there is one far more delicate and refined, and which requires ſome attention to be thoroughly conceived. Notwithſtanding cuſtom has always made uſe of the word *voluptuouſneſs* in a bad ſenſe, equally with that of *luxury*, it appears to me, that it may ſometimes be uſed with propriety in a good one. To comprehend this properly, it muſt firſt be conſidered, that *luxury*, implies groſs corporal indulgence only; *voluptuouſneſs*, mental as well as corporal. Thus, ebriety, epicuriſm, venery, &c. are each a ſpecies of *luxury*; but we may be *voluptuous*, even in things innocent in themſelves, as in the rapturous enjoyment of a fine proſpect; the ſtudied delightfulneſs of a rural retreat.

In this ſenſe, *luſt*, indulged to exceſs, is *luxury*; love, indulged to exceſs, *voluptuouſneſs*.

Sober, Temperate, Abſtemious.

A man may be *ſober*, and not *temperate*: *temperate*, yet not *abſtemious*.

In that ſenſe, in which theſe words are reputed ſynonymous, *ſobriety* implies preſent freedom from the power of ſtrong liquor; *temperance* ſignifies moderation in drinking; and, by *abſtemiouſneſs*, is underſtood a refraining from all ſorts of liquor that may intoxicate.

Some men, who have the character of being *ſober*, very little deſerve it, as their freedom from intoxication is more owing to ſtrength of conſtitution, which reſiſts the force of ſtrong drink, than to the virtue of *temperance*. An *abſtemious* perſon, practiſes the virtue of ſelf-denial, and by a rigid abſtinence from all liquors that may hurt him, keeps his head clear, and his conſtitution ſound.

A *ſober* man may drink much and not be affected with it. A *temperate* man, drinks little. An *abſtemious* man, drinks not at all.

Note. By the word *drink* here, is meant the uſe of ſtrong drink.

Sharp. Sour, Acid.

Theſe words expreſs different degrees of ſourneſs; *ſharp*, implies ſourneſs without aſtringency, or a ſmall degree of ſourneſs. Thus, wine, beer, &c. grow frequently *ſharp*, by long keeping. *Sour*, includes in its idea little or no acrimony. Thus, cyder, vinegar, verjuice, &c. are *ſour*, but palatable; made ſo for uſe. By *acid* is underſtood a corroſive *ſour*; as the *acid* lemon; the *acid* vitriol, &c.

Unreaſonable,

Unreaſonable, Inconſiſtent, Abſurd.

The general idea of theſe three words is incongruity; but that of *unreaſonable* implies rather non-agreeableneſs to reaſon; that of *inconſiſtent*, contrariety of act or argument, where one part deſtroys the other; that of *abſurd*, ſeems to intimate both.

Nothing can be more *unreaſonable*, than requeſting the ſervices of another to his detriment; he who complies with ſuch requeſt, would act very *inconſiſtently*; and both would commit the groſſeſt *abſurdity*.

He who endeavours to raiſe his own name, by cruſhing that of another, acts *unreaſonably*. He who would be thought a man of ſenſe and learning, and ſtrives to ſupport that character, by a contumelious contempt of others, acts *inconſiſtently*. He who is culpable in either of theſe particulars, acts *abſurdly*.

Abſtinence, Faſt.

Abſtinence implies a forbearance from ſuch food as is ſuppoſed to pamper the fleſh; *faſt*, a reſtraining from all ſorts of food. Wedneſdays and Fridays are appointed by the church, as days of *abſtinence*; Aſh-Wedneſday and Good-Friday, as *faſt*-days.

Contiguous, Adjacent.

By the word *contiguous* is underſtood, ſo ſituated as to touch; by *adjacent*, ſo lying, as having nothing of the ſame kind between: Thus, one houſe, or one room, is *contiguous* to another; but we ſay, an *adjacent* church; the *adjacent* village.

The true ſenſe then of theſe words is, that *contiguous*, implies actual contact; *adjacent*, only hard by.

Benevolence, Beneficence.

Of theſe two words, one is the intention, the other the act; *benevolence* being the deſire of doing good, *beneficence* actual goodneſs.

A *benevolent* man delights in *beneficence.*

Providence has ſufficiently evinced its love to mankind, by planting in our nature a *benevolent* diſpoſition, and rewarding the effect of that diſpoſition, *beneficence.*

Acquainted, Familiar, Intimate.

A ſlight or initial knowledge of any one conſtitutes *acquaintance.* To be *familiar*, requires an *acquaintance* of ſome ſtanding. *Intimacy* ſuppoſes ſuch an *acquaintance*, as is ſupported by friendſhip.

Theſe words then riſe one upon the other by gradation; *intimacy*, reſulting from cloſe *familiarity*, which proceeds from long *acquaintance.*

Thoſe who are apt to be *familiar*, on a ſlight *acquaintance*, will never acquire any degree of *intimacy*; as forwardneſs of that ſort, generally meets with the contempt of mankind.

Pillar, Column.

By the word *pillar* is underſtood a ſupporter of ſome roof; by the word *column*, a particular kind of *pillar*, that which is round: thus, every *column* is a *pillar*, though every *pillar* is not a *column.*

In moſt buildings, where the beauty of the architecture is ſtudied, *columns* are generally inſulated; whereas, ſquare *pillars* are, for the moſt part, ſet within a wall, ſhewing only a fourth or fifth part of their thickneſs, and are then called pilaſters.

Amuſement,

Amuſement, Diverſion.

The general idea of theſe words is innocent recreation; but, that of *amuſement* implies tranquil entertainment: that of *diverſion*, tumultuous merriment.

Card-playing, concerts, plays, &c. are *amuſements*; cricket, cudgel-playing, horſe-races, &c. are *diverſions*.

Some perſons are ſo quietly inclined, as to find great *amuſement* in reading; while others are of ſuch a riotous diſpoſition, as to imagine all *diverſion* conſiſts in uproar and confuſion.

Satire, Lampoon.

Satire is general, being a poem in which the folly and wickedneſs of the times are ſeverely cenſured; written with an intent to reform. *Lampoon* is a poem alſo, but perſonal, containing invective reflections againſt one perſon in particular, with a deſign only to vex.

A *ſatire* then is commendable; a *lampoon*, ſcurrilous. The laſh of *ſatire* has been often found more beneficial to a ſtate, than the ſcourge of power. The writer of a *lampoon* may be well compared to a bee, whoſe ſting wounds but ſlightly, but whoſe malicious act is ſure to be puniſhed with the whole ſwarm.

Steeple, Spire.

By theſe words is meant a high building, raiſed above the main edifice; but that of *ſteeple* is more general; that of *ſpire*, more particular.

Steeple implies the turret of a church, be it of

what form ſoever. By *ſpire* is underſtood a *ſteeple* riſing taper to the top.

Religion, Perſuaſion.

The ſenſe in which theſe words are held ſynonymous, is that of a certain ſyſtem of divine faith and worſhip. But that which *religion* implies, ſeems to be one more general and eſtabliſhed; that which is underſtood by *perſuaſion*, more particular and vague.

By *perſuaſion*, then is meant a deviation from ſome ſettled *religion*.

The divine ſyſtems of the church of England, and of the church of Rome, are *religions*; thoſe of a Preſbyterian, and a Lutheran, are *perſuaſions*.

Letter, Epiſtle.

Cuſtom has made the word *letter*, of more general uſe than *epiſtle*: *letter* being quite familiar; *epiſtle*, rather pedantic: but this is not the only obſervation I would make. *Letter* appears to me more proper when the matter relates to private correſpondence; *epiſtle*, when the buſineſs is public. Thus we ſay, *letters* of friendſhip; *letters* of buſineſs; but if theſe *letters* relate to public matters, or appear in print, we may with elegance call them *epiſtles*; as Paul's *epiſtles*; Ovid's *epiſtles*; Melmoth's *epiſtles*.

The word *epiſtle* may be uſed with propriety, when the ſubject is written in verſe, or in an ancient language; indeed it is never uſed with elegance, when it refers to modern compoſitions. We ſay Voltaire's *letters*; Pope's *letters*; but the *epiſtles* of Cicero, Pliny, and Seneca.

Gold,

Gold, Golden.

The preſent age has made an innovation with reſpect to theſe two words, converting the ſubſtantive *gold*, into an adjective, and altering the ſenſe of *golden*, which, in reality, implies made of *gold*, into that of gilt. In this corrupted ſenſe then I am obliged to conſider them; as ſuch, the word *gold* relates to the metal of which a thing is made; that of *golden*, to the hue it bears. Thus, we ſay, a *gold* ring; a *gold* watch; a *gold* buckle; but the *golden* lion; the *golden* head; the *golden* lamp. That theſe ideas are often confuſed is very evident; as we ſometimes hear of a *golden* cup, or a *golden* ewer. Should it be ſaid, ſuch a one ſtole a *golden* cup from the houſe, with the *golden* lamp, we muſt either imagine that both cup and lamp were of ſolid *gold*, or that they were only gilt.

Endeavour, Effort.

Endeavour is labour directed to ſome certain end; *effort* is a laborious *endeavour*.

When we would accompliſh a deſign, we uſe our *endeavours*; if we meet with any conſiderable and unexpected obſtacles in the way, we apply our utmoſt *efforts*.

Mute, Silent.

By *mute* is underſtood incapability of ſpeech; by *ſilent*, a voluntary forbearance.

In eaſtern countries nobles have *mute* attendants. *Silence* is a mark of wiſdom.

A man had ſometimes better be abſolutely *mute*, than inadvertently betray himſelf, as is frequently the caſe by too great a volubility, and which *ſilence* only would prevent.

Room, Chamber.

Room is a general expreſſion; *chamber*, a particular one. *Room* implies any divided part of a houſe. *Chamber* is a *room*, appropriated to ſleep in.

We ſay a ſpacious *room*; a ſnug *chamber*.

Some *chambers* are ſo contrived as to conceal the bed, and make the *room* fit to entertain company.

Houſe, Tenement.

The preſent ſignification of theſe words is, that *houſe* means a dwelling diſtinct by itſelf; *tenement*, part of a houſe divided off for the uſe of another family.

We ſay a ſpacious, magnificent *houſe*; a ſnug, pretty *tenement*.

Large *houſes*, which the owners find difficult to ſet to one family, are frequently converted into ſmall *tenements*, and let out to many.

In law, the word *tenement* implies any eſtate that may be holden.

Lodging, Apartment.

Lodging relates more to a ſet of rooms appropriated to a family in ſome private houſe; *apartment*, more to a convenient dwelling in ſome public edifice.

The firſt or ſecond ſtory of a houſe let out is called a *lodging*: any particular range of rooms in a large building, ſo allotted as to contain a number of families, one over another, is called an *apartment*. As the *apartments* in an hoſpital; the *apartments* in an inn of court; the *apartments* in a palace.

It is, in ſome reſpects, mean to live in a *lodging*; but

but perſons of great fortune have dwelt with credit in *apartments*.

Warmth, Fervency.

Conſidering theſe words in a religious ſenſe, that of *fervency* ſeems to riſe upon *warmth*; *warmth*, implying a flame of devotion in oppoſition to coolneſs; *fervency*, great heat of mind, as oppoſed to coldneſs.

Warmth is in ſome meaſure neceſſary; it will make us punctual in the exerciſe of our duty, through a ſenſe of gratitude and affection: *fervency* has a dangerous tendency; it will, if not kept within due bounds, drive men into enthuſiaſm.

Warmth is the offſpring of a good heart; *fervency*, of a weak mind.

Warmth makes the heart beat high in the cauſe of God. *Fervency* will carry us into a vain confidence of having ſome intercourſe with the Deity.

Plenty, Abundance.

By *plenty* is underſtood enough, and ſome little to ſpare; by *abundance*, more than enough, or a conſiderable deal over.

He that wants but a yard of cloth, and poſſeſſes a yard and a quarter, has *plenty*: he that needs but one yard, and has ſeveral, may be ſaid to have *abundance*.

A contented man will be ſatisfied, though he ſhould fall ſhort of *plenty*; but the covetous man is ſtill graſping for more, even though he enjoys *abundance*.

Surmiſe, Suſpicion.

Surmiſe is imagination in general, without certain knowledge: *Suſpicion* is imagination of ſome ill, without proof.

Surmiſe is often uſed with reſpect to things good in themſelves; *ſuſpicion*, never but with regard to things that are ill.

Surmiſe is an imperfect notion, or a kind of conjecture, riſing in a great meaſure from curioſity; *ſuſpicion* ſuppoſes a degree of fear and jealouſy concerning things not known.

We ſhould never build an opinion upon bare *ſurmiſe*, which is at beſt but a ſandy foundation. *Suſpicion* is in reality its own tormentor, raiſing in the mind a thouſand apprehenſions, which is no eaſy matter afterwards to quell.

Sequel, Concluſion.

Sequel is the ſucceeding part; *concluſion*, the cloſe.

The *ſequel* continues; the *concluſion*, ends.

A ſtory is unintelligible without its *ſequel*; but not ſo without its *concluſion*; the *concluſion*, being comprehended in few words; the *ſequel*, requiring many.

The *ſequel*, in part, forms the ſtory; the *concluſion* puts the finiſhing ſtroke to it.

Before we paſs any judgment on what we hear, we ſhould attend to the *ſequel*, and wait till the *concluſion*.

To *Diſperſe, Scatter.*

The act of ſpreading abroad is the general idea of theſe two words; but that of *diſperſe* ſeems to imply ſome ſort of order and care: that of *ſcatter* means to throw about looſely and careleſly.

In

In order to ſow a field, we *diſperſe* the ſeed in different places. He who *ſcatters* his wealth, without making a proper uſe of it, will one day come to want.

To *diſperſe*, is always voluntary: to *ſcatter*, is frequently involuntary.

When a family of children are come to years of maturity, they generally *diſperſe* themſelves into various parts. It is almoſt impoſſible to carry a load of hay from one place to another, without *ſcattering* ſome of it.

New, Freſh, Recent.

That which has not been uſed is new; that which is not ſtale is freſh; that which has juſt happened is *recent*.

We ſay of clothes that they are *new*; of topics, that they are *freſh*; of actions, that they are *recent*.

A thought is *new* by the turn we give it; *freſh*, by the ſenſe it expreſſes; *recent*, by the time of its production.

New things carry with them a creditable appearance. *Freſh* matter is food for tatlers. We are more affected with *recent* ſtories, than with thoſe of long date.

Expreſſion, Word.

Theſe words have been treated of before, when that of *expreſſion* was conſidered as implying a phraſe of ſpeech; but there being another ſenſe in which it is uſed as ſynonymous with *word*, it may not be unneceſſary to ſhew the difference between them: and as the diſtinction is very delicate, we muſt view it with attention.

Expreſſion then repreſents the meaning: a *word* expreſſes the idea, which we employ to form that

meaning. It is in order to uſe the *expreſſion* that the *word* is eſtabliſhed. The firſt is natural, general, and univerſal among men; the ſecond is arbitary and different according to the varied cuſtom of the people. The YES and the NO are always, and in all places, the ſame *expreſſions*; that is, they carry the ſame meaning; but that meaning is not expreſſed by the ſame *words* in all languages and on all occaſions.

We have the gift of *expreſſion* and the knowledge of *words*: we give a turn and juſtneſs to the one, we chooſe and range the others.

The production of ſenſe and formation of a propoſition, are what we expect from an *expreſſion*: but a *word* is commonly of no other value than to make a part of that ſenſe, or of that propoſition. Thus *expreſſions* differ among themſelves, according to the difference of the ſenſes they bear; and *words* differ among themſelves, either by the ſimple articulation of the voice, or by the different ideas they convey. A *word* is no otherwiſe bad, than by its not being in uſe in the polite world.

A variety of *expreſſions* proceeds not always from the fertility and extent of the mind. An abundance of *words* enriches not the language, unleſs thoſe *words* convey an abundance of ideas.

Not, No.

Not barely expreſſes the negation; *no* ſtrengthens, and ſeems to affirm it. The firſt often denies the thing in part only, or with limitation; the ſecond denies it always, abſolutely, wholly, and without reſerve. Thus we ſay he has *not* money; he has *not* patience; meaning he is *not* overburthened with either: but when we ſay he has *no* money; he has *no* patience; we would be underſtood he has none at all.

It

It is on account of this limitation, that the word *not* is generally uſed in company, with thoſe words, that mark either the degree of quality or quantity; ſuch as MUCH, VERY, ONE, and the like.

There is *not* commonly much money to be found in the poſſeſſion of men of letters. The major part of thoſe who frequent divine ſervice are *not* very devout. It often happens that he who has *not* one ſingle penny in his pocket, is much happier than many rich men.

Great, Sublime.

Theſe words here are conſidered in no other ſenſe than as they relate to language, in which that of *great* ſeems to me to have more relation to the learning or the nature of the ſubjects we treat of; and that of *ſublime* more to the ſpirit and manner in which we treat them.

Locke, on Human Underſtanding, is a very *great* work; Milton's Paradiſe Loſt, is a very *ſublime* one.

Great or ſcientific pieces are often ſtarched, and diſcover the labour of the author; but *ſublime* pieces, though compoſed with a great deal of art, ſeem always natural.

Studied words, known only to the learned, joined to profound and metaphyſical reaſonings, form the *great* or elevated ſtile; expreſſions, equally juſt and brilliant, joined to beautiful thoughts, finely and nobly turned, conſtitute the *ſublime*.

It is not poſſible for every work to be *great*; but it may be *ſublime*: *ſublime* works, however, are more rare than *great* ones.

To *Excel, be Excellent.*

To *excel* ſuppoſes a compariſon; is being ſuperior to all of the like kind; excludes equals, and is applied

plied to all ſorts of objects. To *be excellent*, is being in the higheſt degree without any ſort of compariſon; it admits of equals, and agrees beſt with things of taſte. Thus we ſay that Titian *excelled* in colouring; Michael Angelo in deſign; and that Garrick was an *excellent* actor.

Perſons who *excel* in any particular art gain a name. The more *excellent* the meats, the more dangerous the feaſting.

Lazy, Indolent.

A *lazy* man never goes through with an undertaking. An *indolent* man will undertake nothing. The firſt wants courage and reſolution; he ſtops, he turns, he fears, and changes preſently. The ſecond wants will and emulation; one cannot animate or make him ſenſible.

The *lazy* man is a burthen to ſociety. The *indolent* man is an enemy to himſelf.

To *Name, Call.*

As much as theſe words differ in their meaning, they are nevertheleſs uſed frequently to expreſs the ſame idea; the abſurdity of which is groſs. We *name*, to diſtinguiſh in converſation: we *call*, as for help, when wanted.

The Lord *called* every living creature before Adam, and he *named* them.

It is not proper to *name* all things by their names; nor *call* all ſorts of people to our aſſiſtance.

Quality, Talent.

Qualities form the character of perſons; *talents* are their ornament. The firſt renders them either good

good or bad, and have great influence over their morals. The ſecond makes them uſeful or entertaining, and goes a great way towards making them eſteemed.

We may uſe the word *quality* either in a good or bad ſenſe; but we cannot take that of *talent* in any other than a good one.

Man is a mixture of good and bad *qualities*, ſometimes ſo ſtrange as to poſſeſs the extremes of each: There are perſons poſſeſſed of ſuch *talents* as make themſelves admired, and yet give ſome pain to others who would be witneſſes of them; but, in this caſe, I ſhould think it more eligible to endure the caprice of the entertaining, than the diſagreeableneſs of the tireſome.

The *qualities* of the heart are more eſſential; thoſe of the mind more brilliant. *Talents* which are of uſe in neceſſity are more neceſſary; thoſe which conduce to entertainment are beſt rewarded.

Our *qualities* render us either beloved or deſpiſed. Our *talents* make our company coveted.

Excellent *qualities*, joined to rare *talents*, conſtitute great worth.

To *Extol, Praiſe.*

We *extol* a perſon, to procure him the eſteem of others, or raiſe his reputation; we *praiſe* him, to teſtify the eſteem we have for him, or to applaud him.

To *extol*, is to ſay a great deal in favour of others, and aſcribe to them great qualities, whether they poſſeſs them or not. To *praiſe*, is to approve, with a kind of admiration, whatever they ſay or do, whether they deſerve it or no.

We *extol* the abilities of a man; we *praiſe* his conduct.

The word *extol*, ſuppoſes that the perſon of whom

we

we ſpeak, and the perſon to whom we ſpeak, are different, which the word *praiſe* does not.

Quacks never fail to *extol* themſelves; they promiſe always more than they can perform; and pride themſelves in an imaginary eſteem. Conceited perſons frequently *praiſe* themſelves, and are generally well ſatisfied with that *praiſe*.

It is far more ridiculous, in my opinion, for a man to *praiſe* himſelf than *extol* himſelf: for we *extol* ourſelves through a deſire of having the eſteem of others, which is a vanity one may look over; but when we are guilty of ſelf-*praiſe*, it is done through the great eſteem we have for ourſelves, which is a pride inſufferable.

Darkneſs, Obſcurity.

Darkneſs ſeems to ſignify ſomething real, in oppoſition to light: *Obſcurity* is a mere privation of brightneſs.

We ſay often of *darkneſs*, that it is thick; of *obſcurity*, that it is great.

Conſidering them in a figurative ſenſe, *darkneſs* implies a ſtate of life in which we are ſhut up from the world; as the ſtate of a hermit; the ſtate of a recluſe. By *obſcurity* is underſtood a ſtate of retirement, or a ſtate unnoticed, as when we retreat into the country, far from the obſervation of the public eye.

He who lives in a ſtate of *darkneſs* is uſeleſs to ſociety, and dead, as it were, to mankind. He who lives in a ſtate of *obſcurity* enjoys a ſerenity unknown to him who revels in the open world.

To *Feel*, *Handle*.

We *feel* lightly; we *handle* with the full hand.

We *feel* a column to know whether it be made of marble

marble or wood; we *handle* ſtuff to know what ſtrength it has, or what body it is of.

It often happens that a thing, though diſagreeable to the eye, ſhall be agreeable to the *feel*. There is no pleaſure in handling any thing that is rough.

Tranſlation, Verſion.

Tranſlation relates to the turning into modern language; *verſion* into ancient. Thus, the Engliſh Bible is a *tranſlation*; but the Latin, Greek, Arabic, and Syriac Bibles are *verſions*.

Tranſlations, to be perfectly good, ſhould be neither more or leſs ornamented than the originals. The antient *verſions* of ſcripture have acquired almoſt as much authority as the Hebrew text.

A new *tranſlation* of Virgil and Horace would ſtill pleaſe, notwithſtanding the many that have appeared. The time when the *verſion* of the Septuagint was made, is unknown.

Vile, Bad.

Although the firſt of theſe words is not in very general uſe, with reſpect to the ſenſe in which I would here conſider it; yet it is not ſo entirely diſuſed, but that I may characteriſe it without fear of impropriety. As to the ſecond word, it is not here taken in all its ſignifications, but in that only in which it is uſed as ſynonymous with the firſt.

Uſeleſſneſs, and little or no value, make a thing *vile*. Defect, and loſs of merit render it *bad*. Thence it is we ſay, in a myſtic ſenſe, that we are *vile* creatures, intimating that we are nothing with reſpect to God, or that he does not ſtand in need of our ſervices; and that we ſay he is a *bad* chriſtian who is void of faith, or who has, through ſin, loſt the grace of baptiſm.

He

He is a *vile* ſubject who is fit for nothing, or who cannot be of any ſervice to the community. He is a *bad* ſubject who will not attempt to do good, but gives way to every vicious inclination.

A *vile* man is contemptible, and becomes the outcaſt of the world. A *bad* man is condemnable, and draws upon himſelf the hatred of every honeſt perſon.

In ſpeaking of uſeful things, as ſtuffs, linen, and the like, the word *vile* riſes upon that of *bad*. That which has been much uſed, but will ſtill ſerve upon an occaſion, is *bad*: that which cannot be uſed any more, or that we cannot uſe with credit, is *vile*.

Bad clothes are not always a mark of poverty. There is ſometimes more pride under a covering of *vile* rags, than under that of gold and purple.

Matter, Subject.

Matter is that which we uſe in the work; *ſubject* is that on which we work.

The *matter* of a diſcourſe conſiſts in the words, in the phraſes, and in the thoughts; the *ſubject* is that which we explain by thoſe words, thoſe phraſes, and thoſe thoughts.

The reaſonings, the paſſages of holy writ, the characters of paſſions, and the maxims of morality are the *matter* of ſermons; the myſteries of faith, and the precepts of the goſpel ought to be the *ſubject*.

To *Maſk*, *Diſguiſe*.

In order to *maſk*, it is neceſſary to cover the face with a falſe viſage; but to *diſguiſe*, it is ſufficient to change the common appearance.

We *maſk* ourſelves, to go to a ball. We *diſguiſe* ourſelves, to bring about an intrigue.

View,

View, Proſpect.

The ſight of ſomething diſtant is the general idea of theſe words; but that of *view* ſeems, in my opinion, to imply a ſight more extenſive than that of *proſpect*. Thus we ſay a confined *proſpect*; but a long or extended *view*.

Beſides, there ſeems to be leſs variety in a *view* than in a *proſpect*. Thus we ſay, the pleaſing *proſpect* of the neighbouring villages. The fine *view* of a diſtant mountain. See *Landſcape*, *Proſpect*.

Hovel, Shed.

A *hovel* is a ſmall place, indifferently run up, with mud walls, in order to preſerve things from the weather: a *ſhed* is a ſupported roof only; a place covered overhead, but open on the ſides; generally erected as a dry ſtanding-place for carts or other things.

Hovels are ſeldom ſeen but in country places; *ſheds* frequently in towns.

The poor, in many parts of the kingdom, are reduced to the neceſſity of dwelling in huts, very little better than *hovels*. Happy is the traveller, in bad weather, to take ſhelter even under a *ſhed*.

Oval, Oblong.

By *oval*, we mean that which is regularly ſo; by *oblong*, that which reſembles the longitudinal ſection of an egg, whether regular or not.

Tables are frequently made *oblong*, though not exactly *oval*.

We may ſay, with propriety, that an *oval* is *oblong*; though cuſtom will not admit us to invert the expreſſion.

Miſt,

Miſt, Fog.

By *miſt* is underſtood a thin cloud, hanging very low: or rain ſo extremely ſmall as not to be perceived in drops. By *fog* is implied a moiſt vapour near the ſurface of the land; or water ſo denſe as to obſcure the ſight.

The *miſt* falls; the *fog* riſes.

A *miſt* prevents our ſeeing things at ſome diſtance; a *fog* thoſe immediately before us.

Some days are ſo extremely *miſty* as to obſtruct proſpects; others ſo very *foggy* as to be unhealthy, and miſlead the traveller in his way.

Genteel, Elegant.

Genteel implies ſomething above the common run; *elegant* means beautiful without grandeur.

Genteel carries with it the idea of ſomething reputable; *elegant*, of ſomething in taſte.

By a houſe *genteely* furniſhed, is underſtood a houſe containing every neceſſary, good and creditable; by *elegantly* furniſhed, is meant *genteelly*, and in ſuch a manner as to pleaſe without elevation.

Genteel relates more to the neatneſs and goodneſs of the furniture; *elegant*, more to the diſpoſition of it.

A man's notions are diſcovered in the *genteelneſs* of his houſe; his taſte in the *elegance*.

To *Beat, Strike.*

In order to *beat*, we muſt redouble the blows; but to *ſtrike*, we need give only one.

We are never *beaten* without being *ſtruck*; but we are often *ſtruck* without being *beat*.

We

We are never *beat* but with deſign; we often *ſtrike* by accident.

Wiſe men have ſaid, that the rod ſhould be always on the back of children: thoſe, therefore, who have the bringing of them up ſhould never think differently: however, we are to interpret theſe words no otherwiſe than alluding to fear, not imagining that we are to be conſtantly *beating* them; for nothing is more oppoſite to good education, than the example of violent conduct and ſevere diſcipline. The preceptor who *ſtrikes* his pupil, does it oftener through haſtineſs of temper than deſign of correction.

Coward, Poltron.

The *coward* will fire up upon the leaſt offence, but proceed no farther. The *poltron* is ſo meanly ſpirited, as, through want of courage, to take every inſult calmly.

The *coward* draws back; the *poltron* dares not advance.

Cowards, they ſay, will fight when deſperate. We muſt not depend on the ſuccour of a *poltron*.

Trench, Ditch.

A *trench* is either a channel made in lands by digging out the earth, in order to carry off the water, or where earth is thrown up, in order to defend ſoldiers in their approach to a town, or to guard a camp. *Ditch* is a *trench* cut in the ground between two fields, in order to ſeparate them.

The earth, dug from *trenches* that ſerve as drains, is generally ſpread ſo as to leave no heap. The earth dug from *ditches*, is uſually thrown up into a bank on one ſide.

Trenches

Trenches are commonly regular. *Ditches* are often irregular.

The largeneſs of a *ditch* is determined by the wideneſs of the *trench*.

To *Think*, *Study*, *Muſe*.

We *think* quietly and orderly to be thoroughly acquainted with our object. We *ſtudy* with inquietude and without order, to attain our wiſhes. We *muſe* deeply, to paſs away the time agreeably.

The philoſopher *thinks* on the arrangement of his ſyſtem. A perſon in difficulty *ſtudies* for expedients how to get rid out of it. The ſolitary lover *muſes* on his miſtreſs.

I have often remarked, that obſcure things frequently appear clear to thoſe who know not how to *think* properly; they comprehend, but are not able to explain. It is an act of prudence to *ſtudy* to avert ſuch evils as threaten us. The pleaſure of *muſing* is perhaps moſt agreeable, but leſs uſeful.

Sign, *Signal*.

The *ſign* makes known, and is ſometimes natural. The *ſignal* gives notice, and is always arbitrary. The appearances of the face are commonly the *ſigns* of what paſſes in the heart. The hoiſting of a flag in one ſhip is a *ſignal* to another.

We make ourſelves underſtood by the deaf, by *ſigns*. The readieſt way of making perſons underſtand us at a diſtance, is by *ſignals*.

Only, *Alone*.

When ſpeaking of a thing, we make uſe of the word *only*, we mean there is no other of the ſame kind;

kind; when that of *alone*, that it is not accompanied with any other.

A child that has neither brother or ſiſter, is an *only* child. A perſon when by himſelf is ſaid to be *alone*.

That thing muſt be very rare of which we can find *only* one. Nothing is more tireſome than to be always *alone*.

Affection, Love.

Affection is that attachment ariſing from natural ties, or from a continued courſe of friendſhip. *Love* is that attachment between the ſexes implanted in us by our Creator, for mutual happineſs in a connubial ſtate.

It is *affection* that unites a man to his child or to his friend, but *love* that ties him to his wife.

Love attaches us ſolely to one perſon; but we may have an *affection* for many.

It is rare to find a firſt *love* followed by a ſecond; and I doubt whether ever it can be ſaid by a third; but *affection* is as frequent as attractions occur.

To *Lower, Let down.*

We make uſe of the word *lower* with reſpect to diminiſhing the height of things, or to certain motions of a body; we *lower* a beam; we *lower* the ſails of a ſhip; we *lower* a building; we *lower* the eyes, the head. We uſe the expreſſion *let down*, with regard to things made to cover others, and which being lifted up, leave them uncovered; we *let down* the lid of a trunk; we *let down* the eyelids; we *let down* the lappets, or the gown.

The contrary of to *lower* is to raiſe; that of to *let down* is to lift up.

To

To *lower* is in uſe in the neuter ſenſe; to *let down* is not.

Rivers *lower* in the ſummer. Tall perſons are obliged to *lower* their heads when they paſs through ſmall door-ways. It is dangerous to *let* ourſelves *down*, as advantages are frequently taken of it. It is not a prince's *letting* himſelf *down*, even to familiarity, that acquires him the reputation of being good; but the mildneſs and equity of his government.

Plant, Herb.

A *plant* is any vegetable-production ariſing from ſeed; but ſeems confined to ſuch as are not very large. Thus, ſaplings are the largeſt that ſhould be called *plants*. *Herbs* are thoſe *plants* whoſe ſtalks are ſoft, and have no wooden ſubſtance in them, ſuch as graſs, hemlock, &c.

The knowledge of *plants* is both uſeful and entertaining. There are many medicinal qualities in *herbs*.

To *Grow, Increaſe.*

Things *grow* by the nouriſhment they receive; they *increaſe* by the addition that is made to them of the ſame kind. Corn *grows*; the harveſt *increaſes*.

The better we manure the land, the faſter the trees *grow*, and the more our revenues *increaſe*.

The word *grow* ſignifies only the augmentation, independent of that which occaſions it. The word *increaſe* gives us to underſtand, that augmentation is cauſed by a freſh quantity which caſually joins it. Thus to ſay that the river *grows* larger, is to ſay only that the water is riſen, without expreſſing that it is become ſo by the arrival of an additional quantity of water: but to ſay that the river is *increaſed*, is to ſay

ſay that it is ſwelled by a freſh quantity of water. This diſtinction is extremely delicate; it is for this reaſon, therefore, that we make uſe of the words *grow* and *increaſe* indifferently on many occaſions, where that delicacy of choice is of no great importance, as in the example I have mentioned; for we may ſay, with equal propriety, that a river either *grows* larger or *increaſes*, although each of theſe words has its particular idea. But there are other occaſions where it is proper, and ſometimes even neceſſary to pay a regard to the peculiar idea, and make ſome kind of choice between theſe terms, according to the ſtrength of meaning we would give our thoughts: for example, when we would be underſtood to ſay, ſpeaking of the paſſions, that they are in our nature, and that the nouriſhment we take to ſupport life, at the ſame time gives ſtrength to them; the uſe of the word *grow* would be elegant. Otherwiſe we might employ that of *increaſe*, with reſpect either to the paſſions or the talents of the mind.

The paſſions in general receive birth, and *grow* with the man; but there are ſome which exiſt but for a time, and which, after having *increaſed* to a certain age, diminiſh and diſappear with the powers of nature: there are others which laſt the whole life, and which are always *increaſing*, ſo as to be ſtronger in old age than in youth.

Love, which forms itſelf in infancy, *grows* with age. True courage never brags; it *increaſes* at the ſight of danger. Ambition *grows* proportionably as our wealth *increaſes*.

It is eaſy to ſee through all theſe examples, that one of theſe words will agree in ſome places in which the other will not; for what perſon is ſo little delicate in expreſſing himſelf as not to perceive, by his natural taſte, if not on reflection, that there is more propriety in ſaying, ambition *grows* proportionably as our wealth *increaſes*, than to ſay, ambition *in-*

creaſes proportionably as our wealth *grows*. If it is not difficult to perceive this delicacy, it is to explain the reaſon of it: to do this, I muſt expreſs myſelf a little metaphyſically, and have recourſe to ſuch ideas as may enable me to explain it: theſe ideas, however, ſhall be no other than the proper ones. Since wealth conſiſts in many different things, which unite themſelves in the poſſeſſion of one ſingle perſon; the word *increaſe*, which as I have ſaid before, denotes the addition of a freſh quantity, agrees better with it than that of *grow*, which preciſely marks the augmentation of one ſingle thing, cauſed by ſome ſort of nouriſhment. For this ſame reaſon, the word *grow* agrees beſt with ambition, it being a ſingle paſſion, to which wealth ſerves as a kind of nutriment to ſupport it, and makes it act with more force and ardour.

Corporeal things *grow* by an inward and mechanical addition, which is in effect their proper and real nutriment; they *increaſe* by the bare outward addition of a freſh quantity of the ſame matter. Spiritual things *grow* by a kind of nouriſhment, conſidered in a figurative ſenſe; they *increaſe* by the addition of degrees they bear.

An egg does not begin to *grow* in the ovarium till it teems, that is, till fruitfulneſs has made it fit to receive nouriſhment; nor does it leave the body till its bulk is ſufficiently *increaſed*, to cauſe an alteration in the membrane that encloſes it.

Our pride *grows* in proportion as we exalt ourſelves; and *increaſes* ſometimes till we become contemptible in the eyes of the world.

To *Riſe*, *Get up*.

To change our poſture from recumbent to erect, is the true meaning of the verb to *riſe*; whereas to *get up*, implies rather to climb: thus we *riſe* from the

the ground; we *riſe* from our bed; we *riſe* from our ſeat. We *get up* ſtairs; we *get up* a ladder.

Copy, Model.

The ſenſe in which theſe words are reputed ſynonymous, does not inſtantly preſent itſelf to the reader; the firſt glance of the eye that ſhews us a *copy* made after an original work, and a *model* made as the original of a work, throws them ſo far diſtant from each other as not to admit the leaſt ſimilitude; but a ſecond reflection will make us ſenſible that cuſtom has uſed theſe two words under one common idea on many occaſions; and that, to denote equally the original after which a work is made, and the work made after the original; *copy* having been underſtood as well as *model*, to mean the firſt work by which we form the ſecond: and *model*, as well as *copy* the ſecond work, formed after the firſt. Thus, then they have been conſidered as in a manner doubly ſynonymous; but they have each their peculiar ideas as follow.

In the firſt ſenſe, *copy* ſhould be never uſed, but with reſpect to the manuſcript of an author upon which the printer works. *Model* may be uſed on every other occaſion, as well with reſpect to morality as the arts.

A proof ſheet is not often very incorrect, unleſs the *copy* is ſo. Bookſellers, who often refuſe to purchaſe excellent *copies*, frequently buy bad ones at too great a price. There is no perfect *model* of virtue. I ſhould imagine that the arts and ſciences would gain more ground, if artiſts and authors would purſue more their own genius, than imitate the *models* they meet with.

In the ſecond ſenſe, *copy* is uſed for painting; *model* for relief. A *copy* ought to be faithful; a *model*

juſt. The ſecond of theſe words ſeems to ſuppoſe a greater reſemblance than the firſt.

Some *copies* are ſo extremely well performed as to be little inferior to the originals. *Models* of antiquity are frequently more expreſſive than modern originals.

Preciſion, Abſtraction.

The common idea of theſe two words is, that of a ſeparation made by the force of the mind in conſidering of objects; but difficult as it is to find out their peculiar ideas, and determine their reſpective characteriſtics, I have attempted it.

Preciſion then ſeparates things diſtinct in themſelves, in order to prevent the confuſion which ariſes from a jumble of ideas. *Abſtraction*, if I may uſe the expreſſion, ſeparates things that are in themſelves inſeparable, in order to conſider them apart, independent one of another. The firſt is the effect of the juſtneſs and clearneſs of the underſtanding, which prevents our adding any thing that is uſeleſs or foreign to the ſubject we treat of; conſequently it will agree in every circumſtance, either with reſpect to affairs or ſciences. The ſecond is the effort of a metaphyſical mind, which removes from the point of view all that we would detach from the ſubject; it in ſome reſpect mutilates, though it ſometimes contributes to the diſcovery of truth, and ſometimes draws it into error. We may however uſe it, but with care.

It appears to me, that *preciſion* is more applicable to things which may not only be conſidered apart, but may be conceived to be one without the other, ſuch as, for example, alms and charity; and *abſtraction*, more particularly to things which may indeed be conſidered apart, but which cannot be conceived to be one without the other, as body and ſize. Thus the

the deſign of *preciſion* is to prevent a wandering from the ſubject, removing, for that purpoſe, all that is foreign to it; and that of *abſtraction*, to obviate our entering into the utmoſt extent of it, conſidering only one part, without any regard to the other.

There is no ſcience more certain or more clear than that of geometry; it making very exact *preciſions*: There are, however, certain metaphyſical *abſtractions* blended with it, which make geometricians fall into errors equally with others; not indeed when ſize and quantity are in queſtion, but with reſpect to phyſics.

Our ideas cannot be too *preciſe*; but it is ſometimes dangerous to have them too *abſtracted*. The firſt is the ſurer way of arriving at the truth in ſcience, and our aim in affairs; whereas, the ſecond often puts us farther from both.

Preciſion is the gift of nature, receiving its birth with the mind; thoſe who are endowed with it are excellently qualified for converſation; we liſten to them with pleaſure, becauſe they liſten to us in return: they underſtand what is ſaid to them equally as they make themſelves underſtood. *Abſtraction* is the fruit of ſtudy, produced by profound application; thoſe who are familiar with it, talk of common things ſometimes with too great refinement; ſimple and natural ſubjects are in their converſation very difficult to comprehend in the manner they ſpeak of them.

Preciſe ideas embelliſh common language, and make it in my opinion ſublime. *Abſtracted* ideas are very tireſome, they ſeem to me to be of very little uſe, except in the ſchools, or in certain learned debates.

We expreſs by *preciſe* ideas the moſt ſimple and moſt ſenſible truths; but we cannot prove them otherwiſe than by ideas very *abſtracted*.

Juſtneſs, Preciſion.

Juſtneſs prevents our running into errors: *preciſion* removes every thing that is uſeleſs.

The *preciſion* of diſcourſe is a common mark of the *juſtneſs* of the mind.

Attachment, Paſſion, Devotion.

Although the word *attachment* may ſometimes be uſed with reſpect to things bad in themſelves, it is however applied with more propriety when an honeſt or moderate paſſion is in queſtion than either of the two others. As for example, we are *attached* to our duty, to our friends, to our families, and to virtuous women whom we eſteem. That of *paſſion* is more applicable with reſpect to things leſs approved, or when they are carried to exceſs; thus men are ſaid to have a *paſſion* for gaming, for women, &c. As to the word *devotion*, though I have ranked it here, as moſt agreeable to the other two ſubſtantives; the idea it is ſuppoſed to convey, is beſt comprehended by the preterite of the verb *devote*; the ſubſtantive *devotion* being very rarely uſed in this ſenſe: by it then is underſtood an implicit obedience, or a perfect diſpoſition to conform in every thing. Thus we ſay, a man is *devoted* to his prince, to his maſter, to his benefactor, to a lady who has acquired an abſolute empire over him.

Attachment is ſtrong; *paſſion* is violent; *devotion* has no reſerve.

The firſt unites us to what we love; the ſecond to what we thirſt after; and the third makes us ſubmit to the will of thoſe we are deſirous of ſerving.

The manners of the preſent age have baniſhed from the laws of friendſhip all *attachment* contrary to intereſt. We dare not confeſs a *paſſion* for any thing through fear of cenſure. We often obſerve, that

that thoſe perſons who *devote* themſelves to others, in expectation of future advantage, are frequently diſappointed.

Life would not be agreeable without ſome *attachment*. A *paſſion* for any one thing generally gives as much pain as pleaſure. It is difficult to pleaſe the great, without *devoting* ourſelves entirely to their will.

In Love, Lover.

It is ſufficient to regard with paſſionate affection, in order to be ſaid with propriety that we are *in love*; but we muſt teſtify that affection, in order to be called a *lover*.

We become *in love* with a woman whoſe beauty affects the heart; we become her *lover* by waiting on her.

Variety of tender ſentiments crowd into the breaſt of a man *in love*. Paſſionate airs appear with caution in the behaviour of a *lover*.

We are often very much *in love*, without daring to appear a *lover*. We frequently declare ourſelves a *lover*, without ever being *in love*.

It is always the paſſion that conſtitutes our being *in love*, of which the poſſeſſion of the object is the only end we propoſe. Reaſon and intereſt may form the *lover*, of whom an honeſt eſtabliſhment, or ſome particular advantage, is the chief aim or tendency.

It is very rare to be *in love* with two perſons at the ſame time; there is none that I ever heard of, except Phillis of Siro, who was ſo much *in love* with two men, that ſhe could not give the preference, or her company, to either one or the other: but it is not very rare to find a man at the ſame time the *lover* of many miſtreſſes, which he continues to be, frequently to the very hour of marriage. We may alſo

be *in love* with one perſon, and the *lover* of another. I ſpeak of that caſe where intereſt engages us to the one, whilſt we ſigh in ſecret for her whom it is not convenient for us to marry.

Aſſiduity finds opportunity to favour the deſigns of a man *in love*. Riches give the *lover* a great advantage over his rivals.

Abſent, Inattentive.

Theſe two words equally expreſs want of attention; but with this difference, that it is our own inward ideas occupying us ſo fully, as to prevent our attention to any other thing that offers which renders us *abſent*; whereas 'tis ſome freſh outward object attracting our attention, in ſuch a manner as to turn it from what we at firſt gave it to, or from what we ought to give it to, that makes us *inattentive*. When theſe faults are become habitual, they are very inconvenient in our commerce with the world.

We are *abſent*, when we think not of any preſent object, or any thing that is ſaid to us. We are *inattentive*, when we pay more regard to any other object than to that which is propoſed to us, or when we liſten to any other converſation than to what is addreſſed to us.

Very ſtudious perſons, and thoſe who have great affairs upon their hands, or are endued with ſtrong paſſions, are more apt to be *abſent* than others; their internal ideas and deſigns quite engroſſing them. Young people are the moſt apt to be *inattentive*; a mere nothing being ſufficient to amuſe and divert their attention.

Our *abſence* of mind is owing to thoughtfulneſs; our *inattention*, to curioſity.

The mind of an *abſent* man is never where he himſelf is; nothing round him makes the leaſt impreſſion on him; he is often at Athens or Rome, in the midſt

midſt of London or Paris; and frequently muſes upon politics or geometry, while the converſation, perhaps, runs upon love or gallantry, The mind of an *inattentive* man is always preſent with him; is caught by every thing he either ſees or hears; he quits his attention to one thing, in order that he may attend to another; liſtening to all that is ſaid, both on the right and left; he frequently underſtands not thoroughly, or comprehends but in part which makes him liable to take things ſometimes in a quite oppoſite ſenſe to what they are meant.

The *abſent* man cares little for converſation; the *inattentive* man loſes the fruit of it. When we are in company with the former, we had beſt give ourſelves up to ſilent meditation; when with the latter, we had better wait for their attention till every other object is out of their way.

A new paſſion, if ſtrong, ſeldom fails to render us *abſent*. We can ſcarce help being *inattentive* when liſtening to a tireſome ſtory, or when we hear on the other ſide ſomething more intereſting.

To *Conduct*, *Guide*, *Lead*.

The firſt two of theſe words ſuppoſe a ſuperiority of light, which the laſt does not; but, on the other hand, the laſt carries in its idea a degree of credit and aſcendancy, entirely foreign to the other two.

We *conduct* and *guide* thoſe who know not the way; we *lead* thoſe who cannot or care not to go by themſelves.

In the literal ſenſe it is, properly ſpeaking, the head that *conducts*; the eye that *guides*; and the hand that *leads*.

We *conduct* an affair. We *guide* a traveller. We *lead* an infant.

It requires underſtanding to *conduct* in buſineſs. Politeneſs ſhould be our *guide* in all proceedings. Taſte ſhould *lead* the way in pleaſures.

We are *conducted* ſtep by ſtep, that we may do exactly what is neceſſary. We are *guided* in roads, to prevent our loſing the way. We are *led* to the knowledge of people, in order to procure their acquaintance.

Wiſe men do not *conduct* themſelves by the light of others ſo much as by their own. An attentive peruſal of the goſpel is ſufficient to *guide* us in the way of ſalvation. It is great weakneſs to ſuffer ourſelves to be *led* in all our actions by the will of another; ſenſible perſons will indeed conſult a friend in matters of doubt, but they make their determinations themſelves.

Entire, Complete.

A thing is *entire* when it is neither mutilated, broken, or divided, but when all its parts are together as they ought to be. It is *complete*, when it wants nothing, but has every thing that is neceſſary.

The firſt of theſe words relates more to that totality of parts which conſtitutes the whole of a thing; the ſecond more to that totality which contributes to its accidental perfection.

Small families in the country occupy *entire* houſes; but in London they have ſcarcely *complete* apartments.

Diſgraceful, Scandalous.

Both theſe words expreſs the effect of thoſe actions that hurt the reputation of thoſe who commit them; with this difference, that a *diſgraceful* action is an obſtacle to glory, loſes the eſteem, and draws on us the contempt of the honeſt: whereas a *ſcandalous* action is a ſhameful blot in our life, deſtroys our honour, and draws on us the hatred of the juſt.

He

He who has the folly or the misfortune to do any thing *diſgraceful*, ſhould be very careful not to give himſelf any unbecoming airs. When we have been guilty of any thing *ſcandalous*, the beſt thing we can do is, to hide ourſelves entirely from the eyes of the world.

Nothing is more *diſgraceful* to men, than meanneſs of ſpirit; nor any thing more ſo to women, than gallantry carried to exceſs. Nothing is more *ſcandalous* to all ſorts of people, than to be puniſhed according to the ſentence of public juſtice.

Reſerved, Modeſt.

The advantage of theſe two qualities is confined to the perſon who poſſeſſes them; they contribute to his perfection, which are nothing to others but an object of ſpeculation, which merits their approbation, but is ſometimes injurious to their ſatisfaction.

We are *reſerved* in our words and actions. Taking too great a liberty is the fault in oppoſition; when that liberty is carried to exceſs, and we are in no reſpect *reſerved*, it becomes impudence. We are *modeſt* in our deſires, in our geſtures, and in our dreſs. There are three kinds of *modeſty*, thoſe of the heart, the mind, and the body; but their oppoſite vices are not all expreſſed by the word immodeſty, which denotes only that which regards the body, proceeding from the indecency of geſtures and clothes. That vanity which we aſſume in giving ourſelves bold and unbecoming airs is the vice in oppoſition to *modeſty* of mind: that which is contrary to *modeſty* of heart is immoderate ambition, which makes us covet all that comes in our way, and all that we can poſſibly attain.

Reſervedneſs is good at all times; but it is abſolutely neceſſary in public, and in company with our

ſuperiors; any liberty they may ſeem to wink at giving ſome degree of offence: for they reſerve to themſelves a certain title to reſpect, the failure of which they conſider as an unpardonable fault. *Modeſty* is an ornament to perſons who have ſome pretence for carrying their head higher than others, and thoſe who are poſſeſſed of ſome known and diſtinguiſhed merit; but to all other perſons it is an indiſpenſable virtue, and a quality, without which they cannot appear becoming, or avoid ridicule.

Aſhamed, Baſhful.

It is reproach of conſcience that makes us *aſhamed;* but the ſentiments of modeſty that make us *baſhful.* Both one and the other throw a colour into the face, but when we are *aſhamed,* we redden; when *baſhful,* we bluſh.

We need never boaſt or be *aſhamed* of our birth, which is a mark only of pride; but it is praiſe-worthy in all ranks of people, both high and low, to be *aſhamed* of their faults. Although *baſhfulneſs* is a virtue, there are nevertheleſs occaſions when it would paſs for weakneſs and timidity.

To *Finiſh, Ceaſe, Leave off.*

We *finiſh,* by putting the laſt hand to a work. We *ceaſe,* in quitting it entirely. We *leave off,* in diſcontinuing.

To *finiſh* a diſcourſe properly, we ſhould do it, juſt before it begins to grow tireſome. We ought to *ceaſe* from our purſuits, as ſoon as we diſcover them to be uſeleſs. We ſhould not *leave off* work but to refreſh ourſelves, that we may begin again with freſh ſpirits, and more vigour.

Man is born to trouble; he has no ſooner *finiſhed* one

one affair, than another ſucceeds; he may indeed ſeek repoſe and tranquillity, but Providence will not permit him in this life to *ceaſe* from labour; and if want of ſpirits or fatigue induces him ſometimes to *leave off* his work, it is not for any length of time; he is preſently obliged to return to his taſk and continue his employ.

That is certainly a good maxim which ſays, we ſhould not begin a thing which we cannot *finiſh*; but that in my opinion is much better, which forbids our *ceaſing* from one work, in order to begin another; without neceſſity obliges us. When our mind is employed, it is neceſſary ſometimes to *leave off*; not at that time when the imagination, full of fire, finds itſelf beſt capable of its taſk; but only at the firſt inſtant we perceive it flag; it being wrong either to ſtop it in its career, or attempt to drive it when it ſtops.

Perſons who never *finiſh* their ſtories, *ceaſe* talking, or *leave off*, are as little fit for converſation as thoſe who never ſpeak a word.

To *Invent*, *Find out*.

We *invent* new things by the force of imagination. We *find out* things that are hidden or unknown by examination and ſtudy. The one denotes the fruitfulneſs of the mind; the other the penetration.

It is the principle of mechanics to *invent* tools and machines; of phyſics, to *find out* cauſes and effects.

The ventilator was *invented* by Dr. Hales. Harvey *found out* the circulation of the blood.

Joy, Gaiety.

Joy is in the heart; *gaiety* in the manners. The one conſiſts in the ſweet ſentiments of the ſoul; the other, in the agreeable ſituation of the mind.

It ſometimes happens that the poſſeſſion of a good, from which we expected a great deal of *joy*, gives us a great deal of uneaſineſs. It is often owing to a turn of imagination only, that the bittereſt tears are ſucceeded by the greateſt *gaiety*.

Project, Deſign.

A *project* is a plan or an arrangement of means, in order to execute a *deſign*. The *deſign* is what we propoſe to execute.

We commonly ſay of *projects*, that they are fine; of *deſigns*, that they are great.

The beauty of *projects* depend upon their order and magnificence. The grandeur of *deſigns* riſes from the advantage and glory they may procure. We ſhould not ſuffer ourſelves to be dazzled with the beauty of the one, or the grandeur of the other; for practice does not often agree with ſpeculation; the admirable order of a ſyſtem, and the advantageous idea which we form from it, do not always prevent *projects* from running aground, or put *deſigns* out of the poſſibility of failing.

The experience of all ages teaches us, that heads fruitful in great *deſigns*, and excellent *projects*, are frequently chimerical.

The word *project* is taken alſo for the thing we even propoſe to execute, as well as that of *deſign*. But though theſe words, conſidered in that ſenſe, are more nearly ſynonymous, we ſhall nevertheleſs find a difference very conſpicuous to thoſe who have any delicacy of taſte. The following is ſuch as I am able to diſcover.

It appears to me, that *project* relates to ſomething more diſtant; *deſign*, to ſomething more near. We make *projects*, for the time to come; we form *deſigns*, for the time preſent. The firſt is more vague; the other more determined.

The *project* of an avaritious man is to enrich himſelf; his *deſign* is to amaſs money.

A good miniſter of ſtate has no other *project* than the glory of his prince, and the happineſs of the ſubject. A good general ſtudies as much to conceal his own *deſigns*, as to diſcover thoſe of his enemy.

The union of all the ſtates of Europe into one ſingle republic for general government, and the diſcuſſion of their particular intereſts, without changing the interior government peculiar to each of them, was a noble *project* of Henry the IVth of France; but perhaps more difficult to execute than the *deſign* of univerſal monarchy, in which Spain was at that time buſied.

To *Oblige*, *Engage*.

To *oblige* implies rather ſomething of force; to *engage*, rather ſomething agreeable. Duty and neceſſity *oblige* us; promiſes and good manners *engage* us.

Convenience often *obliges* thoſe who are abroad in the world, to do things they very much diſlike. Complaiſance *engages* thoſe, who are not very choice in their company, ſometimes to enter upon bad actions.

Alſo, *Likewiſe*.

Alſo relates more to number and quantity, its proper office is to add and to augment.

Love is not only liberal, but *alſo* prodigal.

Likewiſe

Likewiſe is uſed with moſt propriety when it relates to ſimilitude or compariſon; its particular office is to denote the conformity and equality of things.

When the body is ſick, the mind is ſo *likewiſe*. Politeneſs is not only to be met with in London, but *likewiſe* in country places.

Upright, Up.

We are *upright*, when we are neither crooked or ſtooping. We are *up*, when upon our feet.

A graceful air requires us to be *upright*. Reſpect makes us ſometimes hold ourſelves *up*.

Flags, Colours.

By the word *flags*, we underſtand enſigns hoiſted upon the top of towers, caſtles, or churches. The word *colours* implies the jack, enſign, and pendant of a ſhip, or the ſtandard of a regiment.

The arms of England are generally painted upon *flags*; the union upon *colours*.

The firſt, for the moſt part, is uſed in the ſingular number; the ſecond never. We ſay *the flag* of a fort; the *colours* of a regiment. Engliſh *flags*, except thoſe on which the arms of the country are painted, are commonly of one colour, ſuch as white, blue, &c. but *colours* are of many.

Flags are hung out on days of public rejoicing; and frequently hoiſted as ſignals. Great reſpect is uſually paid to the *colours* of a regiment, as military honour ſeems there to be chiefly centered.

Fine,

Fine, Delicate.

To conceive things are *fine*, we need only ſufficient comprehenſion; but it requires taſte to conceive that which is *delicate*. The firſt is within the reach of many perſons; the ſecond, but of few.

A *fine* diſcourſe is ſometimes uſefully repeated to thoſe who do not at firſt comprehend it: but he who perceives not the *delicate*, at firſt glance, will never perceive it. We may ſeek the one; but muſt catch the other.

The word *fine* is of more extenſive uſe; we apply it equally with reſpect to the ſtrokes of ill-will as to thoſe of good. The application of the word *delicate* is more rare; it agrees not with any thing malicious, but is uſed with moſt propriety with reſpect to things in themſelves flattering. Thus we ſay a *fine* ſatire; a *delicate* encomium.

Steadineſs, Conſtancy, Reſolution.

Steadineſs prevents our varying, and ſupports the heart againſt levity and curioſity, which diverſity of objects may produce: it riſes from preference, and juſtifies choice. *Conſtancy* prevents our changing, and furniſhes the heart with reſources againſt being diſguſted or tired with the ſame object: it reſults from perſeverance, and gives a luſtre to attachment. *Reſolution* prevents our giving way, and endues the heart with ſtrength to reſiſt the attacks it meets with: it ſprings from reſiſtance, and throws a brightneſs upon victory.

Rakes pride themſelves more in being fickle, than in the *ſteadineſs* of their engagements. If the affections of the ladies do not laſt for ever, it is leſs owing to a want of *conſtancy* to the perſons they love, than to a want of *reſolution*, in the object of their affections.

To

To *Conceal, Diſſemble, Diſguiſe.*

We *conceal*, by a profound ſecret, that which we would not have known. We *diſſemble*, by reſerve, that which we would not have appear. We *diſguiſe*, by contrary appearances, that which we would not lay open to the penetration of others.

It requires care and attention to *conceal*; art and cleverneſs, to *diſſemble*; labour and cunning, to *diſguiſe*.

He who would *conceal*, throws as it were a veil over himſelf, that he may not betray himſelf through indiſcretion. He who would *diſſemble*, throws a veil over the eyes of others, that what he does or ſays may not fall within the reach of their knowledge. He who would *diſguiſe*, never opens himſelf any otherwiſe than to elude.

Were we to enter into affairs of intereſt or policy we ſhould always *conceal* our deſigns, often *diſſemble*, and ſometimes *diſguiſe* them: with reſpect to matters which concern the heart, we ſhould be more frank.

It is ſufficient to *conceal* from thoſe who cannot ſee without ſome additional light; we muſt *diſſemble* with thoſe who can ſee without any ſuch acceſſary brightneſs; but it is neceſſary to *diſguiſe* thoroughly from thoſe, who not content to pierce through the darkneſs that oppoſes, examine into that light with which we would dazzle them.

When we have no reſolution to correct our faults, we ſhould at leaſt have wiſdom to *conceal* them. That maxim of Louis the XIth of France, which ſays, in order to know how to reign, we ſhould know how to *diſſemble*, is very juſt; even with reſpect to domeſtic government. When the neceſſity of circumſtances, and the nature of affairs require us to *diſguiſe*, it is political; but when urged to it, through an inclination to cheat or ſhuffle, it is knaviſh.

To

To *Adjuſt*, *Reconcile*.

To *adjuſt* ſuppoſes ſome diſpute or diſagreement. To *reconcile* ſuppoſes only ſome diſtance or difference.

We *adjuſt* matters; we *reconcile* minds.

It ſeems impoſſible to *adjuſt* the liberties of the Gallic church with the pretenſions of the court of Rome; ſooner or later one muſt neceſſarily deſtroy the other; for it will always be difficult to *reconcile* the maxims of their parliaments with the opinions of the conſiſtory.

We uſe the word *adjuſt*, with reſpect to opinions which oppoſe one another; and that of *reconcile*, with reſpect to paſſages that ſeem to contradict each other.

Want of juſtneſs in the mind, is what commonly prevents ſchoolmen from *adjuſting* their diſputes. A preciſe knowledge of the value of every word, in all the different circumſtances wherein they may be uſed, would go a great way towards *reconciling* authors.

To *Bring*, *Fetch*.

To *bring* implies conveying a thing ourſelves from one place to another, in oppoſition to the verb ſend. To *fetch* implies going to a place, in order to *bring*.

He who *fetches* a thing is always ſuppoſed to *bring* it; but he who *brings* it is not always ſuppoſed to *fetch* it. Thus we cannot *fetch* without *bringing*; but we may *bring* without *fetching*.

If we ſend for a workman in any branch of buſineſs in order to make or repair, he naturally *brings* his tools with him: ſhould he leave any behind through forgetfulneſs, he is obliged to go back and *fetch* them.

To *Swallow*, *Gulp*.

In the literal ſenſe, theſe words are more nearly ſynonymous than in the figurative; yet even in that they will admit of ſome diſtinction. We *gulp* in order to *ſwallow*. This however is not the only difference. By *ſwallowing* we underſtand taking down the throat ſimply; by *gulping* we mean ſucking down eagerly, or without intermiſſion.

With reſpect to eating, *ſwallowing* carries in its idea the act of chewing; *gulping* does not.

The glutton will *gulp* down a greater quantity of food in five minutes, than a moderate eater would *ſwallow* in half an hour.

In the figurative ſenſe, *gulping* rather implies a difficulty of *ſwallowing*.

We are all too apt to *ſwallow* flattery; and as fulſome as it may poſſibly be, there are ſome vain perſons that will make a ſhift to *gulp* it down.

Detraction, *Defamation*.

Injuring the reputation is the general idea of theſe two words; but that of *detraction* implies the taking off from a man's good name; *defamation* the giving him a bad one. Were we to be ſilent, when aſked the character of a worthy man, it would be *detraction*. Were we to vilify him, by declaring him guilty of infamous practices, it would be *defamation*.

Defamation is puniſhable by human laws; *detraction* is not.

The one is an open and ſcurrilous way of injuring the reputation; the other a cloſe and demure one.

There are thoſe accuſtomed to *detraction* who would fly the thoughts of *defamation*, little imagining that both

both are equally bad, being two different means, only, working to the ſame end.

Meagre, Lean.

In that ſenſe in which theſe two words are reputed ſynonymous, *meagre* ſignifies want of fleſh; *lean*, want of fat.

Meagreneſs ſuppoſes a waſte of body, owing either to a bad conſtitution or a ſcarcity of food. *Leanneſs* ſuppoſes no want of fleſh, being oppoſed only to corpulency or fatneſs.

A man may be *lean*, yet not *meagre*.

The *lean* are uſually ſtrong: the *meagre* commonly weak.

The firſt is generally a mark of beggary; the ſecond frequently denotes the perſon accuſtomed to labour.

Activity attends the *lean*; indolence the *meagre*. Many perſons, if poſſible, would chooſe to be *lean*; but none would care to be *meagre*.

Sailor, Seaman, Mariner.

Theſe words denote perſons who live by the ſea, or practiſe navigation; but *ſailor*, in my opinion, is uſed with moſt propriety, with reſpect to the common men, or, in the ſea-phraſe, thoſe before the maſt. *Seaman* agrees beſt with regard to the ſuperior claſs of the ſhip's company, ſuch as the officers, boatſwain, gunner, &c. *Mariner* relates more to thoſe who gain their livelihood at ſea, but who are generally their own maſters; as fiſhermen.

Sailors are ignorant of navigation, and are they who work the veſſel by the direction of others; *ſeamen* are ſuppoſed to underſtand it, and are they who generally direct it: *mariners* are ſuppoſed to have no greater

greater knowledge of the art, than ſuch as is ſufficient to ſerve their purpoſe; working their veſſels themſelves.

Both *ſailors* and *ſeamen* take long voyages; whereas *mariners* do little elſe than coaſt.

We ſay an able *ſailor*; an expert *ſeaman*; a bold *mariner*.

The great hardſhips the poor *ſailors* undergo, one would imagine ſhould be ſufficient to endear them to their country. It is not every captain of a ſhip that is a good *ſeaman*. *Mariners* earn their bread very hard; they not only being obliged to work more than other men, but are in daily danger of their lives.

Grot, Grotto.

Though theſe words are evidently one and the ſame, *grot* being no more than an abbreviation of *grotto*, yet cuſtom has made them expreſſive of different ideas.

Grot then ſeems to denote ſomething more natural; *grotto* ſomething more *artificial*.

The firſt is, in effect, the work of nature; the ſecond the work of art.

The one implies a cool cave appropriated to pleaſure, ſtony, rough, irregular, and overgrown with moſs; the other a pleaſurable cave or room ornamented with ſhell-work.

We ſay a pretty *got*: a beautiful *grotto*. It is as much out of the power of the moſt ingenious artiſt to make a *grotto* any thing equal to a *grot*, as it is for art to rival nature.

Cave, Cell.

The ſenſe in which theſe words are eſteemed ſynonymous, is that of the retired dwelling of ſome religious perſon.

Cave

Cave is a habitation under ground, made either by art or nature. *Cell* is ſome little dwelling raiſed above ground.

We dig a *cave*. We build a *cell*.

Hermits, or ſuch perſons as chuſe to ſeclude themſelves from the world, bury themſelves in *caves* they may chance to meet with, or wear out their lives in *cells*, remote from public view.

Broad, Wide.

By *broad* is underſtood extended each way; as *broad*-cloth; a *broad*-brimmed hat. By *wide* is meant *broad*, to a certain degree; as three inches *wide*; four feet *wide*.

Broad ſeems to be confined to things of leſs extent; wide to thoſe of greater. Thus we ſay a *broad* bean, a *broad* face, a *broad* back, a *broad* apron, a *broad* table-cloth, but a *wide* room, a *wide* ditch, a *wide* field, the *wide* ocean.

Bleſſing, Benediction.

Benediction appears to me to be limited to the decretory pronunciation of happineſs. *Bleſſing* is a more general expreſſion, intimating the various means of happineſs.

Religious men find as much comfort in the *benediction* of the church, as others experience in the *bleſſings* of life.

Bleſſing ſeems to intimate Divine favour; *benediction*, that which is human.

We ſay the *bleſſing* of God; the *benediction* of the prieſt.

Heaven ſhowers down its *bleſſings* upon the virtuous. The *benediction* of a good man is a very deſirable thing.

Ambaſſador,

Ambaſſador, Reſident.

The general idea of theſe words is that of a miniſter, repreſenting the perſon of his ſovereign, ſent from one court to another; but *ambaſſador* is ſuperior to that of *reſident.*

The firſt are generally men of great rank; the ſecond of leſs.

Ambaſſadors are not ſuppoſed to ſtay long at the court to which they are ſent, their office being to tranſact ſome ſtate-affairs between the two powers. *Reſidents* are ſuppoſed to reſide for ſome conſiderable time, as a teſtimony of the good harmony between the two ſtates.

The Earl of Northampton was ſent from London, *ambaſſador* to Venice, in the year 1764, during the time that Mr. Murray was there as *reſident.*

Dregs, Sediment.

Dregs are groſs; a *ſediment* is fine.

After the *dregs* are taken away, there will frequently remain a *ſediment.*

We ſay the *dregs* of wine, the *dregs* of melted tallow; but the *ſediment* of water, the *ſediment* of urine.

Lofty, High.

Lofty ſeems to carry with it an idea of magnificence, which *high* does not. Thus we ſay a *lofty* room, the *lofty* cedar; but a *high* houſe, a *high* tree.

With reſpect to other things 'tis the ſame. Thus it is in the power only of a ſevere fit of ſickneſs or a heavy ſtroke of adverſity to lower the *high* looks of

of the great, and the *lofty* imaginations of the proud.

Betwixt, Between.

If any two words in the Engliſh language may be ſaid to carry the ſame meaning, theſe, in ſome reſpect, may. As a ſtudied delicacy here is not immediately eſſential, cuſtom has made no other diſtinction than that of uſing the word *between*, on every occaſion, as being ſofter on the tongue, and almoſt baniſhing the uſe of the word *betwixt*, as being much harſher: but as I deviate from the common opinion, and think there is not a word ſo trivial, but the choice of it, on particular occaſions, may be neceſſary, I hope I may not be condemned as too nice, with reſpect to the words before us.

Betwixt then appears to me to be uſed with moſt propriety, when that which is in the middle is, as it were, embraced by the other two; *between*, when that which is in the middle is at a diſtance from the other two. Thus, to ſpeak properly, with reſpect to a houſe ſtanding in a row, we ſhould uſe the word *betwixt*; as, for example, the houſe I dwell in ſtands *betwixt* two high houſes: but, with reſpect to a tree ſtanding in a line with others, we ſhould uſe the word *between*; as for inſtance, the oak-tree I mentioned ſtands *between* two elms.

Middle, Midſt.

A thing is in the *middle*, when it ſtands at an equal diſtance from the two extremes; it is in the *midſt*, when it ſtands in the center of a great many.

Thus we ſay in the *middle* of a pond; in the *midſt* of a crowd.

There cannot be a more tormenting ſituation than to hang in the *middle* between hope and fear. Pro-

vidence ſometimes has taken a man out from the *midſt* of his misfortunes, when he has ſeen no viſible way of eſcaping.

Marſhy, Boggy.

Marſhy lands are thoſe that lie low, and are watry; *boggy* lands are thoſe where there are many quagmires.

In walking over the firſt, we ſink not deeper than our ankles. In paſſing over the ſecond we may entirely be loſt.

Marſhy lands frequently produce fine meadows; *boggy* lands are wholly uſeleſs.

Rough, Rugged.

Roughneſs is a ſmall degree of *ruggedneſs*; *ruggedneſs* a great degree of *roughneſs*.

Smooth is the reverſe of *rough*; level, the reverſe of *rugged*.

We ſay a *rough* hand; a *rugged* road.

Ray, Beam.

A *beam* ſeems to me to be more powerful than a *ray*, caſting a greater degree of light and heat.

We ſay *rays* of light; *beams* of the ſun; by the firſt of which expreſſions we mean that thoſe are *rays*, which ſhine early in the morning; by the ſecond, that thoſe are *beams*, which gleam at noon.

We frequently apply the epithet cheerful to the word *ray*; that of ſcorching to the word *beam*.

The *rays* of the ſun being ſeparated by a priſm is the origin of colours. The *beams* of the ſun collected into one point, by means of a convex lens, will ſet fire to any thing they touch.

Clergyman,

Clergyman, Parſon.

There are three ranks of *clergymen* below that of a dignitary, viz. *parſon*, vicar, and curate. *Parſon* is the firſt, meaning a rector, or he who receives the great tithes of a benefice. By the word *parſon* then is implied one of a particular claſs of clergy; whereas by the word *clergyman* is underſtood any perſon ordained to ſerve at the altar.

Parſons are always prieſts; many *clergymen*, are only deacons.

Every biſhop, dean, &c. is a *clergyman*, though not always a *parſon*.

As the general and indiſcriminate uſe of theſe two words has rendered it neceſſary, I have pointed out the diſtinction that ſhould be made between them; but am of opinion, as cuſtom has thrown into the word *parſon* an idea of contempt, it would be better not to uſe it at all; but when we have occaſion to point out one of that claſs of *clergymen* who enjoy the great tythes of a living, to ſubſtitute in its room that of rector.

Suffocated, Smothered, Choaked.

Death, brought on by a ſtoppage of breath, is the general idea of theſe three words; but that of *ſuffocated* implies an extinction of life, occaſioned by being in a place where we cannot breathe; that of *ſmothered*, by being in a place where we are not ſuffered to breathe; that of *choaked*, by having the wind-pipe cloſed.

Thus men are frequently *ſuffocated* by ſmoke, and for want of air. Perſons raving mad, when incurable, are ſometimes *ſmothered* between two feather-bed. Malefactors, when hanged, are *choaked*.

It has happened that travellers, by falling into bogs, have been ſometimes *ſuffocated* before aſſiſtance could be had. Children are frequently *ſmothered*

in bed, through the careleſſneſs of nurſes. Perſons are often *choaked*, by eating too greedily.

The words *ſmother* and *choak* are often uſed in a figurative ſenſe; the word *ſuffocate*, never.

We *ſmother* a flame. We *choak* a paſſage.

It is an act of charity to *ſmother* the failings of another. When intereſt is predominant, it is ſure to *choak* up all the avenues to the heart, which would otherwiſe be open to the cries of diſtreſs.

Rule, Order.

Rule reſpects properly thoſe things that ought to be done; *order*, the manner in which they ſhould be done. In the idea of the firſt, there ſeems to be ſomething ariſing more from natural right; in the idea of the ſecond, ſomething reſulting more from poſitive right.

Equity and charity ought to be the two grand *rules* of our conduct: they may even deviate from all kind of *order*.

We ſubmit to *rule*. We conform to *order*. Although the firſt is much more indiſpenſible, it is yet much more broke through; the particularity of *order* making a greater impreſſion on us than the advantage of *rule*.

Regular, Methodical.

We are *regular* in our conduct. We are *methodical*, with reſpect to our affairs.

A *regular* man is careful of his reputation; he runs into no exceſs. A *methodical* man takes care of his time; he gives no way to diſſipation.

With reſpect to expences, we are *regular* in relation to the bounds we ſet to them; *methodical*, with regard to the manner of them.

Regular

Regular perſons are always admired; *methodical* perſons are frequently laughed at.

To be *Sorry for*, *Regret*.

We are *ſorry for* the misfortunes of another; we *regret* his abſence. The one is the effect of pity; the other of attachment.

Grief occaſions our *ſorrow*: repentance excites our *regret*.

A court favourite in proſperity is the object of envy; but when he falls into diſgrace no one is *ſorry for* him. Thoſe princes who are moſt commended during their life, are not always moſt *regretted* after their death.

The expreſſion, *ſorry for*, when uſed with reſpect to ourſelves, in ſome meaſure changes its ſignification. Retaining the common and general idea of ſenſibility, it ceaſes to expreſs that particular motive of pity, that makes us ſympathiſe inwardly for the diſtreſſes of others; and, in its room, marks only a certain uneaſineſs which diſcovers itſelf outwardly. When we are *ſorry for* the misfortunes of others, we are often inwardly touched, and perhaps no outward ſign of it ſhall appear: when we are *ſorry for* our own, we ſhew it outwardly, in order to draw the compaſſion of others. This expreſſion is ſometimes uſed in another ſenſe beſides that mentioned; inſtead of motives of pity it denotes motives of repentance: In this ſenſe we ſay he is *ſorry for* the ſteps he has taken.

As much taken up as we may be with ourſelves, there are certain moments when we are *ſorry for* the diſtreſſes of others. However philoſophical we may pretend to be, it is extremely difficult to ſuffer a long time together, without ſhewing ſome ſigns of *ſorrow*. Mercenary people are *ſorry for* every ſtep they take that does not turn out to advantage. We often ſeem

to *regret* the abſent, in order to affront the perſon preſent.

A hard heart is *ſorry for* no one. An inſenſible man is never *ſorry for* any thing that happens to him. A miſerly perſon *regrets* every morſel he eats.

We ſhould never be *ſorry for* a man, who ſuffers deſervedly; for ourſelves, when we can procure any kind of comfort; nor for any trouble we take, when prudence enjoins it. We ſhould not *regret* the departure of a friend, when his abſence will turn out to his advantage.

Rivulet, Brook, Stream.

Rivulets and *brooks* are certain ſpecies of *ſtreams*, which are running waters; with this difference, that a *rivulet* runs between banks; whereas a *brook* winds its way through the meadows, or by a hedge ſide.

A *rivulet* is a much larger *ſtream* than a *brook*.

Fiſh are found in *rivulets*, but never in what we properly call *brooks*, there not being ſufficient depth of water.

We ſay the rapid *ſtream*; the clear *rivulet*; the gurgling *brook*.

Heavy rains will ſwell a *ſtream* in ſuch a manner as to overflow the neighbouring grounds. Poets are very luxurious in their deſcription of *rivulets* and *brooks*.

Stream, Current.

A *ſtream* iſſues from a head, and moves forward with a continuity of parts. A *current* is a certain progreſſive motion of ſome fluid body. Theſe words, in the literal ſenſe, are applied to water. Thus we ſay, the *ſtream* of a river; the *current* of a ſea.

Streams are frequently rapid; *currents* are ſeldom ſo.

In

In the figurative ſenſe, theſe words convey the ſame ideas. Thus we ſay, a *ſtream* of light; a *current* of air.

To *Swear*, *Make oath of*.

Cuſtom has made the word *ſwear* to ſignify the profane and illegal uſe of the ſacred name in common converſation; whereas, by the phraſe *make oath of*, is underſtood the divine name uſed ſolemnly on legal occaſions, in confirmation of the truth.

In courts of judicature we are required to *make oath of* every thing we have to ſay. He who *ſwears* upon every occaſion gives us to underſtand, that his bare word is not to be credited.

Pleaſing, *Agreeable*.

It is the air and behaviour that render *pleaſing*; good ſenſe and good humour that render *agreeable*.

We love the company of a *pleaſing* man, becauſe he charms. We covet the company of an *agreeable* man, becauſe he diverts.

Well-bred perſons are always *pleaſing*. Merry perſons are commonly *agreeable*.

How difficult is it to avoid being attached to one of a *pleaſing* addreſs and *agreeable* converſation!

It appears to me that it is more the behaviour than the air that makes the men *pleaſing*; and that it is rather the air than the behaviour, that makes the women ſo. It ſeems to me alſo, that it is rather good ſenſe and a livelineſs in converſation that conſtitutes *agreeableneſs* in the men; and that it is an even temper and a merry diſpoſition that eſtabliſhes that quality in the women.

When theſe words are uſed otherwiſe than to denote perſonal qualities, that of *pleaſing*, properly ſpeaking, implies ſomething which flatters the ſenſe,

or ſelf-love; that of *agreeable*, ſomething which agrees with the taſte and the mind.

It is *pleaſing* to have always deſirable objects before us. Nothing is more *agreeable* to a joyous man than good company.

It is ſometimes dangerous to approach that which is *pleaſing* to the ſight; and it may happen, that what is very *agreeable*, may be very prejudicial.

Graces, Charms.

Graces reſult from natural politeneſs, accompanied with a noble freedom; it is a varniſh that appears in our converſation, our actions and our carriage, making us pleaſe in every thing we do. *Charms* riſe from an aſſemblage of fine touches animated by good-humour and good ſenſe, and are ſometimes far ſuperior to what is perfectly agreeable.

The body ſeems to be more ſuſceptible of *grates*; the mind of *charms*. We ſay of a lady that ſhe walks, dances, and ſings with *grace*; and that her converſation is full of *charms*.

What can a man deſire more in a lady than an outward union of *graces* and *charms*, and an inward compoſition of ſolidity in her diſpoſition, and delicacy in her ſentiments.?

Ready, Eaſy.

Both the one and the other of theſe words denote that which is done without difficulty; but the firſt excludes difficulty which ariſes from obſtacles and oppoſitions; the ſecond, that which ſprings from the very nature of the thing. Thus we ſay a *ready* entrance, when no one ſtops the paſſage; an *eaſy* entrance, when the paſſage is large and commodious. For the ſame reaſon, we ſay of a woman, without

without reſerve, that ſhe is *ready* of acceſs: and of a ſhoe that does not pinch, that it is *eaſy*.

It appears to me beſt to uſe the word *ready*, in naming the action; and that of *eaſy*, in expreſſing the event of that action. Thus, ſpeaking of a commodious harbour, I ſhould ſay we have there a *ready* landing; and that it is *eaſy* to land there.

Of theſe two adjectives there are formed two adverbs *eaſily* and *readily*; which, beſides the difference of ideas, remarked in their originals, have one peculiar to themſelves, which I ſhould not here omit taking notice of. In ſpeaking then of a ſenſible perſon, I ſhould rather ſay he comprehends *eaſily*, and pardons *readily*, than that he comprehends *readily*, and pardons *eaſily*. This choice of words, I muſt confeſs, is delicate; but as *I* can perceive the neceſſity of it, why ſhould not *another* do the ſame?

Flat, Inſipid.

That which is *flat*, does not pierce the taſte; that which is *inſipid*, does not touch it in the leaſt. Thus the laſt riſes upon the firſt; the one wanting only a degree of ſeaſoning; the other wanting it entirely.

In works of the mind they are both very far from pleaſant: but the *flat*, appearing to affect the graces, diſpleaſes: the *inſipid*, appearing to have no knowledge, tires.

In relation to the beauty of the ſex, I do not think the word *inſipid* ſhould be uſed but with reſpect to thoſe who are of a diſpoſition wholly inſenſible: but we ſay beauty is *flat*, when it is not animated, and when it has neither the charms of vivacity, nor thoſe of ſoftneſs.

To *Keep, Detain.*

We *keep* not what we intend to part with. We *detain*, what we propoſe not to reſtore.

We *keep* that which is our own. We *detain* that which is another's.

The miſer *keeps* his money. The debtor *detains* the property of his creditors.

The honeſt man finds a difficulty in *keeping*, what he poſſeſſes; when the rogue finds none in *detaining*, what he has taken.

Complicated, Involved.

Affairs or actions are *complicated* one with another by their mixture and mutual dependance. Perſons are *involved* in actions or in affairs, when they are far immerged in them.

Things extremely *complicated*, become obſcure to thoſe who have not ſufficient underſtanding or diſcernment to unfold them. If we are often in company with raſh people, we are liable to be *involved* in diſagreeable matters.

The moſt *complicated* affairs become ſimple and eaſy to be underſtood, in the mouth or in the writings of an able advocate. It is dangerous to be *involved*, even innocently, in the crimes of the great; as at thoſe times we are always the dupe, and are ſure to be ſacrificed to their intereſts.

Complicated has a ſubſtantive in general uſe, *involved* has not; but, in return, that has a verb in general uſe, which the other has not. We hear frequently of *complication*, ſeldom of *involution*; ſo again, we meet frequently with the verb to *involve*, ſeldom with that of to *complicate*.

Nothing embarraſſes phyſicians more than a *complication* of diſorders, of which the remedy of one ſhall oppoſe the cure of another. It is very diſagreeable

agreeable to have ſuch acquaintance as *involve* us always in their own faults.

For, As to.

However ſynonymous theſe may be, *for* ſeems to me to agree beſt, when ſpeaking of a perſon or thing which governs the following verb. *As to*, appears to me to be uſed with moſt propriety, when ſpeaking of that which is governed by the verb. I ſhould ſay then, *for* my part, I will not interfere in ſuch matters as do not concern me; *as to* me all things are indifferent.

The religion of the underſtanding part of mankind conſiſts in a lively faith, a pure morality, and in a ſimple conduct, guided by divine authority, and ſupported by reaſon. *For* that of the people in general, it conſiſts in a blind credulity, and in exterior practices, authoriſed by education, and corroborated by the force of cuſtom. *As to* that of thoſe belonging to the church, we can determine nothing concerning it; unleſs we could detach them from their temporal intereſts.

Trade, Buſineſs, Art, Profeſſion.

In the ſenſe in which theſe words are eſteemed ſynonymous, that of *trade* implies a manual occupation; that of *art*, ſuch as requires the labour of the mind, as well as the hands; that of *buſineſs*, ſuch an occupation as conſiſts only in buying and ſelling; that of *profeſſion*, ſuch as reſults from the lucrative uſe of the ſciences. Thus, the occupations of a carpenter, taylor, baker, &c. are *trades*; thoſe of a linen-draper, mercer, haberdaſher, &c. are *buſineſſes*; thoſe of a watchmaker, lockſmith, &c. are *arts*; thoſe of a phyſician, counſellor, muſician, &c. are *profeſſions*.

In

In point of rank, *profeſſions* take place of *arts*; *arts* of *buſineſſes*; *buſineſſes* of *trades*.

Divination, Prediction.

Divination brings hidden things to light; *prediction* foretells what will come to paſs.

The firſt regards things preſent and paſt. The objects of the ſecond are things to come.

A learned and diſcerning man, one who knows what relation the leaſt outward ſigns bear to the motions of the ſoul, readily paſſes with the world as well-ſkilled in *divination*. A wiſe man, one who ſees what will be the conſequences of certain principles, and the effects of certain cauſes, may paſs with the people, as having the knowledge of *prediction*.

To *Reprove, Reprimand.*

He who *reproves* another, points out his fault and blames him. He who *reprimands*, pretends to puniſh, and mortifies the offender.

We *reprove* a friend. We *reprimand* a child.

Reprove is ſeldom uſed but with reſpect to the faults of the mind; *reprimand*, with regard to the manners and conduct.

We ſometimes *reprove* one, who knows better than ourſelves. No one has a right to *reprimand* but ſuperiors.

Auſtere, Severe.

We are *auſtere* by our manner of living; *ſevere* by our manner of thinking.

Softneſs is the reverſe of *auſterity*; it is rare to paſs immediately from one to the other; a common regular

regular way of life is the medium between the two. Remiſſneſs and *ſeverity* are the two extremes, in one of which we are ſure to fall; few perſons being able to diſtinguiſh the true medium, which conſiſts in an exact and preciſe knowledge of the law.

We are *auſtere* only with reſpect to ourſelves; but we may be *ſevere*, as well with reſpect to others as ourſelves.

Enthuſiaſts give themſelves up to the exerciſes of *auſterity*; this was alſo once the cuſtom of recluſes. Some caſuiſts affect to diſtinguiſh themſelves by a *ſevere* morality, extending it even 'till it loſes ſight of every degree of reaſon.

An *auſtere* life conſiſts in the privation of pleaſures and conveniences; we ſometimes embrace it through a taſte of ſingularity, and would fain have it thought to proceed from a principle of religion. Morals too *ſevere* may, equally with morals too remiſs, wound the regularity of manners.

To *Appear*, *Seem*.

I know not how much I may differ from the reſt of my countrymen; but the verb *appear*, in my opinion, relates more to the eye; *ſeem*, more to the imagination.

An object always *appears* leſs, the farther it is off. Many things *ſeem* practicable, which cannot be carried into execution.

Faſt, *Hard*.

The ſenſe in which theſe words are accounted ſynonymous is that of quick motion; but *faſt* denotes quickneſs without force; *hard*, quickneſs with violence. Thus to run, ride, or rain *faſt*, implies a quicker motion than common; but to run, ride, or rain *hard*, ſome degree of force or violence.

With

With reſpect to work, *faſt* means expeditiouſly; *hard*, laboriouſly. Thus he who works *faſt*, will ſoon have done. He who works *hard*, will ſoon be weary.

Clock, Dial.

Theſe are both time-pieces, with this difference, that the *clock* ſtrikes; the *dial* does not. 'Tis for this reaſon we call that plate which determines time by a ſhadow in the ſun, a ſun-*dial*.

The *clock* tells the hour; the *dial* ſhews it.

Dials were long in uſe, before the invention of *clocks*.

Every, All.

Though the word *every* is more frequently made uſe of by itſelf, it is ſometimes connected with the word ONE; eſpecially when uſed as ſynonymous to *all*. As *all* of us; *every one* of us. Theſe expreſſions ſhew that *every* is rather particular, relating more to individuals; and that *all* is rather general, relating to the whole; the word ONE, being added to *every*, ſpecifying that determination.

Every includes always in its idea the word *all*, though *all* does not always include the word *every*; that is, *all* ſpeaks in general only, whereas *every* excepts none.

Every man is undoubtedly bound to aſſiſt his neighbour. *All* men are mercenary.

All ſeems to me to be the plural of *every*: *every* being conſtantly applied to the ſingular number; *all* to the plural. Thus we ſay *every* man, *every* thing, *every* part, &c. but *all* men, *all* things, *all* parts, &c.

Pity,

Pity, Compaſſion, Commiſeration.

I cannot ſay whether, in the characteriſing of theſe words, I may fall in with the opinion of the public; but with reſpect to the firſt two, *pity* ſeems to me to be rather particular, and to be uſed with moſt propriety, with regard to perſons we have ſome knowledge of; whereas *compaſſion* is more general, and may be uſed equally with reſpect to thoſe we know, as to thoſe we know not.

We are ſaid to *pity* the diſtreſſes of a friend; and *compaſſionate* the misfortunes of a ſtranger.

Pity ſeems moſt applicable to the firſt emotions we feel at the ſight or deſcription of an object in diſtreſs, riſing from tenderneſs of heart; *compaſſion* ſeems to reſult from reflection on the unmerited calamities of another, ſpringing from the trueſt benevolence.

Thus we ſay, it was through *pity* we were led to *compaſſionate* his caſe.

Beſides *compaſſion* may be uſed with propriety with reſpect to the brute creation, which *pity* cannot. Thus the killing of a lamb or the beating of a dog will excite the *compaſſion* of a perſon of feeling.

Commiſeration, in my opinion, implies a fellow-feeling, or the bearing a part in another's woe, and riſes from ſympathy.

We naturally *commiſerate* the ſorrows of one we love.

According to this interpretation of the words, we may *pity* and yet not have *compaſſion*; we may have both *pity* and *compaſſion*, yet not *commiſeration*.

The word *pity*, on ſome occaſions, has been made uſe of by way of contempt; as I *pity* her pride: but it ſeems here to be uſed rather ironically, than to imply in its real ſignification any degree of ſcorn.

Slippery, Glib.

Glibneſs implies a great degree of *ſlipperineſs*; *ſlipperineſs* a ſmall degree of *glibneſs*.

All ice is *ſlippery*; but that which is remarkably ſmooth is *glib*.

The proper and literal definition of *ſlippery* is, affording no firm hold or footing; that of *glib*, made eaſy to be moved. In this ſenſe, the firſt denotes ſomething natural; the laſt ſomething not ſo.

An eel is ſo *ſlippery* as to be difficult to hold. Wet weather, ſucceeded by a froſt, makes the ways *ſlippery*. Oiling the fly of a jack makes it run *glib*.

So, in the figurative ſenſe, ſpeaking of a woman fond of gallantry, we ſay ſhe is a *ſlippery* dame. Nothing is of a more *ſlippery* nature than true happineſs, it ſlides through the fingers, even while we think we hold it faſt. Strong liquor on different perſons has different effects: ſome it ſickens; others it ſtupifies; of others again it makes the tongue run ſo *glib*, as to be greatly entertaining.

END OF VOLUME I.